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Chapter 1
Introduction
Energy economics is a broad field offering the researcher opportunities to explore differ-
ent research questions that are inspired by real world energy systems including electricity
and resource markets and related environmental and climate issues. In this thesis, the
following four essays on energy economics, covering the above listed topics, are presented:
 Chapter 2: A test of the theory of nonrenewable resources - Controlling for market
power and exploration (based on Malischek and Tode, 2015)
 Chapter 3: Models of endogenous production capacity investment in spatial oligopolis-
tic markets
 Chapter 4: Modeling strategic investment decisions in spatial markets (based on
Lorenczik et al., 2014)
 Chapter 5: The future of nuclear power in France: an analysis of the costs of
phasing-out (based on Malischek and Tru¨by, 2014).
The essays are stand alone and may be read in any order. The selection of research
topics and methodologies presented in these essays is governed by the author’s interests,
the hope that by probing these markets new knowledge and understanding could be
gained, as well as by the adequacy of the methodologies to the respective topics.
This introduction provides a short summary of the four essays, including a discussion
of how each essay adds to existing literature and improves understanding of the topics
explored. The introduction concludes with reflections on future research and possible
improvements to methodologies for each of the four essays.
1
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1.1 Introducing the essays
Chapter 2 investigates one of the workhorse models of resource economics, the Hotelling
model of an inter-temporally optimizing resource extracting firm. The essay is based
on Malischek and Tode (2015) to which both authors contributed in equal parts. It
is motivated by recently sparked interest in Hoteling’s model as a result of new appli-
cations like Hans-Werner Sinn’s Green Paradox and the fact that, despite providing a
convincing theory of fundamental concepts like resource scarcity, empirical validations of
the Hotelling model are largely absent. This is usually attributed to data shortcomings
in the empirical analyses conducted so far or the simplifying assumptions made in the
baseline Hotelling model. Even though further work has therefore focused on theoretical
extensions of the standard Hotelling model, convincing empirical evidence for the theory
is still missing. The empirical analysis presented in Chapter 2 adds to the literature on
tests of the Hotelling model by extending the standard Hotelling model by exploration
activity as presented in Pindyck (1978) and market power as presented in Ellis and
Halvorsen (2002) and bringing this extended model, which is in essence a combination
of existing model extensions, to a newly constructed data set for the uranium mining
industry. Applying a Hausman test, we test whether a major resource extracting min-
ing firm in the industry is following the theory’s predictions. Our results show that the
theory is rejected in all considered settings. We therefore add to the existing literature
on negative results of the theory’s validity.
Chapters 3 and 4 turn to a different research stream in energy economics which is not
restricted to energy market applications but also draws on game theory and operations
research. The essays presented in the two chapters investigate the difference in market
outcomes under spot-market based trade as compared to long-term contract based trade
in oligopolistic markets with investments. The analysis is motivated by recent develop-
ments in resource markets, including the iron ore and the metallurgical coal markets,
which are experiencing a shift away from long-term contract-based trade towards spot-
market based trade. It is also relevant for electricity markets, which feature a mix of
differently traded products.
Chapter 3 analyzes the electricity market application of the impact of a shift away from
long-term contracts to spot-market based trading on supply, investment and welfare. It
takes an analytical approach and presents a spatial extension of the one node, peak and
base-load player model presented in Murphy and Smeers (2005). The extended model
consists of two markets and two players, representing a peak and a base-load producer,
which can each serve both markets. In the chapter, criteria are developed for the two
market structures to result in the same market outcome. Further, it is shown that, if
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divergent and under certain assumptions, supply, investments and consumer welfare are
higher under spot-market based trade than under long-term contracts.
Chapter 4 changes both methodology and market focus of the investigation, moving
from an analytical to an empirical analysis and from a simple electricity market model
to a detailed model of the global seaborne metallurgical coal market. The chapter is
based on Lorenczik et al. (2014) to which all three authors contributed in equal parts.
It presents for the first time the empirical solution of a large-scale spatial oligopolistic
spot-market based trade model with investments. The model drops the rather restrictive
assumptions posed on the number of players and their cost structures used in Chapter
3. The validity of the developed modeling approach is shown through various sensitivity
analyses. The results demonstrate in this more general context that supply, investments
and welfare are higher under spot-market based trade than under long-term contracts.
Chapter 5 investigates investment decisions in yet a different light than Chapters 3
and 4, namely by looking at the influence of uncertainty on investment decisions. It
is based on Malischek and Tru¨by (2014) to which both authors contributed in equal
parts. While previous work in this area of energy economics has mostly focused on
weather or fuel-price uncertainty, Chapter 5 focuses on the effect of policy uncertainty
on market outcomes. The topic is motivated by the central role policy frameworks play
in energy markets, in particular in electricity markets. This assertion is best illustrated
by the German and European electricity markets which are both strongly influenced
by numerous quotas, remuneration schemes and policy decisions against/in favor of
certain technologies. Further, the rapid speed at which policies may change poses a
significant amount of uncertainty to market participants. The recent history of German
nuclear policy after the Fukushima catastrophe, leading to the phase-out decision from
the technology just shortly after prolonged lifetimes of nuclear power plants had been
decided on, may serve as an illustration. In Chapter 5, we turn our attention to the
largest nuclear power producer in Europe, France. With France heatedly debating the
role of nuclear technology, we analyze how policy uncertainty regarding nuclear power
in France may feature in the French and European power sector. Different pathways
for nuclear policy in France are investigated using a stochastic linear programing model
of the European power system. The analysis shows that the costs of uncertainty in
this particular application are rather low compared to the overall costs of a nuclear
phase-out.
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1.2 Future research and possible improvements to method-
ologies
The four chapters address different research questions, each of which requires a differ-
ent methodology. Chapter 2 presents a quantitative analysis of an extended Hotelling
model. For this analysis, econometric methods are applied. Even though the baseline
Hotelling model is extended by the features of market power and exploration activity,
the theory could not be validated. The critique applied to previous literature may there-
fore also apply to the analysis presented here: First, the model may fail to incorporate
important features of the industry or of the decision-making process within the firm.
One such factor that industry participants might consider and which is not considered
in the model is uncertainty. For example, in the essay, despite uranium demand being
rather well predictable due to long lead times of nuclear power plant constructions and
the predictability of nuclear power plant shut downs, the events following the nuclear
accident at Fukushima show that uranium demand is subject to shocks and uncertainty.
A test for this particular shock is provided in the appendix to the chapter. The test
shows that the findings of the analysis do not not change by accounting for this shock.
A more in-depth analysis of shocks and an extension of the model to incorporate un-
certainty may, however, provide an interesting stream for further research, in particular
in light of testing other markets. Second, the data collected may be insufficient to cap-
ture the firm’s behavior in all detail. In response to this critique it may be noted that
the collected data are the best available to the authors and the particular choices and
assumptions made are documented in the appendix to the chapter.
In Chapters 3 and 4, strategic interaction of players in a game theory context is intro-
duced. While it is possible to derive analytically properties of a simple version of the
model in Chapter 3, the complexity of the model due to the large number of players
in Chapter 4 makes an analytical solution infeasible and therefore requires an empirical
analysis and computer assistance. Several extensions of the analysis presented in the two
chapters might be of interest. First, the restrictions imposed in Chapter 3 on the players’
cost structure may be too restrictive to apply to the important class of resource-market
applications. While the electricity-market application introduced in Chapter 3 is impor-
tant, further research could investigate more general cost structures and explore whether
the results may be extended to a more general context. Second, only one supply and one
investment period are considered in the models in Chapter 4. As investments usually
have a medium to longer-term horizon, taking into account several supply and invest-
ment periods might be more adequate. However, rapidly increasing computer run-time
when using more periods prohibited such an analysis. Third, investment decisions are
typically prone to uncertainty regarding certain parameters, like for instance demand.
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As with the issue of multiple time periods mentioned above, this analysis has not been
within the scope of the current modeling and computational power.
Chapter 5 uses a stochastic linear programing model of the European power system
to investigate the effect of policy uncertainty on system costs. Probably the most im-
portant critique to the analysis presented in Chapter 5 is that there are costs that are
not considered in the analysis. These costs include among others the costs of nuclear
catastrophes, the risk of operating nuclear plants and the costs of storing nuclear waste.
These costs are at best hard, if not to say, impossible to quantify. In order to keep the
analysis within the boundaries of the modeling approach taken and in order not to get
lost in discussions on the quantification of these costs, these costs are not included in
the analysis. Further, retrofit and investment costs for nuclear power plants can only
be approximated and are based on publicly-available resources. Clearly these costs are
prone to uncertainty and there is a large bandwidth of costs that could be considered rea-
sonable. Extending the work presented in Chapter 5 through various further sensitivity
analyses may be a promising avenue for future research.

Chapter 2
A test of the theory of
nonrenewable resources -
Controlling for market power and
exploration
Despite the central role of the Hotelling model within the theory of nonrenewable re-
sources, tests of the model are rarely found. If existent, these tests tend to ignore two
key features, namely market power and exploration. We therefore extend the literature
on tests of Hotelling’s theory by conducting an implicit price behavior test, incorporat-
ing for the first time the concepts of market power and exploration into a single model.
When applied to a newly constructed data set for the uranium mining industry, the null
hypothesis of the firm optimizing inter-temporally as implied by Hotelling’s theory is
rejected in all settings. However, parameter estimates of the model still yield valuable
information on cost structure, resource scarcity and market power. Our results suggest
that the shadow price of the resource in situ is comparably small at the beginning of the
observations and is therefore potentially overshadowed by market power. However, even
as the shadow price increases over time, firms still fail to incorporate it in their decision
making.
2.1 Introduction
There is hardly a field in economics that has been influenced by one single publication
as much as the field of resource economics. Harold Hotelling published his work on the
7
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economics of exhaustible resources in 1931 (Hotelling, 1931). The paper gained attention
in the 1970s due to the oil embargo and the subsequent energy crisis as well as the
debate initiated by Meadows et al. (1972). Even today, the assumption of inter-temporal
optimization within the nonrenewable resource industry, as introduced by Hotelling, is
the foundation for many policy recommendations as seen in Hans-Werner Sinn’s green
paradox (Sinn, 2008).
Even though Hotelling’s theory maintained academic attention for over 80 years, empir-
ical applications and tests of the theory are rarely found mainly due to the vast number
of influencing factors within the model paired with the unavailability of appropriate data
sets. However, in order to derive policy recommendations, such as the ones implied by
the green paradox, understanding the significance of the theory is crucial. Thus, the
question as to whether the scarcity of a nonrenewable resource influences the actual
decision-making process of a mining industry is the focus of this analysis.
This process depends on the value of the resource in situ (which can be represented
by the shadow price, the scarcity rent or the user cost) and whether it is large enough
to be incorporated into the firm’s choice of variables. The relative size of the shadow
price of the resource in situ compared to the full cost of production crucially depends on
different characteristics of the extraction and processing of the resource as well as the
market in which the firm is operating.
So far, the majority of empirical tests addressed methodological or data issues and hardly
found evidence of the practical relevance of Hotelling’s theory. Yet, two factors are
mostly ignored that directly influence the shadow price and a firm’s decisions. First, the
resource shadow price depends not only on the extraction decisions but also on decisions
made in order to increase the resource stock by exploratory activities. Exploration
influences the shadow price as under the assumption that lower cost deposits will be
produced first, increasing resource stock decreases extraction costs (Pindyck, 1978). For
that reason, exploration is a critical feature of mining industries (Krautkraemer, 1998).
Second, the market structure has impacts on a firm’s decision regarding extraction. For
instance, for a monopolistic producer of a nonrenewable resource, it might be optimal
to restrict production in order to increase prices (Lasserre, 1991). Further, the existence
of rents from market power might support a conjecture by Halvorsen (2008), namely
that the shadow price of the resource in situ is too small to be considered in a firm’s
decisions. The existence of rents from market power might therefore overshadow shadow
prices and hence, explain, why tests tend to reject the theory.
Given the relevance of market power and exploration in nonrenewable resource indus-
tries, we extend the literature on tests of Hotelling’s theory by conducting a test based
on the methodology introduced by Halvorsen and Smith (1991), incorporating for the
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first time the concepts of market power, as introduced by Ellis and Halvorsen (2002),
and exploration, as in Pindyck (1978) into a single model. Using data from a newly
constructed data set for the uranium mining industry, we study the consistency of the
behavior of the shadow price with the Hotelling model and perform an implicit price
behavior test for a major firm in the industry. We estimate two models: one accounting
only for the static optimality implied by the Hotelling model and another accounting
additionally for dynamic optimality. Applying a Hausman specification test, the null
hypotheses of the firm extracting the resource inter-temporally optimal is rejected in all
of the settings analyzed. Despite this rejection, parameter estimates of the model still
allow us to derive information on costs, resource scarcity and market power mark-ups.
These estimates suggest that the shadow price of the resource in situ is comparably
small at the beginning of the observations and may be overshadowed by market power,
which may explain why the firm fails to optimize inter-temporally. However, even as
steep increases in shadow prices occur in the later observations, the firm still fails to
incorporate its size into its decision making.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows: Section 2.2 presents existing
literature on the topic. Section 2.3 describes the theoretical model, while Section 2.4
introduces the applied econometric framework. Section 2.5 introduces the data used and
market considered. Test results and parameter estimates are discussed in Section 2.6.
Section 2.7 concludes.
2.2 Literature Review
Hotelling (1931) was the first to introduce and solve the inter-temporal optimization
problem in nonrenewable resource economics. As a consequence, the concept of the
shadow price of the resource in situ was also established. Academic and public interest
was low until the end of the second half of the last century when the publication of
Meadows et al. (1972) and Solow’s lecture on Hotelling’s model (Solow, 1974) boosted
interest in the theory of nonrenewable resource extraction. Subsequent additions to the
literature are extensively surveyed by Krautkraemer (1998). Today, Hotelling’s work is
considered to be the foundation of resource economics and plays a significant role in the
discussion on climate change and, e.g., in the discussion on the green-paradox (Sinn,
2008).
As academic interest rose, first tests of the theory were conducted. Different analyzes
have since been done, which Chermak and Patrick (2002) classified into two main groups:
price path and price behavior tests. Price path tests examine whether the price of a
nonrenewable resource changes according to Hotelling’s r-percent rule (i.e., whether
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the price increases at the rate of interest). None of the price path analyzes done by
Barnett and Morse (2013), Smith (1979) and Slade (1982) could find evidence for the
theory in actual data. However, these tests come with strong assumptions resulting from
simplifications in Hotelling’s model: First, technology is assumed to be constant over
time and second, the relation of extraction costs to the resource base and marginal costs
is not considered.
Price behavior tests incorporate the price path into the decision-making process of the
extracting firm. Explicit price behavior tests assume a process that consists of extraction
and direct selling of the nonrenewable resource. This implies that the extracted resource
is not processed and therefore marginal costs are simply given by the extraction costs.
The results of these analyzes are ambiguous: While Farrow (1985) and Young (1992)
reject the theory, Stollery (1983) and Slade and Thille (1997) obtain positive results
whereas Miller and Upton (1985) present mixed results. As Chermak and Patrick (2002)
point out, even though the test approach is similar across analyzes, data handling and
underlying assumptions vary strongly.
For most nonrenewable resources, processing of the resource is a necessary step (e.g.,
extraction of the mineral of interest from the ore) before the good can be sold. As
the majority of mining firms can, in general, be considered vertically integrated (i.e.,
offering both mining and processing of the resource), explicit price behavior tests are not
applicable to most nonrenewable industries. Implicit price behavior tests, on the other
hand, take vertical integration into account. The results of previous analyzes considering
implicit price behavior are again mixed. While Halvorsen and Smith (1991) reject the
theory, Chermak and Patrick (2001)1 obtain positive results. Caputo (2011) develops a
nearly complete set of the testable implications of the Hotelling model; however, he finds
that data inadequacies prevent testing all the implications of the theory. Compared to
Caputo’s analysis, the test in this paper could be considered to be only a partial test,
as we closely follow the approach of Halvorsen and Smith (1991).
Table 2.1 gives an overview of the tests conducted thus far and their main character-
istics.2 It becomes obvious that the tests do not only vary in their testing approach
but also in the data time resolution and level. Furthermore, almost all articles assume
perfect competition in the input and output markets. Exploration activities as a means
of increasing the resource base are generally not considered.
1Using data from Chermak and Patrick (2001) and the test approach of Halvorsen and Smith (1991),
Chermak and Patrick (2002) do not reject the theory.
2Table 2.1 is a slightly extended version of Table 1 in Chermak and Patrick (2002).
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Assumptions of perfect competition or monopoly market structure for nonrenewable
resource markets have been the norm ever since Hotelling (1931). The idea that this
may not be an appropriate assumption for the mining industry was first empirically
shown by Ellis and Halvorsen (2002). They extend the general Hotelling framework
with respect to a one-shot Nash-Cournot oligopoly and find that prices substantially
exceed marginal costs in an application to the international nickel industry. However,
these mark-ups can be attributed to a large extend to market power rather than the
resource scarcity rent.
The impact of exploration activities and an extension of the resource base on the
Hotelling framework was first investigated by Pindyck (1978). By allowing the firm
to simultaneously decide on exploration activities (with certain outcomes) and resource
extraction, they find that exploration activities and the resource price and production
path are related: With an increase in reserves comes an increase in production. How-
ever, as the discovery of further reserves and, hence, the exploration activity declines,
production also decreases. Subsequent research on exploration in the context of non-
renewable resources was surveyed by Cairns (1990) as well as Krautkraemer (1998). A
noteworthy empirical application was made by Pesaran (1990). By investigating explo-
ration and production decisions for oil at the United Kingdom continental shelf, they
find a reasonable degree of support for the theoretical consideration of exploration in
the Hotelling framework.
Our paper contributes to the existing stream of literature in several ways: First, we
extend the literature on empirical tests of Hotelling’s theory by means of incorporating
two important features of nonrenewable resource industries, namely, combining the the-
oretical extensions found in Ellis and Halvorsen (2002), with regard to market power,
and Pindyck (1978), with regard to exploration activity. Second, we conduct an im-
plicit price behavior test in the spirit of Halvorsen and Smith (1991) using a newly
constructed data set for the uranium mining industry. In order to address data limita-
tions, we apply a multiple imputations approach. Third, despite obtaining negative test
results, our analysis allows us to provide suggestions for why firms may not optimize
inter-temporally. More specifically, we find that among others market power mark-ups
may cast a shadow on the scarcity rent and therefore incentivize short-term rather than
long-term planning.
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Table 2.2: Notation
Abbreviation Explanation
State variables
χ Cumulative resource additions
S Amount of proven resources
Control variables
E Extraction rate
Q Rate of final output
B Exploration expenses
Parameters
T State of technology
P Market price of final output
W Market price of reproducible inputs (labor, capital)
X Amount of reproducible inputs (labor, capital)
r Real interest rate
λ1 Shadow price of reserves (i.e., resource in situ)
λ2 Shadow price of cumulative discoveries
Functions
f Exploration function
R Revenue function
U Utility function
V Firm-specific factor prices of competing firms
Y Exogenous global demand shifters
CR Restricted cost function
FTC Full total costs
FMC Full marginal costs
Subscripts
K Capital
L Labor
CAP Global thermal capacity of nuclear power plants
MFM Recycled warheads (“Megatons for Megawatts”)
INV Changes in global uranium inventories
LAU,LKZ Labor Australia, Kazakhstan
KAU,KKZ Capital Australia, Kazakhstan
SAU, SKZ Proven reserves Australia, Kazakhstan
2.3 Theoretical Model
We consider the optimization problem of a resource extracting and processing firm. The
firm faces an inverse residual demand function which is assumed to be given by
P (t) = P (Q(t), T (t), Y (t), V (t)) , (2.1)
where P denotes the price of the firm’s final product, Q the quantity of the firm’s
product, Y a set of exogenous demand shifters entering the demand system and V the
firm-specific factor prices of the other firms including, e.g., location-dependent costs for
labor and capital. The observable arguments of the residual demand curve are threefold:
own quantity, structural demand variables and the other firm’s cost variables. Modeling
of inverse residual demand curve hence closely follows Baker and Bresnahan (1988).
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The firm is assumed to maximize its profits U , which are defined as revenues minus full
total costs FTC:
U(t) = P (t) ·Q(t)− FTC(t). (2.2)
The necessary first order condition gives
FMC(t) =
∂FTC(t)
∂Q(t)
= P (t) +
∂P (t)
∂Q(t)
·Q(t), (2.3)
where FMC denotes the firm’s full marginal costs, obtained by taking the derivative of
the firm’s full total cost with respect to its own quantity.
In order to derive the firm’s full marginal costs, we have to analyze the firm’s decision-
making process in more detail. The firm operates a two-stage production process: In
the first stage of production, a nonrenewable resource is extracted and fed into the
second stage of production, where it is processed into a final output. We thus assume
a vertically integrated firm, which holds true for most companies in resource industries.
The production function of the firm is given by
Q(t) = Q(E(t), X(t), S(t), T (t)), (2.4)
where E is the extraction rate of the nonrenewable resource, X is the amount of re-
producible inputs (i.e., capital and labor), S the amount of proven resources and T the
state of technology.
Dual to this cost function is the restricted cost function of reproducible inputs, CR,
which is defined by
CR(t) = CR(Q(t), E(t),W (t), S(t), T (t)) (2.5)
with W denoting the market price of the reproducible inputs (see, e.g., Halvorsen
and Smith, 1984). The firm’s decision-making process is then given by the following
(generalized) Hotelling model
max
E(τ),Q(τ),B(τ)
∫ T
t
e−r(τ−t) [R(Q(τ))− CR(Q(τ), E(τ),W (τ), S(τ), T (τ))−B(τ)] dτ
(2.6)
subject to: χ˙(τ)− E(τ) = S˙(τ) (2.7)
f(B(τ), χ(τ)) = χ˙(τ) (2.8)
S(τ), Q(τ), B(τ), χ(τ), E(τ) ≥ 0. (2.9)
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As shown in Equations (2.7) and (2.8), our model incorporates the exploration activities
of the firm: Given a certain effort B and already discovered resources χ, new resources
χ˙ are found by means of the exploration function f(B,χ). Consequently, the avail-
able stock is equal to discoveries minus extracted quantities. Pindyck (1978) introduced
the concept of exploration into the Hotelling framework, arguing that producers “are
not endowed with reserves but must develop them through the process of exploration”
(Pindyck, 1978). Therefore, the producer’s choice set is increased by the decision to
invest in exploration activities. The approach in this article is to assume a set of char-
acteristics for the exploration function f . Those include (i) increasing discoveries with
increasing exploratory expenditures, (ii) diminishing marginal productivity and (iii)
the discovery decline condition (see, e.g., Pesaran, 1990). Letting λ1 and λ2 denote
the costate variables (or shadow prices) of Equations (2.7) and (2.8), we derive the
Hamiltonian of the optimization problem as
H(t) = R(Q(t))− CR(Q(t), E(t),W (t), S(t), T (t))−B(t)− λ1(t) · (χ˙(t)− E(t))
−λ2(t) · f(B(t), χ(t)). (2.10)
In the following, time arguments are omitted for improved readability. The static opti-
mality conditions, i.e., the first-order conditions of Equation (2.10) with respect to the
control variables E, B and Q, are given by
0 = −∂CR
∂E
+ λ1 (2.11)
0 = −1− (λ1 + λ2) · ∂f
∂B
(2.12)
0 =
∂R
∂Q
− ∂CR
∂Q
. (2.13)
Following the maximum principle, Equations (2.11) to (2.13) state that the Hamiltonian
has to be maximized by the control variables in every point in time t (Chiang, 2000).
Rearranging Equations (2.11) and (2.12), the static optimality conditions result in the
following equations for the shadow prices λ1 and λ2:
λ1 =
∂CR
∂E
(2.14)
λ2 = −
(
∂f
∂B
)−1
− ∂CR
∂E
. (2.15)
The interpretation of Equations (2.13), (2.14) and (2.15) is rather straightforward. Equa-
tion (2.13) states that the firm chooses output quantity Q such that the marginal rev-
enue equates the marginal changes in restricted costs CR. Equation (2.14) states that
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extraction is optimally chosen if marginal changes in restricted costs (due to changes
in extraction E) correspond to the shadow price of the resource in situ λ1. Finally,
Equation (2.15) gives the relationship between the shadow price of exploration λ2 and
changes in the exploration function f with respect to exploration expenditures B as well
as the shadow price of the resource in situ, which is equivalent to the marginal changes
in restricted costs with respect to extraction E. This illustrates that, even though the
restricted cost does not directly depend on the exploration activities, a connection exists
via the amount of proven resources S and the values λ1 and λ2.
The dynamic optimality conditions of the generalized Hotelling model follow from the
relation of the choice for the control variables and the state variables. The dynamic
optimality conditions give the optimal path for the shadow prices (see, e.g., Chiang,
2000, Wa¨lde, 2012)
λ˙1 =
∂CR
∂S
+ r · λ1 (2.16)
λ˙2 = (λ1 + λ2) · ∂f
∂χ
+ r · λ2. (2.17)
Inter-temporal changes in the shadow price of the resource in situ λ1 equate changes in
restricted costs CR with respect to the amount of proven resources S and the changes in
interest rates r. Similar, inter-temporal changes in λ2 result from variations in the inter-
est rates but also from changes in the exploration function f with respect to cumulative
resource additions χ3, weighted by both shadow prices.
2.4 Econometric Model
The restricted cost function covers different variable types: E is an intermediate good,
XL and XK are production inputs of capital and labor, respectively, Q is the output of
the final good, and S is an environment variable. We approximate the true restricted cost
function using an transcendental logarithmic (translog) functional form (see, e.g., Ellis
and Halvorsen, 2002, Ray, 1982). The small time-span covered by our data (compared
to innovation cycles in mining industries) allows us to exclude the state of the technology
T from the cost function. Therefore, the interaction terms of the translog-representation
of the restricted cost function are limited to the intermediate as well as the production
input and output variables. We median-adjust our independent variables, allowing for
first-order coefficient estimates to be interpreted as cost elasticities at the sample median
(Last and Wetzel, 2010).
3By the discovery decline condition: ∂f
∂χ
< 0.
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The restricted cost function is given by
lnCR = α0 + αQ lnQ+
∑
j
αj lnWj + αE lnE + αS lnS
+
1
2
∑
j
∑
k
γjk lnWj lnWk +
1
2
γQQ(lnQ)
2 +
1
2
γEE(lnE)
2
+
∑
j
γjQ lnWj lnQ+
∑
j
γjE lnWj lnE + γQE lnQ lnE (2.18)
with j ∈ {K,L} and L and K being subscripts for labor and capital. Symmetry and
homogeneity of degree one in inputs are given by the following restrictions:
γKL = γLK∑
j
αj = 1∑
j
γjQ =
∑
j
γjE =
∑
j
γjk =
∑
j
γkj = 0. (2.19)
We impose homogeneity in prices by dividing by one price and thus account for just one
price in the estimation. Symmetry conditions are imposed directly into the model.
In order to increase estimation efficiency, we incorporate cost share equations into our
system of equations. The cost share equations for production inputs follow directly from
the logarithmic differentiation of the implicit cost function with respect to input prices
(Ray, 1982):
MK = αK +
∑
j
γKj lnWj + γKQ lnQ+ γKE lnE (2.20)
ML = αL +
∑
j
γLj lnWj + γLQ lnQ+ γLE lnE (2.21)
with MK = WKXK/CR and ML = WLXL/CR equal to the shares of reproducible
inputs in restricted cost.
Following Equation (2.3), the supply relation requires an expression for full marginal
costs (FMC), which are given by the partial derivative of full total costs (FTC) with
respect to output quantity Q.
In our model, FTC are represented by the sum of restricted costs, exploration expen-
ditures, the shadow price of the resource in situ multiplied by the changes in resource
stock and the shadow price of exploration multiplied by the discoveries from exploration:
FTC = CR+B + λ1(f − E) + λ2f. (2.22)
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From this, we derive the FMC as
FMC =
∂FTC
∂Q
=
∂CR
∂Q
+
∂CR
∂E
∂E
∂Q
− λ1∂E
∂Q
=
∂CR
∂Q
(2.23)
given the firm sets E at its optimal level. Therefore, the full marginal costs contain no
direct expression of the unknown shadow prices λ1 and λ2 and therefore can be estimated
without further transformations (see also Ellis and Halvorsen, 2002).4 An expression for
the right-hand side is obtained inserting the specification for the restricted cost function,
i.e., Equation (2.18):
FMC =
∂CR
∂Q
=
∂ lnCR
∂ lnQ
CR
Q
= (αQ + γQQ lnQ+
∑
j
γjQ lnWj + γQE lnE)
CR
Q
. (2.24)
The relationship between the firm’s own price and quantity and the other firms’ supply
responses is given by the inverse residual demand curve, which we specify following the
methodology introduced in Baker and Bresnahan (1988). In other words, the inverse
residual demand curve of the firm of interest covers the firm’s price P and quantity Q as
well as the other firms’ factor prices V and global demand shifters Y . As shown in Baker
and Bresnahan (1988), estimation results are not sensitive to the particular specification
(i.e., log-log or linear-linear) of the inverse residual demand curve. For our application,
it is convenient to apply a linear-log specification as it simplifies further calculations.
Thus, the residual demand curve is specified as follows (Baker and Bresnahan, 1988):
P = β lnQ+
∑
k
%k lnVk +
∑
l
τl lnYl. (2.25)
In order to allow for time-varying mark-ups, we apply a semi-parametric approach fol-
lowing Ellis and Halvorsen (2002) and Diewert (1978) and represent β as a polynomial
function in time. In the subsequent estimation procedure, we estimate different func-
tional specifications for the polynomial representation of β. Overall, we find robust
estimation results among different specifications for β(t). Results suggest that specify-
ing the mark-up term as a biquadratic polynomial yields satisfactory results. Further
insights on this procedure are displayed in Appendix A.1. It follows the inverse residual
demand curve as
P = (β0 + β1T + β2T
2 + β3T
3 + β4T
4) lnQ+
∑
k
%k lnVk +
∑
l
τl lnYl. (2.26)
4Note however, that the price of the resource in situ is included in the full marginal costs.
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Having specified the FMC (Equation (2.24)) as well as the inverse residual demand curve
(Equation (2.26)), we can transform and use these estimation equations to obtain the
estimation equation for the supply relation, i.e., Equation (2.3). First, we take the first
derivative of price with respect to firm quantity
∂P
∂Q
=
∂P
∂ lnQ
∂ lnQ
∂Q
= (β0 + β1T + β2T
2 + β3T
3 + β4T
4)
1
Q
. (2.27)
The supply relation for estimation follows as
P = (αQ + γQQ lnQ+
∑
j
γjQ lnWj + γQE lnE)
CR
Q
− (β0 +β1T +β2T 2 +β3T 3 +β4T 4).
(2.28)
We apply the implicit price behavior test by Halvorsen and Smith (1991). In doing so,
we utilize the fact that estimation of the marginal cost function, cost share equation,
inverse residual demand curve and supply relation (i.e., Equations (2.18), (2.21), (2.26)
and (2.28), respectively) is consistent. The resulting estimates of this model represent
the static optimization problem of the firm. However it should be noted that as static
optimality in each point in time is a prerequisite for dynamic optimality, this result
can also represent the dynamically optimal solution. Under the null hypothesis that
the firm optimally extracted its resource, within the framework of the Hotelling model,
the addition of the first dynamic optimality condition given by Equation (2.16) in the
system of equations should result in consistent but more efficient estimates. Under the
alternative hypothesis, the extended model with the dynamic optimality condition is
inconsistent. We test the null hypothesis applying a Hausman specification test.
In order to estimate the model including the dynamic optimality conditions, we first
need to derive the discrete time form of the dynamic optimality condition (2.16), which
is given by
λ1(t) =
∂CR
∂S
(t) + (1 + r)λ1(t− 1). (2.29)
With
λ1 =
∂CR
∂E
=
∂ lnCR
∂ lnE
CR
E
= (αE + γEE lnE +
∑
j
γjE lnWj + γQE lnQ︸ ︷︷ ︸
aλ1
)
CR
E︸︷︷︸
bλ1
= aλ1bλ1
(2.30)
and
∂CR
∂S
=
∂ lnCR
∂ lnS
CR
S
= αS︸︷︷︸
cλ1
CR
S︸︷︷︸
dλ1
= cλ1dλ1 , (2.31)
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we obtain
aλ1(t)bλ1(t) = cλ1(t)dλ1(t) + (1 + r)aλ1(t− 1)bλ1(t− 1). (2.32)
Summarizing, we estimate two models and apply a Hausman specification test. The two
lists below summarize the equations used in each model.
Model 1 (without dynamic optimality condition):
1. The restricted cost function, Equation (2.18);
2. The cost share equation, Equation (2.21);
3. The inverse residual demand curve, Equation (2.26);
4. The supply relation, Equation (2.28).
Model 2 (with dynamic optimality condition):
1. The restricted cost function, Equation (2.18);
2. The cost share equation, Equation (2.21);
3. The inverse residual demand curve, Equation (2.26);
4. The supply relation, Equation (2.28);
5. The dynamic optimality condition, Equation (2.32).
Within our model, the market price of final output P , the quantity of final output Q,
as well as the extracted resource quantities E, are endogenous and need to be treated
in order to prevent biased estimates. Having to deal with endogeneity and simultaneous
equations, we utilize an iterative Three-Stage-Least-Squares approach (3SLS). Despite
being linear in parameters, our system of equations will be nonlinear in endogenous
variables due to transformations of the endogenous variables (e.g., interactions with
other variables and squaring). Even though nonlinear transformations of endogenous
variables are not necessarily a problem5, we follow Wooldridge (2002) (Chapter 9.5)
and use a set of squared and higher-order transformations of exogenous variables. In
addition to exogenous variables already used in our system of equations, we introduce
the following instrumental variables: lnQ3, lnQ4, lnS3, lnS4, lnP 3, lnP 4, T and T 2.
5With endogeneity corresponding to correlation of one variable with the error term, nonlinear trans-
formations may eliminate the correlation.
Chapter 2. A test of the theory of nonrenewable resources - Controlling for market
power and exploration 21
2.5 Data
We construct a data set for the Canadian uranium mining firm Cameco Corporation6.
We use quarterly firm-level data for the years 2002-2012. In our estimation, we therefore
work under the implicit assumption that all relevant information is consistent with this
level of aggregation.
Nowadays, uranium is a mineral that is used almost entirely to fuel nuclear power
plants. The market for uranium mining shows considerable concentration on the supply
side, with KazAtomProm, Cameco and Areva covering almost 50% of global uranium
production (as of 2013) (World Nuclear Association, 2014). These firms are vertically
integrated, i.e., they extract the ore, and later mill and process it via leaching to obtain
a uranium concentrate powder (yellowcake or U3O8) that is subsequently processed in
enrichment and fuel fabrication facilities, which are usually operated by other companies.
Yet, the subsequent processing steps do not alter the buyer and seller interaction, as
consumers (i.e., operators of nuclear power plants) directly purchase the yellowcake from
mining firms and afterwards contract subsequent fuel processing (e.g., Neff, 1984). In
the past, contracting was entirely based on long term agreements. However, nowadays
the spot market and spot price indices gained relevance also in terms of spot market-
related contractual agreements (TradeTech, 2011).
Even though uranium itself is abundant in the earth’s crust, most of the deposits are of
such low concentration that production is not profitable. Deposits with relevant uranium
concentration are found predominantly in Australia, Kazakhstan, Canada and Russia
and hence, making these regions targets for exploratory activity by mining firms. With
exploration expenditures of approx. 100 million U.S. dollars in 2012 (Cameco, 2012a)
it becomes clear that exploration is an important feature of the considered firm and
industry.
This short industry description illustrates that the uranium mining industry is suitable
for the proposed test of Hotelling’s theory for various reasons. First, firms are vertically-
integrated, i.e., they are producing and processing the nonrenewable resource. Second,
there is a considerable amount of market concentration. Third, exploration activity is
a relevant decision variable of uranium mining firms. Fourth, because of the time-span
necessary for nuclear power plants to pass authorization and construction, future de-
mand is comparably certain compared with other mining industries. Hence, short-term
price path deviations (Krautkraemer, 1998) are not to be expected. Fifth, consumption
of uranium has no externalities on the climate such as other nonrenewable resources.
6The decision to choose Cameco was made for no particular reason other than it showed a better
data availability compared to competing firms.
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Therefore, environmental externalities are not expected to alter the optimal path of
resource depletion. And sixth, the chemical alteration of uranium in the process of con-
sumption in nuclear power plants makes recycling of uranium almost impossible under
normal circumstances. This is contrary to most other resources used in previous tests,
e.g., nickel and copper. As reintroduction of recycled resources into the system, alters
the extraction path, uranium is in this regard a more suitable resource to consider.
The main data sources are introduced in the following, while a detailed description of
data sources and calculation steps is given in Appendix A.3. Extraction rate E, rate of
final output Q, exploration expenses B, market price of final output P , amount of proven
reserves S and the amount of reproducible inputs for labor XL and capital XK (using
the perpetual inventory method) are taken from Cameco (2012a) and Cameco (2012b).
Prices for reproducible input labor WL are based on Canadian average wages in the
mining industry (Statistics Canada, 2013a), and prices for capital WK are calculated
from producer price indices, depreciation rates and real rate of interest r˜ (Bank of
Canada, 2014b, Statistics Canada, 2013b).
The other firms’ factor prices V used for the estimation of the inverse residual de-
mand curve contain labor and capital costs as well as proven reserves. With the main
competitors of Cameco active in Kazakhstan and Australia, we approximate the other
firms’ factor prices using values for these countries (e.g., ABS, 2014b, Agency of Kaza-
khstan of Statistics, 2014c, Australia, 2013). The global demand shifters Y cover the
global thermal capacity of nuclear power plants (International Atomic Energy Agency,
2013), changes in global uranium inventories (Nuclear Energy Agency, 2011) and market
quantities from military warhead recycling through, e.g., the “Megatons to Megawatts
Program” (Centrus, 2014).
Specification of the exploration function f is done by testing different functional forms
using available firm-level data as well as extended data sets on Canadian exploration
expenditures and discoveries (Nuclear Energy Agency, 2006). As no functional form
proved consistent with (i) increasing discoveries with increasing exploratory expendi-
tures, (ii) diminishing marginal productivity and (iii) the discovery decline condition,
we have to assume that the multiplicative error term in the discovery function is large.
Given the relatively low number of observations available, it makes it impossible to
accurately estimate the exploration function.
Therefore, we use a functional form that deviates from the theoretic relationship specified
in Equation (2.8). In the following, we use a simplified variant, given by χ˙ = f(B):
χ˙(t) = B(t)
0.4829
(11.1) ω(t). (2.33)
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The error term associated with exploration activities is given by ω. The value in brackets
below the exponent of the exploratory expenditures B represents the resulting t-value
for this model.
This specification satisfies the conditions (i) and (ii) but can not account for the
discovery-decline phenomenon (iii). The insignificance of the discovery-decline con-
dition could correspond to numerous global discoveries made in recent years (similar
results are obtained by Pesaran, 1990).
While quarterly data for exploration expenditures B are published by the firm (see also
Appendix A.3), the amount of proven reserves S and hence resource additions χ˙ are only
available on an annual basis. Therefore, we follow Little and Rubin (2002) and use the
exploration function f to impute the resource additions χ˙. By using a multiple imputa-
tion approach, we create fifty different time series for the amount of resource additions
χ˙ and hence, proven reserves S. Thus, we have 50 different data subsamples that are
identical except for S and χ˙. We estimate each subsample individually. Using quarterly
data from 2002 to 2012 yields 44 unique observations per variable and subsample.7
2.6 Empirical Results
Prior to comparing the estimates for Model 1 and Model 2, we first need to define the
interest rate r in the dynamic optimality condition Equation (2.32) of Model 2. We
test the Hotelling model using different interest rates. Following Halvorsen and Smith
(1991), we test constant discount rates (r = 0.01 to 0.25) as well as variable interest
rates that are proportional to actual real (2012) Canadian interest rates r˜ (r = r˜ · 0.25
to r˜ · 4). This results in a total of 41 different interest rate settings to be tested. Having
50 data subsamples and 41 different interest rates gives a total of 50 estimation results
for Model 1 (i.e., one result per individually estimated subsample) and 2050 estimation
results for Model 2 (i.e., one result for every combination of the 50 subsamples with
the 41 different interest rates). In order to make the estimation results as tractable as
possible as well as to illustrate the distribution of results appropriately, we present the
mean values of estimates together with their standard deviation.
Our test results indicate a rejection of the null hypothesis for both the constant discount
rate (see Table 2.3) and the variable interest rate calculations (see Table 2.4) at least at
the 5%-level (except for two cases, which are significant at the 10%-level). Within our
7Obtaining a larger sample size is often impossible in the mining industry. Hence, 40 to 50 observa-
tions can be considered standard in this respect (e.g., Ellis and Halvorsen, 2002).
Chapter 2. A test of the theory of nonrenewable resources - Controlling for market
power and exploration 24
modeling approach, these results suggest that the firm’s behavior does not satisfy the
dynamic optimality condition.8
Table 2.3: Hausman test results for constant interest rates
Interest rate χ2 test statistic p-value
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
0.01 900.037 1038.959 0.047∗∗ 0.191
0.02 1181.12 1966.562 0.013∗∗ 0.056
0.03 1051.912 1385.697 0.028∗∗ 0.112
0.04 979.57 1254.118 0.045∗∗ 0.191
0.05 1035.038 1269.951 0.052∗ 0.218
0.06 1064.868 1526.222 0.026∗∗ 0.154
0.07 1262.86 1876.377 0.033∗∗ 0.143
0.08 1025.725 1240.366 0.029∗∗ 0.157
0.09 1151.013 1608.189 0.046∗∗ 0.18
0.1 1112.523 1648.475 0.024∗∗ 0.154
0.11 1041.461 1240.148 0.02∗∗ 0.129
0.12 1045.752 1220.42 0.025∗∗ 0.141
0.13 1037.033 1255.913 0.043∗∗ 0.196
0.14 1097.268 1434.342 0∗∗∗ 0.001
0.15 2846.733 11971.337 0.018∗∗ 0.111
0.16 1193.924 1847.219 0.046∗∗ 0.21
0.17 1178.983 1453.245 0.002∗∗∗ 0.011
0.18 1110.566 1521.609 0.008∗∗∗ 0.054
0.19 1005.5 1233.742 0.024∗∗ 0.151
0.2 925.503 1168.636 0∗∗∗ 0.003
0.21 1049.172 1282.834 0.019∗∗ 0.12
0.22 945.77 1134.375 0.024∗∗ 0.152
0.23 939.674 1130.028 0.004∗∗∗ 0.024
0.24 954.936 1159.637 0.023∗∗ 0.151
0.25 1530.604 3029.573 0∗∗∗ 0
∗∗∗ p < 0.01,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗ p < 0.1,+ p < 0.15
The critical value (CV) for p=0.01 is at 37.566
8In 326 models of the 2050 combinations of subsamples and interest rates, we find near-singular
matrices. This collinearity is not originating from a particular set of subsamples or interest rates, but
rather different combinations of them. Therefore, this statistical issue should be solely based on the
inappropriateness of certain interest rates for the rest of the data.
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Table 2.4: Hausman test results for proportional variations of the actual Canadian
interest rate r
Interest rate χ2 test statistic p-value
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
r · 0.25 1682.839 5031.267 0.029∗∗ 0.151
r · 0.5 1141.45 186.521 0.015∗∗ 0.076
r · 0.75 973.025 194.366 0.08∗ 0.251
r · 1 1139.035 172.047 0.05∗ 0.213
r · 1.25 1073.7 203.451 0.026∗∗ 0.154
r · 1.5 1179.135 179.52 0.034∗∗ 0.152
r · 1.75 1044.678 217.54 0.053∗ 0.22
r · 2 1509.901 209.176 0.025∗∗ 0.148
r · 2.25 1049.269 261.291 0.022∗∗ 0.143
r · 2.5 1024.811 279.253 0.025∗∗ 0.147
r · 2.75 1056.235 163.517 0.041∗∗ 0.166
r · 3 1210.659 159.604 0∗∗∗ 0
r · 3.25 1307.49 180.983 0.046∗∗ 0.207
r · 3.5 2358.77 211.189 0.004∗∗∗ 0.023
r · 3.75 1110.498 233.241 0.018∗∗ 0.116
r · 4 1147.636 231.08 0.004∗∗∗ 0.028
∗∗∗ p < 0.01,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗ p < 0.1,+ p < 0.15
The critical value (CV) for p=0.01 is at 37.566
Even though the null hypothesis is rejected, estimation results of Model 1 provide in-
formation on cost factors, market power and the shadow price of the resource in situ.
Table 2.5 gives the related mean values and standard deviations for coefficients, standard
errors and p-values.9,10
9Tables A.5, A.6, A.7 in Appendix A.3 provide quantiles and further descriptions of the distribution
of coefficient estimates, p-values and standard errors of the Model 1 estimation results.
10Note that γKK = −γLK = γLL = −γLK .
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Table 2.5: Estimation results for Model 1
Parameter Estimate p-value Std. Error
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
α0 20.715 0.034 3.14E-32
∗∗∗ 1.51E-31 0.105 7.41E-3
αQ 1.57E-8 1.92E-9 3.25E-5
∗∗∗ 2.28E-5 2.82E-9 2.02E-10
αK = 1− αL 0.102 1.26E-5 1.36E-45∗∗∗ 4.13E-46 1.11E-4 1.88E-6
αE 2.116 0.092 9.23E-9
∗∗∗ 1.49E-8 0.211 0.015
αS -0.204 0.134 0.174 0.219 0.116 0.039
γKK -4.72E-4 1.90E-4 0.237 0.161 3.49E-4 4.20E-5
γQQ 1.34E-8 2.46E-9 0.104
+ 0.050 7.58E-9 5.80E-10
γEE 1.665 0.313 0.031
∗∗ 0.059 0.606 0.090
γKQ = −γLQ -9.39E-9 1.56E-9 0.021∗∗ 0.023 3.47E-9 3.12E-10
γKE = −γLE 2.35E-3 6.44E-5 2.89E-8∗∗∗ 2.27E-8 2.59E-4 6.83E-6
γQE -1.93E-8 2.14E-9 5.68E-4
∗∗∗ 4.14E-4 4.53E-9 4.36E-10
β0 -18.297 1.909 7.66E-4
∗∗∗ 2.18E-3 3.910 0.270
β1 0.038 0.090 0.741 0.188 0.209 0.020
β2 0.112 0.017 1.11E-3
∗∗∗ 8.78E-4 0.028 2.61E-3
β3 -8.98E-4 2.32E-4 0.318 0.133 8.45E-4 6.83E-5
β4 -1.84E-4 3.81E-5 0.011
∗∗ 8.55E-3 6.13E-5 5.87E-6
τMFM 14.216 8.742 0.617 0.176 26.319 1.589
τCAP 93.717 17.295 0.324 0.096 91.125 4.263
%LAU 14.580 1.400 0.028
∗∗ 0.014 6.012 0.123
%LKZ 10.609 1.984 0.076
∗ 0.074 5.183 0.282
%KAU 25.376 3.004 0.049
∗∗ 0.031 11.694 0.778
%KKZ 8.555 0.811 0.041
∗∗ 0.025 3.809 0.205
τINV 10.713 0.101 3.66E-16
∗∗∗ 8.69E-17 0.419 4.96E-3
%SAU 19.788 2.295 0.016
∗∗ 8.31E-3 7.268 0.276
%SKZ -4.434 2.130 0.513 0.210 6.446 0.373
Observations 50×44
Adjusted R2 Eq. (2.18): mean 0.55 std. dev. 0.05, Eq. (2.21): mean 0.68 std. dev. 0.02,
Eq. (2.26): mean 0.02 std. dev. 0.22, Eq. (2.28): mean 0.55 std. Dev. 0.05
∗∗∗ p < 0.01,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗ p < 0.1,+ p < 0.15
Given the logarithmic form in Equation (2.19) as well as the convergence point set at
the sample median, first-order coefficients for this equation represent the logarithmic
first-order partial derivatives of the cost function and, thus, the cost elasticities at the
sample median. Alternatively, the level-log specification of Equation (2.26) gives the
absolute change in prices P under a percentage change in the independent variables
(i.e., own quantity Q, the other firms factor prices V and global demand shifters Y ).
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A majority of coefficients are statistically significant at the 1%- and 5%-level. Fur-
thermore, the first-order coefficients for the cost function (2.19) follow intuition: costs
increase with higher costs for labor, capital, increased extraction and higher final output.
Larger reserves tend to result in lower extraction costs. This estimate is not statistically
significant at the 10%-level for all, but some subsamples. The mean p-value is at 0.238
with a standard deviation of 0.256. This illustrates that a considerable amount of sub-
samples give statically significant results also for the amount of reserves. With respect to
the inverse residual demand function in Equation (2.26), the coefficients for own quan-
tity is of the expected sign whereas the other coefficients have no clear interpretation
as they reflect direct and indirect effects due to adjustments made by competing firms
(Baker and Bresnahan, 1988). The estimated coefficients are of plausible magnitude.11
Apart from our main finding, that the firm seems to fail to optimize inter-temporally,
the estimation results for the cost function allow us to also highlight firm/industry
cost characteristics. First, processing of the good into the final output is much less cost
intensive as is the extraction of the resource: Increasing extraction E by 1% corresponds
to an average approximate increase in costs by 2.414%, whereas increasing output Q by
1% hardly changes costs. Second, increasing the reserves, i.e., the resource base, by 1%
through exploration results in an average approximate reduction in production costs of
0.188%.
The estimation results allow us to to directly calculate the market power mark-up in
Equation (2.23) from the difference in the market price of final output P and ∂CR/∂Q,
which equals the FMC if the firm optimally chooses its control variables. Note that the
FMC also include the price of the resource in situ.
Figure 2.1 illustrates the Lerner index calculated from our model.12 The mean value of
the Lerner index is given by the solid line, while the dark gray ribbon illustrates the
standard deviation from the mean values. The light gray ribbon captures all subsample
results. The graph clearly shows a substantial mark-up over marginal costs of approxi-
mately 0.5 for the first half of the last decade and a clearly decreasing trend towards zero
in the first half of 2012. Given that the mark-up corresponds to such a large share of
the final output price for most of the observations, it becomes apparent that firms may
optimize their output with respect to this mark-up rather than the optimal depletion of
the resource.
11Due to the logarithmic form of the restricted cost function, all α- and γ-coefficients represent per-
centage changes in the dependent variable with respect to changes in the corresponding independent
variables. Therefore, plausible magnitudes are single-digit. Under the level-log specification of the in-
verse residual demand curve, all β-, τ - and %-coefficients give level changes in the dependent variable,
i.e., P , with respect to percentage changes in the independent variables. As the price levels vary between
31.75 and 57.38 (see Table A.14), plausible coefficient magnitudes are in the lower half of the two-digit
spectrum.
12The Lerner index is given by (P − ∂CR/∂Q)/P .
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Figure 2.1: Lerner index
However, Figure 2.1 shows that the mean value of the Lerner index drops below zero in
five observations. This represents prices below FMC. The latter four points suggests
that shocks from the global financial crisis in 2008 and the shut down of several nuclear
power plants in the aftermath of the Fukushima nuclear disaster might be the source of
these results. We test these suggestions (see Appendix A.2) and find that there seems
to be no shock effect impacting global price setting at these observations. As for 2003
Q2, no immediate explanation for the negative value can be given.
Figure 2.2: Indexed shadow price of the resource in situ (2002 Q1=100)
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Further conclusions can be drawn from the development of the shadow price (i.e., the
scarcity rent) of the resource in situ. For this, we derive an index of scarcity, as done in
Halvorsen and Smith (1984), by computing an indexed version of the shadow price λ1
given in Equation (2.30). The value for the first quarter of 2002 is set at 100. Figure 2.2
shows a drastic increase in shadow price of the resource in situ and, thus, an increasing
scarcity of the resource. The solid line represents the mean value, the dark gray ribbon
gives the standard deviation and the light gray ribbon illustrates the minimum and
maximum values, similar to Figure 2.1. The nonexistence of ribbons at 2008 Q3 suggests
that there is a data issue of some sort as the source of the negative spike in the Lerner
index. The steep increase in the shadow price at the latter observations might be the
source of the negative Lerner index for 2012 Q2 and Q3. While the relative market
power mark-up is large at the beginning of the observations, the firm might have based
extraction decisions mainly on mark-ups originating from market power. However, for
the latter observations, the shadow price of the resource in situ increases steeply and the
firm fails to incorporate this development in their price setting. As the shadow price of
the resource in situ is a part of the FMC, this might explain the negative Lerner index.
2.7 Discussion and Conclusions
In this paper, we conduct an implicit price behavior test based on the methodology intro-
duced by Halvorsen and Smith (1991). We extend the literature on tests of Hotelling’s
theory by incorporating for the first time the concepts of market power, as introduced by
Ellis and Halvorsen (2002), and exploration, as in (Pindyck, 1978) into a single model.
Applying the test to a newly constructed data set for the uranium mining industry, we re-
ject the null hypothesis of the firm optimizing inter-temporally. This complements prior
research, which mostly failed to find evidence for the empirical validity of Hotelling’s
model.
Parameter estimates show that there exists a substantial mark-up over marginal costs
that does not account for the shadow price of the resource in situ for the earlier observa-
tions and lower and even negative mark-ups over marginal costs for later observations.
For the earlier observations, only a very small share of market prices can possibly rep-
resent resource user costs. This changes as the shadow price of the resource in situ
increases steeply over time. The negative mark-up illustrates that the firm fails to as-
sess the shadow price appropriately. Our results suggest that the hypothesis of Halvorsen
(2008) partly holds, i.e., that the shadow price of the resource in situ may be too small to
be considered in a firm’s decision-making process and that the mistake firms are making
by not optimizing inter-temporally optimal may be small. Nonetheless, we find that
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even as the shadow price increases steeply, firms fail to incorporate this development
appropriately in their price setting.
Furthermore, and as already stated by Halvorsen and Smith (1991), inadequacy of the
theoretical model could be another likely reason for the theory to be rejected. Possible
reasons for this inadequacy can be found in the assumptions made in the model. As we
assume a uniform price for the good, we omit issues of transaction costs and imperfect
information (also regarding foresight).
Similar to the tests previously performed in other analyzes, our results put the predictive
power of the theory for nonrenewable resources into question. However, regardless of
the (comparably) predictable uranium demand due to long nuclear reactor construction
times, uncertainty prevails in the market, e.g., as a result of unknown international
inventories. Therefore, relaxing the assumption regarding perfect foresight could be a
promising next step in testing the theory of nonrenewable resources.
Chapter 3
Models of endogenous production
capacity investment in spatial
oligopolistic markets
This paper introduces two different models of production capacity investment and supply
in spatial oligopolistic markets. In the models explored in the paper, players make
decisions about investment in production capacity and supplies to each market. Supplies
are constrained by the players’ production capacity and are therefore dependent on
both their existing capacities and the investment decision. Markets and players are
spatially dispersed which leads to asymmetry in the cost structures. Two different time
structures regarding players’ decisions are analyzed: In the ’open-loop’ model, which
represents a market based on long-term contracts, investment and supply decisions are
taken simultaneously (e.g. the product is sold at the moment the investment decision
is taken). In the ’closed-loop’ model, which represents a market based on spot markets,
players decide on supply, given observed prior investment decisions. For a two node-two
player Cournot electricity market setting, the paper presents an existence and uniqueness
result for the open-loop model and discusses criteria for investment and supply results for
the two models to coincide or differ. The paper concludes that closed-loop investments
and supplies are larger or equal than those resulting in the corresponding open-loop
model, leading to higher consumer surplus in the closed-loop model.
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3.1 Introduction
Spatial oligopolies are characterized by a small number of producers supplying regionally
separated markets. Next to the production costs, transportation costs and transporta-
tion constraints are important determinants in these markets. Resource markets, like
those for oil, gas and coal as well as electricity markets are the prototype examples of
spatial oligopolies as these markets typically feature a small number of large players and
are generally not fully competitive.
Because of its theoretical and empirical importance, spatial oligopolies have been studied
extensively in economic research. This includes empirical work analyzing market struc-
ture, trade flows and prices in resource markets, e.g., for steam coal markets (Haftendorn
and Holz, 2010, Kolstad and Abbey, 1984, Tru¨by and Paulus, 2012), metallurgical coal
markets (Graham et al., 1999, Tru¨by, 2013), natural gas markets (Gabriel et al., 2005,
Growitsch et al., 2013, Holz et al., 2008, Zhuang and Gabriel, 2008), wheat markets
(Kolstad and Burris, 1986), oil markets (Huppmann and Holz, 2012) or for iron ore
markets (Hecking and Panke, 2014) as well as for electricity markets (Jing-Yuan and
Smeers, 1999, Lise et al., 2006).
Previous work on spatial oligopolies has mostly ignored investment decisions, despite
the fact, as highlighted for instance in Huppmann (2013), that the capacity constraints
used in the analysis strongly impact the results. Huppmann (2013) therefore extends the
model to account for endogenous capacity expansion assuming simultaneous decisions
on supply and investment volumes by the players. This can be interpreted as pointed
out in Murphy and Smeers (2005) as a market organized along long-term contracts, i.e.,
at the moment the investment decision is taken the product is sold. This clearly is an
accurate description for some markets and may also serve as a good approximation to
other markets.
However, in recent years, there is a gradual shift away from long-term contracted trading
towards spot-market based trading in several important energy markets. Examples can
be found for resource markets, like the coking coal market or the market for liquified
natural gas. Electricity markets are also increasingly governed by a mix of long-term
and spot-market based trade.
The difference in market structure not only influences trade flows, prices and supply
decisions but also investment decisions. A priori it is not clear whether more spot-
market based trade will result in higher investment or not. First, long-term trade reduces
risk for investors and might therefore create a more stable environment for investments
which should lead to more investments than under spot-market based trade. Second, it
might also be argued that the inability of a producer to commit over a longer term to
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a production profile under spot-market based trade corresponds to a higher degree of
competition and therefore leads to higher investment than under long-term based trade.
With players anticipating this strategic effect, however, it is not clear how this will play
out and an easy ranking of the different market outcomes is not obvious.
In light of this debate, this paper analyzes the influence of different market structures
on investment decisions and market outcomes in deterministic spatial oligopolies. Two
market structures are considered: In the first model, the so-called open-loop Cournot
model, players decide simultaneously on their supplies and investments. This can be
interpreted as a market organized along long-term contracts. In the second model,
players play a two-stage game. In the first stage, players decide on their investment
level. In the second stage, having observed the investment decisions of all players, a
spot market game is played, i.e., players decide on their production levels. This type
of model is called a closed-loop Cournot model and can be interpreted as a market
organized along spot-market trade.
The effect on investment decisions and market outcome from moving from long-term con-
tract based trading towards spot-market based trading was first systematically analyzed
in Murphy and Smeers (2005). The authors look at a simplified one node electricity mar-
ket featuring two players, one being the peak-load and the other the base-load producer.
The authors provide conditions for divergence of open-loop and closed-loop model re-
sults and give existence and uniqueness criteria for the closed-loop model. Further, they
show that investments and supplies may be larger in the closed-loop model compared
to the open-loop model, leading to higher overall welfare in the closed-loop model.
A further line of research in this area is provided by Wogrin et al. (2013b), which provides
criteria for open-loop and closed-loop investment models to coincide showing results in
the spirit of Kreps and Scheinkmann (1983). Further, in Wogrin et al. (2013a), the
authors introduce mathematical programming solution methods to this type of model
for a one-node electricity market.
The above analyses only considered the case of one demand region. Lorenczik et al.
(2014) were the first to extend the oligopolistic capacity expansion model to a spatial
setting. In an application to the coking coal market, the authors model several demand
and supply nodes, considering also existing capacities available to the players. The
authors show that in a spatial application with non-generic data and existing capaci-
ties available to the players, equilibria are likely to deviate between the two modeling
approaches. They also provide a quantification of the magnitude of the divergence be-
tween closed-loop and open-loop model results with the difference being rather small for
welfare, but not for investments and supplies.
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Despite the contribution of Lorenczik et al. (2014), until now a systematic analytical
treatment for the spatial capacity investment problem is lacking. This paper attempts
to close in part this research gap by presenting an extension of the analysis presented
in Murphy and Smeers (2005) to the spatial setting. As in Murphy and Smeers (2005),
two players are modeled, one representing a peak-load producer, the other a base-load
producer. The analysis is extended from the one demand region case considered in
Murphy and Smeers (2005) to the spatial setting of two markets with player specific
transportation costs to each market. Further, and again in contrast to Murphy and
Smeers (2005), also existing capacities of the players are considered in the model. This
extension is particularly valuable as, as shown in the following, existing capacities may
be another reason not highlighted before for model results to be different between the
two models.
Altogether, the setup may be interpreted as a simple electricity market setting, where
the physical constraints on transport flows are approximated by transportation costs.
While the rather restrictive assumptions on the players’ cost structures, which are tai-
lored to the typical peak-load / base-load producer structure in electricity markets, are
probably to narrow to be applied to the important resource market case, the analy-
sis presented here may serve as a starting point for further investigations into resource
markets. Further, the setting may be applicable to other markets with pronounced and
predictable demand variation.
The analysis shows that the main findings of Murphy and Smeers (2005) can be extended
to the spatial setting: First, an existence and uniqueness result for the spatial open-loop
model is presented as well as closed-form solutions of the open-loop model can be derived.
Second, the paper presents general criteria for model results of the spatial open-loop and
closed-loop capacity expansion models to coincide respectively to diverge and identifies
overcapacity in the market through existing capacities as a new driver for model results
to diverge. Third, the paper provides a comparison of the open-loop and closed-loop
model results showing that investments and supplies may be larger in the closed-loop
model than in the open-loop model, leading to higher consumer surplus in the closed-loop
model in these settings.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 3.2 describes the notation
used in this paper. Section 3.3 introduces the open-loop model and states the main
existence and uniqueness result. Section 3.4 presents the closed-loop model. Section 3.5
provides the main results regarding the comparison of open-loop and closed-loop models.
Section 3.6 concludes.
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3.2 General framework
A spatial, homogeneous good market consisting of two producers i = 1, 2 and two
demand regions j = 1, 2 is considered. Producers may own existing production capacity
cap0i . They decide on both investment in new production capacity yi as well as on their
supplies to the two markets at times t = 1, ..., T . The supply from producer i to market
j at time t is given by xti,j . Total production of producer i at time t is hence given by∑
j x
t
i,j . It is limited by the producer’s capacity limit cap
0
i + yi. Figure 3.1 illustrates
the spatial structure of the model.
 
i1 i2 
j1 j2 
Figure 3.1: Spatial structure of the model: The vertices i1, i2 represent the two pro-
ducers, j1, j2 represent the markets. The arrows indicate possible flows from producers
to markets.
Investment expenditures for producer i are given by Cinvi . The investment cost function
Cinvi is assumed to be linear. With ki denoting marginal investment costs, it is therefore
given by
Cinvi (yi) = ki · yi.
Newly-built capacity is assumed to produce at the same cost as existing capacity. The
variable cost function Cvar,ti is assumed to be linear. Variable costs are composed of
transportation costs τi,j per unit delivered from producer i to market j as well as variable
production costs vi. Both transportation costs and variable production costs are assumed
to be time independent. Total variable costs of producer i at time t therefore amount
to
Cvar,ti (x
t
i) =
∑
j
xti,j · (τi,j + vi) =
∑
j
xti,j · δi,j ,
with xti = (x
t
i,j)j denoting the production vector of producer i at time t.
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Market prices P tj in market j at time t are given by a linear inverse demand function,
i.e.,
P tj = a
t
j − b ·
∑
i
xti,j .
with the slope b being independent of time and the same for both markets.
Producers are assumed to maximize profits. Depending on the assumed time and infor-
mation structure, different model types arise:
 If investment and supply decisions are taken at the same time, an open-loop game
with capacity investments is obtained. This type of model is introduced in Section
3.3 and can basically be solved via the KKT conditions of the players’ optimization
problems. The model can be interpreted as representing a market organized around
long-term contracts.
 If investment and supply decisions are taken successively in time, a closed-loop
model is obtained. This model type is introduced in Section 3.4 and can be inter-
preted as representing a market organized around spot markets.
The relation of the closed-loop and the corresponding open-loop problem is at the core of
the analysis presented in Section 3.5. In order to facilitate the analysis, more structure
is added to the model, namely an extension of the base/peak producer cost structure
introduced in Murphy and Smeers (2005) is assumed in the following. In this set-
up, one producer, the base-load producer (denoted with subscript b) has a supply cost
advantage but an investment cost disadvantage compared to the other producer, the
peak-load producer (denoted with subscript p), i.e.,
xlow(j) · δp,j +Kp < xlow(j) · δb,j +Kb and
xhigh(j) · δb,j +Kb < xhigh(j) · δp,j +Kp
for levels of supply xlow(j) < LEVEL(j) < xhigh(j) and a supply threshold LEVEL(j).
This additional structure enables and facilitates the proofs in Section 3.5. It allows to
characterize when model results coincide respectively diverge between the two models as
well as to rank model results with respect to investment and supplies. The structure fits
well for one important market class, electricity markets. However, adding this structure
also comes at a price as for several important markets these assumptions might not be
appropriate, like for resource markets.
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3.3 The open-loop Cournot model: Simultaneous invest-
ment and supply decisions
In the open-loop Cournot model, producers simultaneously make their investment and
supply decision with the objective to maximize profits. In doing so, producers take into
account their capacity restrictions and their influence on price. In the Cournot case
considered here, the influence on price is given by
∂P tj
∂xti,j
= b for all i. Producer i solves
the optimization problem
max
xti,yi
[∑
t
∑
j∈J
P tj · xti,j −
∑
t
Cvar,ti (x
t
i)− Cinvi (yi)
]
subject to
P tj = a
t
j − b · (xti,j + xt−i,j), ∀j, t
cap0i + yi −
∑
j
xti,j ≥ 0, ∀t (λti)
xti,j ≥ 0, ∀j
yi ≥ 0.
Note that producer i assumes in his optimization the supplies xt−i,j of the other producer
as given. The dual variable to the firm’s capacity constraint is given by λti.
Any solution to the above optimization problem satisfies the short-term Karush-Kuhn-
Tucker (KKT) conditions
0 ≤ δi,j − [atj − b · (xti,j + xt−i,j)] + b · xti,j + λti ⊥ xti,j ≥ 0, ∀j, t
0 ≤ cap0i + yi −
∑
j
xti,j ⊥ λti ≥ 0, ∀t
as well as the long-term KKT condition
0 ≤ ki −
∑
t
λti ⊥ yi ≥ 0.
In equilibrium, the KKT conditions for both players have to hold simultaneously. Ex-
istence and uniqueness of the open-loop Cournot equilibrium can be proven using the
theory of variational inequalities (see Harker and Pang, 1990, for an overview of the
theory of variational inequalities).
Theorem 3.1. There exists an open-loop Cournot equilibrium and it is unique.
Proof. See Appendix B.1.
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Note that the KKT conditions are necessary and sufficient to solve the open-loop Cournot
model due to the quasi-concave objective function and the convexity of the restrictions.
Apart from the general existence and uniqueness result presented in Theorem 3.1, in the
present context it is possible to derive the closed-form solution of the open-loop Cournot
model. This is done in Appendix B.1 for the one-period case and a sketch is provided
of the derivation in the multi-period case.13
3.4 The closed-loop Cournot model: Successive investment
and supply decisions
In the closed-loop Cournot model, producers play a two-stage game. The timing is as
follows:
 In the first stage, producers simultaneously decide on their investments.
 In the second stage, producers choose their production and supplies, based on
observed investment decisions of the first stage.
This structure can be interpreted as a market organized along spot markets. An equi-
librium to this problem is subgame perfect and solving the model leads into the class of
EPECs, see e.g. the overviews presented in Ehrenmann (2004) or Gabriel et al. (2012)
for a general introduction to EPECs. The model is solved by backward induction, i.e.,
by first solving for the optimal solution of the second stage, the short-run problem.
3.4.1 The short-run problem
For a given investment vector y = (yi, y−i), the short-run problem of producer i is given
by
max
xti
[∑
t
∑
j∈J
P tj · xti,j −
∑
t
Cvar,ti (x
t
i)
]
subject to
P tj = a
t
j − b · (xti,j + xt−i,j), ∀j, t
cap0i + yi −
∑
j
xti,j ≥ 0, (λti)
xti,j ≥ 0, ∀j.
13Note that the existence and uniqueness result holds under much weaker assumptions than the peak-
load / base-load producer setting analyzed here.
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In the short-run problem, producer i decides on his production and supplies while taking
the decisions of the other producer as given. Producer i also takes his capacity constraint
into account, the dual variable of which is given by λti. Further, Cournot behavior is
assumed. The corresponding KKT conditions to this problem are then given by
0 ≤ δi,j − [atj − b · (xti,j + xt−i,j)] + b · xti,j + λti ⊥ xti,j ≥ 0, ∀j, t
0 ≤ cap0i + yi −
∑
j
xti,j ⊥ λti ≥ 0, ∀t.
In the short-run equilibrium, the KKT conditions of both players have to hold simultane-
ously. Let xti,j(y) or x
t
i,j(yi, y−i) denote the short-run equilibrium for a given investment
vector y = (yi, y−i).
Lemma 3.2 provides a characterization of the short-run equilibrium. Note, however that
short-run equilibrium curve is typically non-differentiable and has jump points. This
feature was explored in detail in Murphy and Smeers (2005) for the one demand node
case and also applies to the two demand node case considered here. The further analysis
will abstract from these issues of differentiability.
Lemma 3.2. xti,j(yi, y−i) is unique for given (yi, y−i) as well as left and right differen-
tiable with respect to yk, k = i,−i.
Proof. See Appendix B.2.
3.4.2 The long-run problem
In the first stage of the closed-loop problem, the long-run problem, producer i chooses
his investment in order to maximize profits for a given investment strategy of the other
producer (y−i) under consideration of the resulting short-run equilibrium. The long-run
problem for producer i can be stated as
max
yi
[∑
t
∑
j∈J
P tj · xti,j(yi, y−i)−
∑
t
Cvar,ti (x
t
i(yi, y−i))− Cinvi (yi)
]
subject to
P tj = a
t
j − b · [xti,j(yi, y−i) + xt−i,j(yi, y−i)], ∀j, t
yi ≥ 0.
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Combining the short-run and the long-run problem, the following MPEC for producer i
is obtained, hereafter referred to as MPECi:
max
Ωi
[∑
t
∑
j∈J
P tj · xti,j −
∑
t
Cvar,ti (x
t
i)− Cinvi (yi)
]
subject to
yi ≥ 0,
P tj = a
t
j − b · (xti,j + xt−i,j), ∀j, t
0 ≤ δk,j − [atj − b · (xtk,j + xt−k,j)] + b · xtk,j + λtk ⊥ xtk,j ≥ 0, ∀j, t and k = i,−i
0 ≤ cap0k + yk −
∑
j
xtk,j ⊥ λtk ≥ 0, ∀t and k = i,−i.
Producer i considers the investment y−i of the other producer as given and optimizes
over the choice set Ωi = {yi; (xtk,j , λtk)k,j,t}. The first stage decision variable is separated
from the second stage (decision and dual) variables by a semicolon as the latter are
indirectly determined by the first stage choices.
Definition 3.3. An investment strategy (y˜i, y˜−i) is a closed-loop equilibrium if for all
i, y˜i solves i’s MPEC problem MPECi given y˜−i.
The problem of finding a closed-loop equilibrium is hence of EPEC type in the sense of
Gabriel et al. (2012).
3.5 Comparing the open-loop and the closed-loop invest-
ment model
In order to compare the open-loop and closed-loop model solutions, properties of the
short run curve xti,j(y) for a given time point t are analyzed. The following cases,
disregarding some of the symmetric cases, can be distinguished:
1. Both players produce and supply both markets, i.e., xti,j > 0 for all i, j
2. Player 1 supplies both markets, player 2 only market 1, i.e., xt1,1 > 0, x
t
1,2 > 0,
xt2,1 > 0 and x
t
2,2 = 0
3. Player 1 supplies both markets, player 2 none, i.e., xt1,1 > 0, x
t
1,2 > 0, x
t
2,1 = 0 and
xt2,2 = 0
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4. Player 1 supplies market 1, player 2 supplies market 2, i.e., xt1,1 > 0, x
t
1,2 = 0,
xt2,1 = 0 and x
t
2,2 > 0
5. Player 1 supplies market 1, player 2 does not supply, i.e., xt1,1 > 0, x
t
1,2 = 0,
xt2,1 = 0 and x
t
2,2 = 0
Each of the cases has the following sub-cases, the composite cases are referred to in the
obvious way by (1a) to (5d).
(a) Both players produce at full capacity
(b) Both players do not produce at full capacity
(c) Player 1 produces at full capacity, player 2 does not
(d) Player 1 does not produce at full capacity, player 2 does
In the further analysis, a different characterization of the solution to the closed-loop
problem is used. For this, let Bux
t
i,j(y) =
∂xti,j(y)
∂yu
, u = 1, 2. A closed-loop solution then
satisfies, abstracting from the problems of differentiability of the short run equilibrium
curve alluded to in the previous section,
0 ≤ −
∑
t
∑
j∈J
[atj − 2bxti,j(y)− bxt−i,j(y)− δti,j ] ·Bixti,j(y)
+
∑
t
∑
j∈J
bxti,j(y) ·Bixt−i,j(y) +Ki ⊥ yi ≥ 0. (3.1)
The following lemma characterizes Bux
t
i,j(y).
Lemma 3.4. For the cases described above it holds:
1. All produce and supply both markets
(1a)
∑
j B1x
t
1,j(y) = 1 and B2x
t
1,j(y) = 0∑
j B2x
t
2,j(y) = 1 and B1x
t
2,j(y) = 0
(1b) B1x
t
1,j(y) = 0 and B2x
t
1,j(y) = 0
B2x
t
2,j(y) = 0 and B1x
t
2,j(y) = 0
(1c)
∑
j B1x
t
1,j(y) = 1 and
∑
j B2x
t
1,j(y) = 0
B2x
t
2,j(y) = 0 and
∑
j B1x
t
2,j(y) = −0.5
(1d) B1x
t
1,j(y) = 0 and
∑
j B2x
t
1,j(y) = −0.5∑
j B2x
t
2,j(y) = 1 and
∑
j B1x
t
2,j(y) = 0
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2. Player 1 supplies both markets, player 2 only market 1
(2a)
∑
j B1x
t
1,j(y) = 1 and B2x
t
1,j(y) = 0
B2x
t
2,1(y) = 1 and B1x
t
2,1(y) = 0
B2x
t
2,2(y) = 0 and B1x
t
2,2(y) = 0
(2b) B1x
t
1,j(y) = 0 and B2x
t
1,j(y) = 0
B2x
t
2,j(y) = 0 and B1x
t
2,j(y) = 0
(2c)
∑
j B1x
t
1,j(y) = 1 and
∑
j B2x
t
1,j(y) = 0
B2x
t
2,1(y) = 0 and B1x
t
2,1(y) = −0.5B1xt1,1
B2x
t
2,2(y) = 0 and B1x
t
2,2(y) = 0
(2d) B1x
t
1,j(y) = 0 and B2x
t
1,1(y) = −0.5 and B2xt1,2(y) = 0
B2x
t
2,1(y) = 1 and B1x
t
2,1(y) = 0
B2x
t
2,2(y) = 0 and B1x
t
2,2(y) = 0
3. Player 1 supplies both markets, player 2 none
(3a)
∑
j B1x
t
1,j(y) = 1 and B2x
t
1,j(y) = 0
B2x
t
2,j(y) = 0 and B1x
t
2,j(y) = 0
(3b) B1x
t
1,j(y) = 0 and B2x
t
1,j(y) = 0
B2x
t
2,j(y) = 0 and B1x
t
2,j(y) = 0
(3c)
∑
j B1x
t
1,j(y) = 1 and B2x
t
1,j(y) = 0
B2x
t
2,j(y) = 0 and B1x
t
2,j(y) = 0
(3d) B1x
t
1,j(y) = 0 and B2x
t
1,j(y) = 0
B2x
t
2,j(y) = 0 and B1x
t
2,j(y) = 0
4. Player 1 supplies market 1, player 2 supplies market 2
(4a) B1x
t
1,1(y) = 1 and B2x
t
1,1(y) = 0
B1x
t
1,2(y) = 0 and B2x
t
1,2(y) = 0
B2x
t
2,2(y) = 1 and B1x
t
2,2(y) = 0
B2x
t
2,1(y) = 0 and B1x
t
2,1(y) = 0
(4b) B1x
t
1,j(y) = 0 and B2x
t
1,j(y) = 0
B2x
t
2,j(y) = 0 and B1x
t
2,j(y) = 0
(4c) B1x
t
1,1(y) = 1 and B2x
t
1,1(y) = 0
B1x
t
1,2(y) = 0 and B2x
t
1,2(y) = 0
B2x
t
2,j(y) = 0 and B1x
t
2,j(y) = 0
(4d) B1x
t
1,j(y) = 0 and B2x
t
1,j(y) = 0
B2x
t
2,2(y) = 1 and B1x
t
2,2(y) = 0
B2x
t
2,1(y) = 0 and B1x
t
2,1(y) = 0
Chapter 3. Models of endogenous production capacity investment in spatial oligopolistic
markets 43
5. Player 1 supplies market 1, player 2 none
(5a) B1x
t
1,1(y) = 1 and B2x
t
1,1(y) = 0
B2x
t
1,1(y) = 0 and B1x
t
1,2(y) = 0
B2x
t
2,j(y) = 0 and B1x
t
2,2(y) = 0
(5b) B1x
t
1,j(y) = 0 and B2x
t
1,j(y) = 0
B2x
t
2,j(y) = 0 and B1x
t
2,j(y) = 0
(5c) B1x
t
1,1(y) = 1 and B2x
t
1,1(y) = 0
B2x
t
1,1(y) = 0 and B1x
t
1,2(y) = 0
B2x
t
2,j(y) = 0 and B1x
t
2,2(y) = 0
(5d) B1x
t
1,j(y) = 0 and B2x
t
1,j(y) = 0
B2x
t
2,j(y) = 0 and B1x
t
2,j(y) = 0
Proof. See Appendix B.2.
It is easy to see that when there are time points of type (2c) or (2d), then it is the
peak player that is not supplying to one market. This distinction can only be made due
to the special cost structure assumptions made on the players. From this and Lemma
3.4, the two main relations, summarized in the following theorem, between closed-loop
and open-loop solutions are derived. The theorem shows that the existence of time
points of types (1c), (1d), (2c) or (2d) leads to the solutions of the two model types
to fall apart. If not present, the two model results coincide. The theorem illustrates
that the solutions basically fall apart when one player can influence the decisions of
the other player through his own actions. Note that the cases (1c), (1d), (2c) or (2d)
also include the interesting case of markets with overcapacity. With one player having
existing overcapacity, open-loop and closed-loop model results may fall apart.
Theorem 3.5. a) When there is no time point of the closed-loop equilibrium of types
(1c), (1d), (2c) or (2d), then the closed-loop equilibrium is the same as the corresponding
open-loop equilibrium.
b) When there is a time point of the closed-loop equilibrium of types (1c), (1d), (2c)
or (2d), then the closed-loop equilibrium is different from the corresponding open-loop
equilibrium.
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Proof. Proof of part a): Applying Lemma 3.4 to Equation (3.1) it follows that
0 = −
∑
t
∑
j∈J
[atj − 2bxti,j(y)− bxt−i,j(y)− δti,j ] ·Bixti,j(y)
+
∑
t
∑
j∈J
bxti,j(y) ·Bixt−i,j(y)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
+Ki
= −
∑
t
∑
j∈J
[atj − 2bxti,j(y)− bxt−i,j(y)− δti,j ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
λti
·Bixti,j(y) +Ki
= −
∑
t
λti
∑
j∈J
Bix
t
i,j(y) +Ki
= −
∑
t
λti +Ki
which shows that the closed-loop equilibrium is the same as the corresponding open-loop
equilibrium.
Proof of part b): Applying Lemma 3.4 to Equation (3.1), it holds for the player whose
capacity is not fully used
0 = −
∑
t
λti,j +Ki +
∑
t∈(1c),(1d),(2c) or (2d)
∑
j∈J
bxti,j(y) ·Bixt−i,j(y)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
< −
∑
t
λti +Ki
which shows that the solutions fall apart. Similar reasoning applies for the other cases.
It further holds for both the open-loop and the closed-loop model that if the capacity is
binding for the peak player, it is also be binding for the base player. From this it follows
that for the closed-loop equilibrium
Kb >
∑
t
λtb and Kp =
∑
t
λtp
if there are time points of types (1c), (1d), (2c) or (2d). This relationship will be key
input in proving the following theorem comparing capacity investment in the open-loop
and closed-loop model, which shows that the existence of time points of types (1c),
(1d), (2c) or (2d) leads to investments being larger in the closed-loop model than in the
open-loop model. Moreover, in this case it holds that it is the base player who might
invest more in the closed-loop model and that overall supply is larger. In the case of
symmetric markets, consumer welfare is larger in the closed-loop model.
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Theorem 3.6. a) The capacity investment in a closed-loop equilibrium is at least as
large as the capacity investment in the corresponding open-loop equilibrium. It is larger
when there are time points of types (1c), (1d), (2c) or (2d).
b) The base capacity investment in the closed-loop equilibrium is at least as large as in
the open-loop equilibrium.
c) The supplies in the closed-loop model are at least as large as the supplies in the
open-loop model.
d) In case of symmetric markets, i.e., aj = a, overall consumer welfare in the closed-loop
model is at least as large as in the open-loop model.
Proof. Proof of part a): Let the superscripts c and o stand for the closed-loop and open-
loop equilibrium. The theorem is proven by contradiction distinguishing two cases.
Case 1: Suppose that yob+y
o
p > y
c
b+y
c
p and y
o
p > y
c
p. It suffices to show that
∑
t λ
t,c
p > Kp,
which yields the desired contradiction.
The long-term open-loop equilibrium condition yields
∑
t λ
t,o
p = Kp. It remains to be
shown that λt,cp > λ
t,0
p for some t. For this let λ
t,o
p > 0 for some t. This implies∑
j
xt,op,j − cap0p = yop > ycp ≥
∑
j
xt,cp,j − cap0p. (3.2)
Further, since the peak capacity is binding, also the base capacity is binding, i.e.,
∑
j
xt,ob,j − cap0b = yob .
Combining these two relations it follows
∑
j
xt,op,j−cap0p+
∑
j
xt,ob,j−cap0b = yop+yob > ycp+ycb ≥
∑
j
xt,cp,j−cap0p+
∑
j
xt,cb,j−cap0b . (3.3)
Adding Equations (3.2) and (3.3) and simplifying, it follows that
2
∑
j
xt,op,j +
∑
j
xt,ob,j > 2
∑
j
xt,cp,j +
∑
j
xt,cb,j
from which
λt,cp > λ
t,o
p
and hence the desired contradiction follows.
Case 2: Suppose that yob+y
o
p > y
c
b+y
c
p and y
o
b > y
c
b . It suffices to show that
∑
t λ
t,c
b > Kb,
which yields the desired contradiction.
The long-term open-loop equilibrium condition yields
∑
t λ
t,o
b = Kb. It remains to be
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shown that λt,cb > λ
t,o
b for some t. For this let λ
t,o
b > 0. From this it follows∑
j
xt,ob,j − cap0b = yob > ycb ≥
∑
j
xt,cb,j − cap0b . (3.4)
Case 2.1: Let λt,op > 0. This implies∑
j
xt,op,j − cap0p = yop.
Adding this to Equation (3.4) it follows
∑
j
xt,op,j−cap0p+
∑
j
xt,ob,j−cap0b = yop+yob > ycp+ycb ≥
∑
j
xt,cp,j−cap0p+
∑
j
xt,cb,j−cap0b . (3.5)
Adding Equations (3.4) and (3.5) and simplifying as above, the desired result again
follows.
Case 2.2: Let λt,op = 0. Adding the short-run open-loop equilibrium conditions for the
peak player, it follows
∑
j
δtp,j −
∑
j
atj + 2b
∑
j
xt,op,j + b
∑
j
xt,ob,j = 0
and for the closed-loop equilibrium
∑
j
δtp,j −
∑
j
atj + 2b
∑
j
xt,cp,j + b
∑
j
xt,cb,j + 2λ
t,c
p = 0.
From this, it can be concluded that
2b
∑
j
xt,op,j + b
∑
j
xt,ob,j = −
∑
j
δtp,j +
∑
j
atj
≥ −
∑
j
δtp,j +
∑
j
atj − 2λt,cp
= 2b
∑
j
xt,cp,j + b
∑
j
xt,cb,j . (3.6)
Adding Equation (3.4) multiplied by 3b and Equation (3.6) and simplifying the desired
contradiction follows.
Proof of part b): Suppose that yop < y
c
p. Together with y
o
p + y
o
b < y
c
p + y
c
b it follows
2yop + y
o
b < 2y
c
p + y
c
b . Let Kp =
∑
t′ λ
t′,c
p +
∑
t′′ λ
t′′,c
p where λ
t′,c
p > 0 and λ
t′′,c
p = 0. Since
λt
′,c
p > 0 implies λ
t′,c
b > 0, it holds that
2
∑
j
xt
′,o
p,j −2cap0p+
∑
j
xt
′,o
b,j −cap0b ≤ 2yop+yob < 2ycp+ycb = 2
∑
j
xt
′,c
p,j−2cap0p+
∑
j
xt
′,c
b,j −cap0b
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from which λt
′,o
p > λ
t′,c
p follows. Therefore,
Kp =
∑
t′
λt
′,c
p +
∑
t′′
λt
′′,c
p <
∑
t′
λt
′,o
p +
∑
t′′
λt
′′,o
p = Kp,
a contradiction. Proof of part c): It holds that yob ≤ ycb and yop + yob < ycp + ycb .
Case 1: Suppose that λt,cp > 0. Then λ
t,c
b > 0 and∑
j
xt,op,j +
∑
j
xt,ob,j ≤ cap0p + yop + cap0b + yob < cap0p + ycp + cap0b + ycb =
∑
j
xt,cp,j +
∑
j
xt,cb,j
from which the result follows.
Case 2: Suppose now that λt,cp = 0 and λ
t,c
b > 0. It then holds at (x
t,c
p , ycb)∑
j
δtp,j −
∑
j
atj + 2b
∑
j
xtp,j + b(cap
0
b + yb) = 0 (3.7)∑
j
δtb,j −
∑
j
atj + b
∑
j
xtp,j + 2b(cap
0
b + yb) + 2λ
s
b = 0. (3.8)
Taking the derivative with respect to yb, it follows that
∑
j x
t
p,j + cap
0
b + yb decreases as
yb decreases while both conditions (3.7) and (3.8) continue to hold. From this the claim
follows by distinguishing cases of the decrease of yb from y
c
b towards y
o
b .
Proof of part d): The claim follows readily by adding up the two consumer surpluses of
the markets.
3.6 Conclusions
This paper presents two models of capacity investments in spatial markets. The first
model, the open-loop Cournot model, assumes that players decide simultaneously on in-
vestments and supplies. The second-model, the closed-loop Cournot model assumes that
supply decisions are made based on observed prior investment decisions. Both models
have real world interpretations; whereas the first model represents markets organized
along long-term contracts, the second model represents markets organized along spot
markets. This dichotomy between the two market structures is particularly apparent in
resource and electricity markets in which recently a shift away from long-term to more
spot-market based trading has been observed and a mix of differently traded products
exists.
In a simple electricity market setting several results are obtained: First, an existence
and uniqueness result for the open-loop case is derived. Second, the paper provides a
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comparison of open-loop and closed-loop model results presenting criteria for the results
of the two models to coincide respectively to diverge. The analysis shows the important
role of existing capacities in the model and the role they play for market outcomes to
coincide or diverge. And third, the paper shows that supplies and investments in the
closed-loop model may be larger than in the open-loop model under certain assumptions
regarding cost and demand structure, resulting in higher consumer welfare in the closed-
loop model in these cases.
Several promising research streams may be conducted based on the findings presented
here. First, further research needs to be directed towards investigating existence and
uniqueness in closed-loop capacity investment models. Previous analysis has shown that
in other closed-loop settings existence and uniqueness is highly parameter dependent
and moreover pure strategy equilibria may not exist. Second, also regarding effective
empirical programing and solution techniques more work needs to be conducted. Up to
now, only relatively small-scale closed-loop models have been solved successfully empir-
ically. Scaling these techniques up to generate effective solution strategies also for larger
models would be a significant contribution. Third, the cost and demand structure in the
analysis presented here is just one relevant case, particularly suited for electricity market
applications. More general cost and demand structures might need to be considered for
the important class of resource market applications.
Chapter 4
Modeling strategic investment
decisions in spatial markets
Markets for natural resources and commodities are often oligopolistic. In these markets,
production capacities are key for strategic interaction between the oligopolists. We an-
alyze how different market structures influence oligopolistic capacity investments and
thereby affect supply, prices and rents in spatial natural resource markets using math-
ematical programing models. The models comprise an investment period and a supply
period in which players compete in quantities. We compare three models, a perfect
competition and two Cournot models, in which the product is either traded through
long-term contracts or on spot markets in the supply period. Tractability and practical-
ity of the approach are demonstrated in an application to the international metallurgical
coal market. Results may vary substantially between the different models. The metal-
lurgical coal market has recently made progress in moving away from long-term contracts
and more towards spot market-based trade. Based on our results, we conclude that this
regime switch is likely to raise consumer rents but lower producer rents, while the effect
on total welfare is negligible.
4.1 Introduction
Markets for natural resources and commodities such as iron ore, copper ore, coal, oil
or gas are often highly concentrated and do not appear to be competitively organized
at first glance. In such markets, large companies run mines, rigs or gas wells and trade
their product globally. In the short term, marginal production costs and capacities are
given and determine the companies’ competitive position in the oligopolistic market.
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However, in the longer term, companies can choose their capacity and consequently
alter their competitive position.
Investing in production capacity is a key managerial challenge and determining the
right amount of capacity is rarely trivial in oligopolistic markets. Suppliers have to take
competitors’ reactions into account not only when deciding on the best supply level but
also when choosing the best amount of capacity.
In this paper, we introduce three different models to address this capacity expansion
problem in oligopolistic natural resource markets under varying assumptions of market
structure and conduct. Moreover, we pursue the question as to how different market
structures influence capacity investments, supply, prices and rents. The models comprise
two periods: an investment period and a supply period in which players compete in
quantities. We explicitly account for the spatial structure of natural resource markets,
i.e., demand and supply regions are geographically separated and market participants
incur distance-dependent transportation costs.
The first model assumes markets to be contestable; hence investment follows competi-
tive logic. Solving this model yields the same result as would be given by a perfectly
competitive market. The second model assumes the product to be sold through long-
term contracts under imperfect competition. Even though supply takes place in period
two, the supply and investment decisions are made simultaneously in period one. The
long-term contract that is fulfilled in period two determines the level of capacity invest-
ment in period one. Any production capacity that is different from the one needed to
produce the quantity of the best-supply equilibrium in period two reduces the respec-
tive players profits and is not a Nash equilibrium. The outcome is termed ’open-loop
Cournot equilibrium’ and corresponds to the result of a static one-period Cournot game
(accounting for investment costs). The third model assumes that investment and supply
decisions are made consecutively: In period one, when investment takes place, none of
the oligopolists can commit to their future output decision in period two (unlike in the
open-loop case). In period two, when the market clears, the investment cost spent in
the first period is sunk and the players base their output decision solely on production
cost. The resulting equilibrium is termed ’closed-loop Cournot equilibrium’ and may
differ from the open-loop outcome.
Intuitively, the lack of commitment in the closed-loop game and therefore the repeated
interaction of the oligopolists would suggest a higher degree of competition and thus
lower prices and higher market volumes than in the open-loop equilibrium. However, the
players anticipate this strategic effect and make their investment decisions accordingly.
How prices and volumes rank compared to the open-loop game is parameter-dependent
and requires a numerical analysis. As discussed for instance in Fudenberg and Tirole
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(1991) in a more general context, each player in the closed-loop model has a strategic
incentive to deviate from his first period open-loop action as he can thereby influence
the other players’ second period action. Applying this general economic framework to
the capacity expansion problem examined in this paper, indeed tends to lead to higher
investment and supply levels in the closed-loop model and hence to lower prices.
Computing open-loop games is relatively well understood, and existence and uniqueness
of the equilibrium can be guaranteed under certain conditions (see, e.g., Harker, 1984,
1986, Takayama and Judge, 1964, 1971). The open-loop Cournot model can be solved
via the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions as a mixed complementarity problem (MCP).
Oligopolistic spatial equilibrium models have been widely deployed in analyzing resource
markets, without taking investments decisions into account, e.g., for steam coal markets
(Haftendorn and Holz, 2010, Kolstad and Abbey, 1984, Tru¨by and Paulus, 2012), met-
allurgical coal markets (Graham et al., 1999, Tru¨by, 2013), natural gas markets (Gabriel
et al., 2005, Growitsch et al., 2013, Holz et al., 2008, Zhuang and Gabriel, 2008), wheat
markets (Kolstad and Burris, 1986), oil markets (Huppmann and Holz, 2012) or for iron
ore markets (Hecking and Panke, 2014). Investments in additional production capacity
have been analyzed for example in Huppmann (2013) with investment and production
decisions being made simultaneously and therefore implicitly assuming a market struc-
ture with long-term contracts.
Closed-loop models are computationally challenging due to their non-linear nature. De-
pending on the problem this can be resolved. Gabriel and Leuthold (2010) for instance
model an electricity market with a Stackelberg leader using linearization to guarantee
a globally optimal solution. Closed-loop models in energy market analysis have pri-
marily been used to study restructured electricity markets (e.g., Daxhelet and Smeers,
2007, Shanbhag et al., 2011, Yao et al., 2008, 2007). Murphy and Smeers (2005) and
Wogrin et al. (2013a,b) have analyzed the implications of closed- and open-loop model-
ing on market output and social welfare as well as characterized conditions under which
closed- and open-loop model results coincide.
Our two-stage model consists of multiple players on both, the first and second stage (in-
vestment in period one and supply in period two), and therefore existence and unique-
ness of (pure strategy) equilibria cannot be guaranteed. The closed-loop model, which
is formulated as an Equilibrium Problem with Equilibrium Constraints (EPEC), is im-
plemented using a diagonalization approach (see, e.g., Gabriel et al., 2012). In doing
so, we reduce the solution of the EPEC to the solution of a series of Mathematical Pro-
grams with Equilibrium Constraints (MPEC). Concerning the solution of the MPECs
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we implement two algorithms, grid search along the investment decisions of the individ-
ual players and a Mixed Integer Linear Program reformulation following Wogrin et al.
(2013a).
We demonstrate the tractability and practicality of our investment models in an appli-
cation to the international metallurgical (or coking) coal trade. Metallurgical coal is,
due to its special chemical properties, a key input in the process of steel-making. The
market for this rare coal variety is characterized by a spatial oligopoly with producers
mainly located in Australia, the United States and Canada competing against each other
and providing the bulk of the traded coal (Bowden, 2012, Tru¨by, 2013). The players
hold existing mining capacity and can invest into new capacity. Investment and mining
costs differ regionally. Key uncertainties in this market are demand evolution and price
responsiveness of demand. We therefore compute sensitivities for these parameters to
demonstrate the robustness of our results.
Our findings are generally in line with previous results found in the literature on two-
period games with players choosing capacity and output, i.e., we find that prices and
supply levels in the closed-loop game fall between those in the perfect competition and
the open-loop game (see, e.g., Murphy and Smeers, 2005). If investment costs are low
compared to variable costs of supply, the strategic effect of the two-stage optimiza-
tion in the closed-loop game diminishes. With investment costs approaching zero, the
closed-loop result converges to the open-loop result. Hence, the closed-loop model is
particularly useful for capital-intensive natural resource industries in which the product
is traded on spot markets.
The numerical results for supply levels, prices and rents in the metallurgical coal market
analysis differ markedly between the three models. Consistent with actual industry in-
vestment pipelines, our model suggests that the bulk of the future capacity investment
comes from companies operating in Australia followed by Canadian and US firms. Start-
ing in 2010, the metallurgical coal market has undergone a paradigm shift, moving away
from long-term contracts and more towards a spot market-based trade – with similar
tendencies being observed in other commodity markets such as the iron ore trade. In
light of our findings, this effect is detrimental to the companies’ profits but beneficial to
consumer rents. The effect on welfare is negligible: Gains in consumer rents and losses
in producers’ profits are of almost equal magnitude.
The contribution of this paper is threefold: First, by extending the multi-stage in-
vestment approach to the case of spatial markets, we introduce a novel feature to the
literature on Cournot capacity expansion games. Second, we outline how our modeling
approach can be implemented and solved to analyze capacity investments in natural
resource markets. We thereby extend previous research on natural resource markets,
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which has typically assumed capacities to be given. Finally, we illustrate and discuss
the model properties on the basis of a real-world application to the international met-
allurgical coal trade and draw conclusions for this market. In doing so, we also take
into account existing capacities of the players and hence incorporate a feature which
to our knowledge has been ignored in previous work on multi-stage Cournot capacity
expansion games. By comparing open- and closed-loop model results, we illustrate pos-
sible consequences of the ongoing regime switch from long-term contracts to a more
spot market-based trade in the international metallurgical coal market. Our analysis in
particular allows for the first quantification of the magnitude of the divergence between
open- and closed-loop model results in a real-world application.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 4.2 describes the models
developed in this paper and Section 4.3 provides details about their implementation.
The data is outlined in Section 4.4, results are presented in Section 4.5. Section 4.6
discusses computational issues and Section 4.7 concludes.
4.2 The Model
We introduce three different approaches to the capacity expansion problem – two open-
loop models and a closed-loop model. In the open-loop models, all players decide simul-
taneously on their investment and production levels, whereas in the closed-loop model
all players first decide on their investment levels simultaneously and then, based on ob-
served investment levels, they simultaneously decide on their production levels. The two
open-loop models vary in their underlying market structure: one model assumes perfect
competition, the other model assumes Cournot competition with a competitive fringe.
The closed-loop model also assumes Cournot competition with a competitive fringe.
While similar open-loop models have previously been studied, the introduced closed-loop
model varies from existing closed-loop models by taking into account also the spatial
structure of the market as well as considering existing capacities of the players.
4.2.1 General Setting and Notations
Table 4.1 summarizes the most relevant nomenclature used throughout this section.
Additional symbols are explained where necessary. We assume a spatial, homogeneous
good market consisting of producers i ∈ I, production facilities m ∈ M and demand
regions j ∈ J . Each producer i owns production facilities m ∈ Mi ⊂ M . Furthermore,
we assume that Mi ∩Mj = ∅ for i 6= j, i.e., production facilities are exclusively owned
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by one producer. Producers decide on both their investment in production facilities as
well as on their supply levels.
As in equilibrium added capacities are fully utilized, no stock constraint for new capaci-
ties is modeled. Therefore we implicitly assume that mines will be exhausted after their
depreciation period (see Section 4.4).
The supply from production facility m to market j is given by xm,j . Total production of
production facility m is hence given by
∑
j xm,j . It is limited by the facilities’ capacity
cap0m + ym, where cap
0
m is the initial production capacity and ym denotes the capacity
investment. Capacity investments ym are non-negative and limited by y
max
m . The upper
bound on capacity expansion is chosen sufficiently high not to impose restrictions on
economically favorable investments but is rather used to ease the solution algorithm
(the upper limit restricts the solution space of the non-linear MPEC and enables the
equidistant separation of investments in the case of the line search, see Section 4.3).
Capacity investments in an existing production facility (i.e., cap0m 6= 0) can be inter-
preted as capacity expansions, and investments in the case of cap0m = 0 as newly built
production facilities.
Investment expenditures for facility m are given by Cinvm . We assume that C
inv
m is a
linear function in the investment level ym, with km denoting marginal investment costs,
i.e.,
Cinvm (ym) = km · ym.
Variable costs Cvarm are specific to the production facility m. They are composed of
transportation costs τm,j per unit delivered from m to market j as well as the variable
production costs vm. We assume that vm is a linear function in the total production of
the facility. Total variable costs of facility m therefore amount to
Cvarm (xm) =
∑
j
(xm,j · τm,j) + vm(
∑
j
xm,j),
with xm = (xm,j)j denoting the production vector of facility m.
Market prices Pj in market j are given by a linear inverse demand function, i.e.,
Pj = aj − bj ·
∑
m
xm,j .
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Table 4.1: Model sets, parameters and variables
Abbreviation Description
Model sets
m ∈M Production facilities
j ∈ J Markets
i ∈ I Players
Model parameters
km Marginal investment costs [US$ per unit per year]
vm Variable production costs [US$ per unit]
τm,j Transportation costs [US$ per unit]
aj Reservation price [US$ per unit]
bj Linear slope of demand function
cap0m Initial production capacity [units per year]
ymaxm Maximum capacity expansion [units per year]
Model variables
Cvarm Total variable production costs [US$]
Cinvm Investment expenditures [US$]
xm,j Supply [units]
Pj Market price [US$ per unit]
ym Capacity investments [units per year]
4.2.2 Model 1: The Open-Loop Perfect Competition Model
In the open-loop perfect competition model (in the following simply termed ‘perfect
competition model’), each producer i ∈ I solves the optimization problem
max
xm,ym:m∈Mi
∑
m∈Mi
(∑
j∈J
Pj · xm,j − Cvarm (xm)
)− ∑
m∈Mi
Cinvm (ym)
subject to
Pj = aj − bj · (Xi,j +X−i,j), ∀j
cap0m + ym −
∑
j
xm,j ≥ 0, ∀m ∈Mi (λm)
ymaxm − ym ≥ 0, ∀m ∈Mi (θm)
xm,j ≥ 0, ∀m ∈Mi, j
ym ≥ 0, ∀m ∈Mi
while taking the supplies X−i,j of the other producers (−i) as given. Here and in the
following, we use the abbreviation XI1,j =
∑
i∈I1
∑
m∈Mi xm,j for some I1 ⊂ I.
Hence, in the perfect competition model, each producer simultaneously makes his (“long-
term”) investment and (“short-term”) production decisions in order to maximize profits.
In doing so, each producer takes capacity restrictions into account. However, players do
not take into account their influence on price.
Chapter 4. Modeling strategic investment decisions in spatial markets 56
Any solution to the above optimization problem has to satisfy the short-term Karush-
Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions
0 ≤ ∂C
var
m (xm)
∂xm,j
− [aj − bj · (Xi,j +X−i,j)] + λm ⊥ xm,j ≥ 0, ∀i,m ∈Mi, j
0 ≤ cap0m + ym −
∑
j
xm,j ⊥ λm ≥ 0, ∀i,m ∈Mi
as well as the long-term KKT conditions
0 ≤ km − λm + θm ⊥ ym ≥ 0, ∀i,m ∈Mi
0 ≤ ymaxm − ym ⊥ θm ≥ 0, ∀i,m ∈Mi.
In equilibrium, all KKT conditions have to hold simultaneously. Uniqueness of the
solution is guaranteed due to the quasi-concave objective function and the convexity
of the restrictions. The derived KKT conditions are thus necessary and sufficient for
obtaining the solution.
4.2.3 Model 2: The Open-Loop Cournot Model with Competitive
Fringe
In the open-loop Cournot model with competitive fringe (in the following simply termed
‘open-loop model’), each producer i ∈ I solves an optimization problem identical to
the one for the perfect competition model described above. However, each producer
may take additionally into account his influence on price which is represented by the
conjectural variation parameter ψi, where
∂Pj
∂xm,j
= ψi · bj for all m ∈ Mi. Cournot
behavior with a competitive fringe can then be represented as ψi = 1 for the Cournot
players and ψi = 0 for the competitive fringe.
14
Any solution to the open-loop Cournot model with competitive fringe then satisfies the
short-term Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions
0 ≤ ∂C
var
m (xm)
∂xm,j
− [aj − bj · (Xi,j +X−i,j)] + ψi · bj ·Xi,j + λm ⊥ xm,j ≥ 0,
∀i,m ∈Mi, j
0 ≤ cap0m + ym −
∑
j
xm,j ⊥ λm ≥ 0, ∀i,m ∈Mi
14The perfect competition model also follows from this specification by setting ψi = 0 for all i.
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as well as the long-term KKT conditions
0 ≤ km − λm + θm ⊥ ym ≥ 0, ∀i,m ∈Mi
0 ≤ ymaxm − ym ⊥ θm ≥ 0, ∀i,m ∈Mi.
In equilibrium, the KKT conditions of both the Cournot players and the competitive
fringe have to hold simultaneously. As in the perfect competition case, uniqueness of the
solution is guaranteed due to the quasi-concave objective function and the convexity of
the restrictions. The derived KKT conditions are therefore again necessary and sufficient
for obtaining the solution.
4.2.4 Model 3: The Closed-Loop Model
In the closed-loop model, producers play a two-stage game: In the first stage, oligopolis-
tic producers l (l ∈ L ⊂ I) decide on their investment levels. In the second stage, they
choose, based on observed investment decisions of the other oligopolistic producers, their
production and supply levels. In addition, in the second stage, a further player, the com-
petitive fringe (F ), makes his supply decisions. The competitive fringe is not allowed
to invest in either stage.15 As opposed to the oligopolistic producers, the competitive
fringe is a price taker.
4.2.4.1 The Second Stage Problem
For a given investment vector (yl, y−l) of the oligopolistic producers, let the second stage
problem of producer i be given by
max
xm,j :m∈Mi
∑
m∈Mi
(∑
j∈J
Pj · xm,j − Cvarm (xm)
)
subject to
Pj = aj − bj · (Xi,j +X−i,j), ∀j
cap0m + ym −
∑
j
xm,j ≥ 0, ∀m ∈Mi (λm)
xm,j ≥ 0, ∀m ∈Mi, j.
15In our application to the metallurgical coal market, this restriction also holds true for the player in
the perfect competition model corresponding to the competitive fringe in the closed-loop model as well as
for the competitive fringe in the Cournot open-loop model. For better readability, the model descriptions
in the preceding two subsections are slightly more general, i.e., allowing potentially all players to invest.
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As in the open-loop model, producer i decides on his supplies while taking the supplies
of the other producers (−i) as given. A producer’s influence on price is again assumed
to be represented by a conjectural variation parameter ψi, which is equal to one for the
oligopolistic producers and zero for the competitive fringe. Note that the competitive
fringe may not invest and therefore ym = 0 for the fringe. The corresponding KKT
conditions to this problem are then given by
0 ≤ ∂C
var
m (xm)
∂xm,j
− [aj − bj · (Xi,j +X−i,j)] + ψi · bj ·Xi,j + λm ⊥ xm,j ≥ 0,
∀m ∈Mi, j
0 ≤ cap0m + ym −
∑
j
xm,j ⊥ λm ≥ 0, ∀m ∈Mi.
In the second stage equilibrium, the KKT conditions of all producers have to hold
simultaneously. In the following, let x˜m,j(yl, y−l) denote the second stage production
equilibrium for a given investment vector (yl, y−l).
4.2.4.2 The First Stage Problem
The first stage problem for oligopolistic producer l ∈ L is given by
max
ym:m∈Ml
∑
m∈Ml
(∑
j∈J
P˜j · x˜m,j(yl, y−l)− Cvarm (x˜m(yl, y−l)
)− ∑
m∈Ml
Cinvm (ym)
subject to
P˜j = aj − bj · (X˜l,j(yl, y−l) + X˜−l,j(yl, y−l) + X˜F,j(yl, y−l)), ∀j
ymaxm − ym ≥ 0, ∀m ∈Ml
ym ≥ 0, ∀m ∈Ml,
i.e., producer l chooses his investment levels in order to maximize profits for a given
investment strategy of the other oligopolistic producers (y−l) under consideration of the
resulting second stage equilibrium outcome.
Combining the second stage and the first stage problem, we obtain the following MPEC
for producer l, hereafter referred to as MPECl:
max
Ωl
∑
m∈Ml
(∑
j∈J
(aj − bj · (Xl,j +X−l,j +XF,j)) · xm,j − Cvarm (xm)
)− ∑
m∈Ml
Cinvm (ym)
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subject to
ymaxm − ym ≥ 0, ∀m ∈Ml
ym ≥ 0, ∀m ∈Ml
0 ≤ ∂C
var
m (xm)
∂xm,j
− [aj − bj · (Xi,j +X−i,j)] + ψi · bj ·Xi,j + λm ⊥ xm,j ≥ 0,
∀i,m ∈Mi, j
0 ≤ cap0m + ym −
∑
j
xm,j ⊥ λm ≥ 0, ∀i,m ∈Mi
given the investment vector (y−l) of the other oligopolistic producers. Here, Ωl is given
by
Ωl = {(ym)m∈Ml ; (xm,j , λm)m∈M,j∈J}.16
An investment strategy (y˜l, y˜−l) is a closed-loop equilibrium if for all l ∈ L, y˜l solves l’s
MPEC problem MPECl given y˜−l. The problem of finding a closed-loop equilibrium is
hence of EPEC type (Gabriel et al., 2012), and therefore existence and uniqueness of
equilibria typically is non-trivial and parameter dependent.
4.2.5 Discussion of the Models and Equilibrium Concepts
Closed-loop strategies allow players to condition their actions on actions taken in pre-
vious time periods; in open-loop strategies, this is not possible. Thus, equilibria in the
closed-loop model are by definition subgame perfect, whereas open-loop equilibria are
typically merely dynamically (time) consistent. The latter is a weaker equilibrium con-
cept than subgame perfection. It requires only that no player has an incentive at any
time to deviate from the strategy he announced at the beginning of the game, “given
that no player has deviated in the past and no agent expects a future deviation” (Karp
and Newbery, 1992). Therefore, with subgame perfect equilibria requiring actions to be
optimal in every subgame of the game, i.e., requiring that no player has an incentive to
deviate from his strategy regardless of any deviation in the past, an equilibrium of the
open-loop model may fail to be an equilibrium in the closed-loop game.17
Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) and the literature cited therein generally address the issue of
diverging results of open-loop models in comparison to closed-loop models and provide
intuition for the divergence: In the closed-loop model, in contrast to the open-loop
model, a player’s influence via its own actions in the first stage on the other players’
16Note that the first stage decision variable is separated from the second stage decision variables by a
semicolon. The latter are indirectly determined by the choice of the first stage decision variable.
17See Selten (1965) for the first formalization of the concept of subgame perfect equilibria and, e.g.,
Karp and Newbery (1989) for a general account on dynamic consistency.
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actions in the second stage is taken into account. Applying this intuition to the special
case of the capacity expansion problem, Murphy and Smeers (2005) show that in the
closed-loop equilibrium, marginal investment costs may be higher than the sum of the
short-term marginal value implied by the KKT conditions. In particular, they note that
“the difference between the two characterizes the value for the player of being able to
manipulate the short-term market by its first stage investments.” This may lead to higher
investments and supplies and hence lower prices in the closed-loop model compared to
the open-loop model.
The existing literature on the subject, in particular the above mentioned Murphy and
Smeers (2005) as well as Wogrin et al. (2013b), provides general properties of closed-loop
and open-loop models and conditions for diverging and non-diverging results between
the two models, assuming simplified settings (e.g., ignoring existing capacities). We
conjecture that in a spatial application with non-generic data and existing capacities
available to the players, equilibria are likely to deviate between the two modeling ap-
proaches, which is confirmed by our application to the metallurgical coal market (see
Sections 4.4 and 4.5). Analytical analysis is no longer available in this setting due to
increased complexity and thus makes a numerical analysis necessary. The numerical
approach is also suitable to address an issue which to our knowledge has not yet been
comprehensively touched upon in previous literature: a quantification of the magnitude
of the divergence between closed-loop and open-loop model results.
4.3 Implementation
4.3.1 Model 1: The Open-Loop Model
Both open-loop models introduced in Section 4.2, i.e., the open-loop perfect competi-
tion model and the open-loop Cournot competition model with competitive fringe, are
implemented as mixed complementarity problems (MCP).
4.3.2 Model 2: The Closed-Loop Model
We solve the closed-loop model using diagonalization (see for instance Gabriel et al.,
2012):
1. Set starting values for the investment decisions y0l of all oligopolistic producers
l ∈ L, a convergence criterion , a maximum number of iterations N and a learning
rate R
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2. n = 1
3. Set ynl = y
n−1
l
4. Do for all l ∈ L
(a) Fix the investment decisions yn−l of −l
(b) Solve player l’s MPEC problem MPECl to obtain an optimal investment level
yl
(c) Set ynl equal to R · yl + (1−R) · ynl
5. If |ynl − yn−1l | <  for all producers l ∈ L: quit
6. If n = N : quit
7. n = n+ 1 and go back to step 3
Diagonalization thus reduces the closed-loop problem to a series of MPEC problems.
Concerning the solution of the MPECs, we implement two procedures: grid search along
the investment decision yl and a reformulation of the MPEC as a Mixed Integer Linear
Program (MILP).
Both approaches differ with respect to the simplification of the decision variables: With
grid search we discretize the investment decision which is reasonable for many investment
choices in real life. Thus, solving the MPEC problem reduces to solving a series of MCP
problems with the choice of production volumes remaining continuous. On the contrary,
in the MILP approach we discretize the production decisions but retain a continuous
choice of investments in new capacity. The discretization may result in missing the global
optimal solution.18 As both approaches result in very similar outcomes (see Section 4.6)
we are confident that our obtained results are valid.
Implementing both the grid search and MILP reformulation allows for the comparison
of the computer run-times of the two models, with grid search typically being faster for
reasonable grid sizes (see Section 4.6 for details on this issue).
4.3.2.1 Grid Search
When applying grid search along the investment decision yl, MPECl simplifies to a
sequence of complementarity problems. In our implementation, the grid width in the
grid search is the same for all producers; the number of steps for a producer is thus
dependent on his capacity expansion limit.
18A third way of approaching the non-linearities in the model might be using the strong duality
theorem to linearize the original MPEC as described in Ruiz and Conejo (2009).
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4.3.2.2 MILP Reformulation
In addition to grid search, we implement a MILP reformulation of the MPEC. Non-
linearities arise in the MPEC due to the complementarity constraints and the non-
linear term in the objective function. The former are replaced by their corresponding
disjunctive constraints (see Fortuny-Amat and McCarl, 1981), e.g., we replace
0 ≤ cap0m + ym −
∑
j
xm,j ⊥ λm ≥ 0
by
Mλbλm ≥ λm
Mλ(1− bλm) ≥ cap0m + ym −
∑
j
xm,j
for some suitably large constant Mλ and binary variables bλm.
For the discretization of the non-linear term in the objective function, we proceed fol-
lowing Pereira et al. (2005) using a binary expansion of the supply variable. The binary
expansion of xm,j is given by
xm,j = x+ ∆x
∑
k
2kbxk,m,j ,
where x is the lower bound, ∆x the stepsize, k the number of discretization intervals
and bxk,m,j binary variables. Substituting Pj · x + ∆x
∑
k 2
kzxk,m,j for Pj · xm,j , we have
to impose the additional constraints
0 ≤ zxk,m,j ≤Mxbxk,m,j
0 ≤ Pj − zxk,m,j ≤Mx(1− bxk,m,j)
for some suitably large constant Mx.
4.4 Data Set
The models are parametrized with data for the international metallurgical coal market
(see Table 4.1 and Appendix C.1). Yet, as the structure of the international metallurgical
coal trade is (from a modeling perspective) similar to that of other commodities, the
model could easily be calibrated with data for other markets.
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Metallurgical coal is used in steel-making to produce the coke needed for steel production
in blast furnaces and as a source of energy in the process of steel-making. Metallurgical
coal is distinct from thermal coal, which is typically used to generate electricity or heat.
Currently around 70% of the global steel production crucially relies on metallurgical
coal as an input.19
International trade of metallurgical coal amounted to 250 million tonnes (Mt) in 2012.20
International trade is predominantly seaborne, using dry bulk vessels. Up until 2010,
metallurgical coal was almost exclusively traded through long-term contracts. Since
then, the market has begun to move away from this system towards more spot market-
based trading. While the share of spot market activity has increased rapidly, a substan-
tial amount of metallurgical coal is still traded through long-term contracts.
Key players in this market are large mining companies such as BHP-Billiton, Anglo-
American, Glencore and Rio Tinto. These companies produce mainly in Australia and,
together with Peabody Energy’s Australian operations, control more than 50% of the
global export capacity. In addition, adding to this the market share of the Canadian
Teck consortium and the two key metallurgical coal exporters from the United States,
Walter Energy and Xcoal, results in almost three quarters of the global export capacity,
marketed by an oligopoly of eight companies. For the sake of simplicity and computa-
tional tractability, we aggregate these players’ existing mines into one mining operation
per player. Smaller exporters from Australia, the United States, Russia, New Zealand,
Indonesia and South Africa are aggregated into three players: one Cournot player from
Australia (AUS6), one Cournot player from the United States (USA1) and one com-
petitive fringe player that comprises all other regions (Fringe). This results in eleven
asymmetric players who differ with respect to their existing production capacity and the
associated production and transport costs (see Table 4.2).21
We assume that the three players representing the smaller exporters, i.e., USA1, AUS6
and Fringe, cannot invest in additional capacity. Hence, only the largest eight companies
can endogenously expand their supply capacity. The investment decision, made in period
one, is based on the players’ capacities and costs in 2011. We consider one investment
cycle with capacities becoming available after six years (i.e., in 2017) serving one demand
period. Investment costs per tonne of annual production capacity (tpa) are broken down
into equal annual payments based on an annuity calculation using an interest rate of
10% and a depreciation time of 10 years. The profitability of investments is evaluated
based on the comparison of annuity and profits in the considered production period.
We therefore assume that returns are constant over the years of production. Note that
19See WCA (2011).
20See IEA (2013a).
21Data on capacities and costs are taken from Tru¨by (2013).
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Table 4.2: Existing Capacity, Variable and Investment Costs
Players Existing
Capacity
[Mtpa]
Variable
Costs
[US$/t]
Investment
Costs
[US$/tpa]
Max.
Investment
[Mtpa]
USA1 38 122.0 - -
USA2 9 122.1 98.2 50
USA3 11 141.0 98.0 50
AUS1 54 118.3 218.1 50
AUS2 11 118.4 218.0 50
AUS3 17 118.5 217.9 50
AUS4 10 118.6 217.8 50
AUS5 12 118.0 218.2 50
AUS6 18 118.1 - -
CAN 26 105.0 161.0 20
Fringe 26 78.0 - -
production cost of new mines correspond to the production cost of the respective player’s
existing mine.
The two largest importers of metallurgical coal are Europe and Japan, followed by India,
China and Korea. These key importers account for more than 80% of the trade. We
aggregate these and the remaining smaller countries into two demand regions: Europe-
Atlantic and Asia-Pacific.22 The former also includes the Mediterranean’s neighboring
countries and importers from the Atlantic shores of the Americas. The latter includes
importers with coastlines on the Pacific or the Indian Ocean. Exporters from the United
States have a transport cost advantage in the Europe-Atlantic region, while Canadian
and Australian exporters are located closer to the consumers in the Asia-Pacific region
(see Table C.1 in Appendix C.1). We assume the inverse import demand function for
metallurgical coal to be linear. The function can be specified using a reference price and
a corresponding reference quantity in combination with a point-elasticity eta.
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Figure 4.1: Demand functions for Europe-Atlantic (left) and Asia-Pacific regions (right)
with varying elasticity
22Our approach covers 100% of the global seaborne metallurgical coal imports and exports (based on
data from 2011).
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4.5 Results
In practice, investors in production capacity face demand evolution as a key uncertainty.
Accounting for this uncertainty, we run sensitivities in which we vary the point-elasticity
parameter eta across the range -0.2 to -0.5 (see Figure 4.1).23 This bandwidth is gen-
erally considered reasonable in the metallurgical coal market (see Tru¨by, 2013, and the
literature cited therein). Furthermore, we vary the reference demand quantity (see Ta-
ble C.2 in Appendix C.1) from 60% to 140% to account for different demand evolution
trajectories. The presentation of the results is structured around the variation of these
demand parameters followed by a general discussion of the findings.
4.5.1 Variation of Demand Elasticity
Decreasing the point elasticity parameter eta results in a flatter gradient of the linear
demand function (see Figure 4.1). A decreasing eta (i.e., a more negative eta) expresses
an increasing price responsiveness of consumers which, ceteris paribus, limits the extent
to which the oligopolists can exploit their market power. Consequently, with decreasing
eta, average prices achieved in the imperfect competition cases (open-loop and closed-
loop) are decreasing while total production is increasing (Figure 4.2). Note that in the
perfect competition case, the aggregate supply and the aggregate demand curves inter-
sect below the reference point resulting in an increase in production with decreasing eta
and, correspondingly, with increasing marginal costs, an increase in production results
in an increase in price. In the two Cournot models with imperfect competition the
oligopolistic mark-up on marginal costs leads to market prices exceeding the reference
price.
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Figure 4.2: Total production (left) and average market price (right) for varying demand
elasticity
23For eta smaller than -0.4, closed-loop model runs did not converge. Therefore, the results presented
in this section only comprise the range -0.2 to -0.4. For a discussion on computational issues, see Section
4.6.
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A variation of eta impacts the investment trends differently in the three cases (Figure
4.3). However, the capacity expansion investments need to be interpreted in concert
with the corresponding utilization of the existing capacity. Intuitively, one would expect
investment into additional capacity to be highest in the perfect competition case. Yet,
in our setup, the investment level in the perfectly competitive case falls between the
two cases with imperfect competition. This effect stems from the significant amount of
existing capacities which – with the exception of some very high-cost capacities – are
utilized before additional production capacity is built. Murphy and Smeers (2005) show
that in their model which does not account for existing capacities, investment levels are
indeed highest under perfect competition.
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Figure 4.3: Capacity investments (left) and idle capacity (right) for varying demand
elasticity
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Figure 4.4: Capacity investments for the closed-loop (left) and open-loop model (right)
(eta = −0.3)
Of particular interest is the ranking of the closed-loop and open-loop case in terms of
capacity expansion and capacity withholding. Note that withholding (or idle capacity),
here and in the following, concerns only exiting capacities. Each player exhausts existing
capacities before investing in additional capacities. Newly built capacities are always
fully utilized in equilibrium as otherwise players could increase their profit by reducing
investments. Investments in the open-loop case are strictly lower than in the closed-loop
case independent of the elasticity while less capacity is withheld in the open-loop case.
However, the investment behavior of individual players may differ from the aggregate
industry behavior; as can be seen in Figure 4.4 two players from the United States invest
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more in the open-loop model than in the closed-loop model contrary to what the rest of
the industry does.
To get an intuition for the investment behavior in the open-loop case, suppose that there
are two players, an incumbent with infinite existing capacity and an entrant without
any capacity.24 Both players face the same production cost while investment costs
are non-zero. Under these assumptions, the incumbent has no incentive to invest in
additional capacity as his capacity endowment is sufficient to produce the Nash-Cournot-
output. Contrarily, the entrant builds as much capacity as is required to produce the
amount needed in equilibrium (marginal revenue equals the sum of marginal production
and investment cost). Similarly, in our application to the metallurgical coal market
with heterogeneous cost structures, investment primarily comes from the players with
relatively small existing capacity, while larger players withhold capacity in period two
when the market clears.
The investment level is higher in the closed-loop case compared to the open-loop case
as the capacity expansion in the first period can be used strategically to influence the
supply decisions of the other players in the second period. Despite the bi-level structure
of this game, no player has a first mover advantage as investment decisions are taken
simultaneously by all players. The production decision is based on realized investments
and investment costs are considered as being sunk. This way, the choice of capacity
investments can only influence other players’ production decisions.
To get an intuition for the investment behavior in the closed-loop case, again suppose
for a moment that there are two players, an incumbent with infinite existing capacity
and an entrant without any capacity. Both players face the same production cost while
investment costs are non-zero (if investment costs were zero the result would converge
to the open-loop case). As there is no long-term contract, the entrant’s investment cost
is sunk in period two and his production decision is solely based on the production
costs. Therefore, the entrant’s desired production, given sufficient capacity, is higher
compared to a situation where investment costs feature in the first-order-condition (as
in the open-loop case). At the same time, the incumbent’s reaction would be to reduce
his production. Anticipating this, the entrant has an incentive to build a higher capacity
level than in the open-loop case. This way, the entrant can influence the incumbent’s
output decision in period two by his choice of capacity in period one. An analytical
solution of this game becomes non-trivial when more than one player makes subsequent
investment and supply decisions as these decisions mutually influence each other. Yet,
this little example is useful to provide a better understanding of why the closed-loop
24This and the following intuition for the deviations in the closed-loop case are presented in an ana-
lytical example in more detail in Appendix C.2.
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case features higher investment levels but also higher withholding of existing capacities
than the open-loop case.
In both models of imperfect competition, capacity is exclusively withheld by the two
largest players in the market, one producing in Australia and the other one in the United
States. Capacity expansion and withholding are following opposing trends in our models
of imperfect competition, i.e., the open-loop model exhibits a lower level of investment
but also a lower level of unused capacity while the higher investment levels in the closed-
loop model come with a higher level of idle capacity. Thus, it is a-priori unclear how the
two models would rank in terms of total supply and market prices. A numerical solution
of our models yields that supply is higher in the closed-loop case than in the open-loop
case. Consequently, market prices are lower in the closed-loop case. This result is in
line with the findings of Murphy and Smeers (2005).
Industry profits, consumer rent and social welfare are depicted in Figure 4.5. Indus-
try profits decrease with decreasing eta and so does consumer rent (a higher price-
responsiveness of consumers limits market power exploitation but also potential con-
sumer rent). The existence of profits in the perfect competition model is due to capacity
restrictions of existing mines and limited expansion potential for new mines. Social wel-
fare is similar in all three models: in a perfectly competitive market welfare is slightly
higher than in the Cournot models. Welfare is lowest in the open-loop case (Figure 4.6).
Thus, the different underlying assumptions concerning the prevailing market structure
in the international metallurgical coal trade (long-term contracts versus spot market)
primarily influences the surplus distribution rather than its sum: in the open-loop case
in which the product is traded through long-term contracts, companies can earn higher
profits, while consumer surplus is higher in markets with spot market-based trade.
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Figure 4.5: Accumulated profits (left) and consumer rent (right) with varying demand
elasticity
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Figure 4.6: Overall welfare (left) and welfare differences (right)
4.5.2 Variation of Reference Demand
For the variation of reference demand, the point elasticity eta has been fixed to a value
of -0.3; thus the case of 100% reference demand corresponds to the depicted results of
the previous subsection with the same demand elasticity. Variations of the reference
demand results in a shift of the demand curve to the right for values larger than 100%
and a shift to the left for values lower than 100%.
As in the previous subsection, supply is highest under perfect competition and lowest
in the open-loop case for any demand variation (Figure 4.7). Accordingly, prices are
highest in the open-loop case followed by the closed-loop and the perfect competition
cases. As one would expect, supply and average prices increase with increasing demand.
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
60% 80% 100% 120% 140%
Pr
od
uc
tio
n 
[M
t]
Reference demand
Perfect competition
Closed-loop
Open-loop
0
50
100
150
200
250
60% 80% 100% 120% 140%
Av
g.
 p
ric
e 
[U
S$
/t
]
Reference demand
Perfect competition
Closed-loop
Open-loop
Figure 4.7: Total production (left) and average market price (right) for varying reference
demand
For low reference demand levels, the existing capacities of small players are almost
sufficiently high to produce the quantities needed for their best-supply response in period
two. Therefore, the results in the open-loop and closed-loop cases almost coincide at 60%
reference demand as investment activity is low. Investments in additional production
capacity are increasing monotonously with growing reference demand (Figure 4.8). As
with the variation of the demand elasticity, investments are consistently lower in the
open-loop case than in the closed-loop case. For low demand levels, investments in the
competitive model are below those in the models with imperfect competition as existing
capacities are sufficient to serve demand rendering investments unprofitable. In the
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Cournot models, investment into additional production capacity is still profitable for
small players as they can count on players with large existing capacities to withhold
some output.
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Figure 4.8: Capacity investments (left) and idle capacity (right) for varying reference
demand
For high demand levels, investments under perfectly competitive conduct exceed those
even in the closed-loop model. The order of idle capacity is similar to the case of varying
demand elasticity: idle capacity is highest in the closed-loop model followed by the open-
loop case (both due to strategic considerations) and the perfect competition model (due
to market prices below the marginal costs of costlier capacities).
With increasing demand, profits as well as consumer rents increase (Figure 4.9). Again,
results for the open-loop and closed-loop cases almost coincide if reference demand is
very low as investments play a minor role. In the case of high reference demand, profits
in the open-loop model exceed those in the closed-loop model. Results for consumer
rents are vice versa. Total welfare turns out to be quite similar for all three models
with the highest welfare occurring in the perfectly competitive model followed by the
closed-loop and open-loop models (Figure 4.10).
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Figure 4.9: Accumulated profits (left) and consumer rent (right) with varying reference
demand
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Figure 4.10: Overall welfare (left) and welfare difference (right, open-loop minus closed-
loop)
4.5.3 Summary
Asymmetric existing capacities are an important driver of our results. While welfare is
highest in the perfect competition case, investment levels in this case fall between the
two Cournot models as existing capacities are sufficient to absorb additional demand.
Profits are highest in the open-loop case followed by the closed-loop and perfect com-
petition models. Moving away from long-term contracts towards a spot market-based
trade reduces profits of all players, however, companies with large existing capacities
are affected to a larger degree: the two large firms (one from Australia and one from
the United States) who are responsible for the withholding of capacity in the Cournot
models together receive 23% of the industry profits in the open-loop case but see their
share of profits diminished to 17% in the closed-loop case.
In our modeling setup the competitive fringe has no strategic relevance. Fringe players
neither invest nor withhold, i.e., they always produce to capacity. In essence, the fringe
determines the residual demand that the oligopolists optimize against but it does not
introduce any sort of first-mover vs. follower relationship.
The magnitude of result deviations between the different models, and thus the implica-
tions for market participants are quite significant. The models of imperfect competition
differ, for instance, in capacity expansions between 19% and up to 33% (low and high
demand elasticity, respectively).
Even though social welfare differs only slightly between the open-loop and closed-loop
models in our calculations for the metallurgical coal market, the difference may be higher
for other markets with different model parameters. In addition, the surplus distribution
between consumer rent and profits differs significantly and has policy implications since
– in natural resource markets – production and consumption take place in different
countries.
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4.6 Computational Issues
Equilibria in a closed-loop model, if any exist, do not necessarily have to be unique.
Therefore, we perform a robustness check for our closed-loop results by using different
starting values for capacity investments. Starting values are randomly drawn from a
reasonable range of possible investments, with the maximum investment of each player
as given in Table 4.2. Limiting the range of possible investments drastically reduces
computer run-times and increases the probability of finding equilibria. In addition,
calculations are made with starting values set to zero and to the open-loop results. The
algorithm terminates if overall adjustments of investments δ are less than  = 0.1 Mtpa
compared to the previous iteration. We use a learning rate parameter R for the adoption
rate of new investments in order to avoid cycling behavior. The learning rate parameter
is randomly set between 0.6 and 1.0 (see Gabriel et al., 2012). Calculations have been
done on a 16 core server with 96 GB RAM and 2,67 GHz using CPLEX 12.2.
Table 4.3 shows calculation statistics when using the MILP version of our model (see
Subsection 4.3.2.2). We perform six runs per parameter setting using random starting
values. Most runs converged to an equilibrium before the maximum number of itera-
tions was reached. With increasing demand elasticity, the algorithm had difficulties to
converge. In the case of eta = −0.4, only every third run converged to an equilibrium;
for eta < −0.4, no equilibrium could be found at all. Using either zero investments
or open-loop results as starting values, a closed-loop equilibrium was found, except for
eta < −0.4.
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Figure 4.11 illustrates the iterative solution process for a single model run for eta = −0.5
using random starting values. The model run did not converge to an equilibrium.25 After
initial adjustments of investments in the first iterations, investments start to cycle in
a rather small range. Total investments from iteration 5 to 10 vary between 89 Mtpa
and 97 Mtpa. This range is typical for all runs regardless of the starting values. The
maximum range for a single player’s investment deviations is 3 Mtpa. Thus, even if
no equilibrium is reached, analyzing the solution process may hint to possible market
developments.
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Figure 4.11: Course of investments of single players during solution process (eta = −0.5)
Using zero investments or open-loop equilibrium results as starting values led to a sig-
nificant reduction of computer run-times compared to random starting values. This is
probably due to the rather large range of random starting values and the (comparably)
rather small equilibrium investments. Thus, starting from zero investments in most
cases is closer to the equilibrium values than starting with random values. In summary,
using reasonable starting values can support the solution process significantly.
If the algorithm converged, model results were identical for all runs with the same
parameters concerning demand level and demand elasticity. Thus, even if the existence
of multiple equilibria cannot be excluded, equilibria appear to be stable.
Calculations using the MILP version of our model usually took several hours to converge
to an equilibrium. Applying the grid search approach (see Subsection 4.3.2.1) reduced
computer run-times significantly. The conceptional difference between both approaches
lies in the simplification of the decision variables: With grid search we discretize the
investment decision. On the contrary, in the MILP approach we discretize the production
decisions but retain a continuous choice of investments in new capacity.
The same calculations as in the MILP version have been done using grid search with
investment steps of 0.1 Mtpa and the same convergence criterion as in the MILP version
( = 0.1 Mtpa). The model was implemented in GAMS using GUSS (see Bussieck et al.,
2012).
25In our iterative approach, convergence depends on the choice of (an arbitrarily small) .
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Applying grid search, the solution process took only several minutes to converge. Thus,
reducing the optimization process from a series of computationally challenging MPECs
to comparably easy-to-solve complementarity problems reduced overall computer run-
time significantly. As for the MILP version, all model runs converged to the same
equilibrium (for eta ≥ −0.4) or did not converge at all (for eta < −0.4). Aggregated
absolute deviations of investments between the MILP and the grid search version of
our model vary between 0.3% and 3.7%. Thus, in our parameter setting, only minor
differences in the results occurred.
4.7 Conclusions
We presented three investment models for oligopolistic spatial markets. Our approach
accounts for different degrees of competition and as to whether the product is sold
through long-term contracts or on spot markets. The models are particularly suited for
the analysis of investments in markets for natural resources and minerals. We applied
the models to the international metallurgical coal trade, which features characteristics
similar to those of other commodity markets.
Results may differ substantially between the different models. The closed-loop model,
which is computationally challenging, is particularly well suited for when the product is
traded on a spot market and the investment expenditure is large compared to produc-
tion costs. The open-loop model is appropriate for markets with perfect competition
or imperfectly competitive markets on which the product is traded through long-term
contracts. Moreover, the open-loop model approximates the closed-loop outcome when
investment costs are minor.
Over the last several years, progress has been made in the metallurgical coal and iron
ore markets to move away from long-term contracts and introduce spot markets in
commodity trade. Similarly, efforts are being made to introduce spot market-based
pricing between European natural gas importers and the Russian gas exporting giant
Gazprom. Our results suggest that moving away from long-term contracts in oligopolistic
markets is likely to stimulate additional investment and consequently reduce profits and
increase consumer rents. The overall effect on welfare is negligible. However, in natural
resource markets, export revenues and consumer rents from imports are typically accrued
in different legislations. Hence, policy makers from exporting and importing countries
are likely to have differing views on how commodity trade should be organized.
Further research is needed to improve methods for solving complex two-stage problems.
In addition, further research could apply the models presented here to other oligopolistic
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mining industries such as the copper or iron ore trade. Given that static pricing models
tend to give unsatisfactory results for the oil market, in which variable costs are low
but capital expenditure is very high, the closed-loop approach may provide interesting
insights into oligopolistic pricing when accounting for investments in capacity.

Chapter 5
The future of nuclear power in
France: an analysis of the costs of
phasing-out
Nuclear power is an important pillar in electricity generation in France. However,
France’s nuclear power plant fleet is ageing, and the possibility of reducing its share
in power generation or even a complete phase-out has been increasingly discussed. Our
research therefore focuses on three questions: First, what are the costs of phasing-out
nuclear power in France under different scenarios? Second, who has to bear these costs,
i.e., how much of the costs will be passed on to the rest of the European power system?
And third, what effect does the uncertainty regarding future nuclear policy in France
have on system costs? Applying a stochastic optimization model for the European elec-
tricity system, we show that additional system costs in France of a nuclear phase-out
amount up to 76 billion e 2010. Additional costs are mostly borne by the French power
system. Surprisingly, we find that the costs of uncertainty are rather limited. Based
on our results, we conclude that a commitment regarding nuclear policy reform is only
mildly beneficial in terms of system costs.
5.1 Introduction
Nuclear power is an important technology in the global electricity system, comprising
a share of 13% of global power generation (IEA, 2012). Its contribution to electricity
generation is currently substantially higher in OECD countries (21% versus 4% in non-
OECD countries; IEA, 2012) where nuclear power has been widely deployed since the
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1960s in an effort to reduce the import dependency on fossil fuels, diversify the power
mix and reduce power system costs.
A key feature of nuclear power is that its electricity generation is virtually carbon-free.
Therefore, nuclear power is thought to play a key role in mitigating climate change
(IEA, 2012, 2013b). Despite its potential to contribute to the de-carbonization of the
power sector, nuclear power is a politically sensitive topic in many countries due to the
inherent risk of nuclear accidents and subsequent environmental catastrophes.
The public resentment towards nuclear power has been strongly aggravated in the af-
termath of the Fukushima-Daiichi accident, especially in Japan and Europe. Politicians
in Japan and Germany reacted rapidly and introduced moratoria on the operation of
nuclear power plants in their countries. While discussions about a complete phase-out
of nuclear power are still ongoing in Japan, the governments of Germany and Switzer-
land have already decided to fully abolish the use of nuclear energy by 2022 and 2035,
respectively. Nuclear policy was a major topic in the French presidential elections in
spring 2012, and several other countries such as Italy, Belgium and the United Kingdom
have participated in lively public debates on the future of nuclear power.
With only four nuclear power plants currently under construction and more than 10 GW
of existing nuclear plants set to retire in the coming decade (IEA, 2012), nuclear power
is losing its share in the European power sector. Maintaining the current level of nuclear
power generation, let alone increasing its share in order to reduce the carbon intensity of
the power sector, would require several firm investment decisions for new plants by the
end of the decade given the long construction time for such plants. Nuclear investments
are comparably capital intensive due to the large size of the power station, with the
specific investment cost ranging between 3000 to 5000e /kW – roughly three times more
than a typical coal-fired plant and about four times more than a combined-cycle gas
turbine (CCGT). Building a nuclear power plant is a long-term investment with the
expected lifetime of a station ranging between 50 and 60 years. The capital-intensity of
nuclear investments typically requires either a larger cash-flow per output (price spread)
or a longer amortization period than an investment in a coal or gas-fired plant. While
the former is basically a market risk that all investors in liberalized power markets face,
the latter is closely related to political uncertainty. In order to earn money, nuclear
power plant operators need to run their plant – and generate cash-flows – for decades.
What if nuclear policy mandates a sudden phase-out?
We focus on France in the following as France faces several additional challenges and
particularities related to nuclear power. First, nuclear power contributes to roughly 75%
of the electricity generation in France, the highest share of nuclear power in electricity
generation in the world. Second, most (37 out of 58) French nuclear power plants were
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built in the time period between 1975 and 1985. Thus, these plants will reach the end
of their lifetime between 2025 and 2035 and will need to be either replaced by new
plants or retro-fitted via investments in order to prolong their lifetime. Finally, France
faces the political challenge of keeping CO2 emissions from power generation low while
public resentment towards nuclear power grows and renewable energies are still too
costly and variable to replace base-load technologies on a large scale. Public resentment
and recent political debates, such as the one in the presidential elections of 2012, have
introduced political uncertainty toward future nuclear policy in France, which could
impede investments in nuclear technology and raise system costs.
In our analysis, we focus on three main research questions: First, what are the costs of
a nuclear phase-out in France? To this end, we look at two possible phase-out paths
(an immediate phase-out and an extended phase-out over 15 years) as well as examine
the effect of lifetime prolongations of existing nuclear power plants. Second, who picks
up the bill of a nuclear phase-out in France, i.e., will some of the costs be passed down
from the French to the rest of the European power system? And third, what is the
effect of political uncertainty regarding future French nuclear policy on nuclear power
investments and system costs?
In order to address these questions, we apply a stochastic linear programing model of the
European power system. The model allows for the calculation of the least-cost dispatch
of power plants and investment in new generation technologies across Europe, accounting
for power exchange between the individual regions. Additionally, our approach allows us
to model uncertainty regarding future nuclear policy in France, i.e., investment decisions
are made without knowing if and when a future government mandates a nuclear phase-
out.
We investigate different scenarios of nuclear policy in France. To answer the first two
research questions, we compute deterministic benchmark scenarios in which we iden-
tify the cost and necessary modifications of the system under perfect foresight, i.e., all
investors know what will happen in the future and when. These scenarios are comple-
mented by three stochastic cases that vary in the probability (high, low and medium)
of a phase-out decision in the time up to 2050. In these scenarios, the investors in nu-
clear power have information about the probability of a nuclear phase-out at any given
time. The uncertainty about future nuclear policy leads to different investment decisions
and system costs compared to the deterministic cases, allowing us to answer our third
research question.
The findings of our analysis are manifold: We find that complying with a phase-out of
nuclear power leads to higher system costs in France. The additional costs of a nuclear
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phase-out depend strongly on how the phase-out policy is designed, totaling a maxi-
mum of 76 billion e 201026 (which is roughly 2.5% of GDP in France in 2012).27 Costs
are generally highest if the phase-out is immediate, i.e., nuclear plants are required to
shut down immediately after the decision is made, not allowing for a transitory period.
Regarding our second research question, we find that the costs of a nuclear phase-out
are mainly borne by the French power generators. A phase-out reduces infra-marginal
rents in the French system as base-load plants with low marginal costs that have fully
recovered their investment expenditure are replaced by plants with higher marginal costs
(or imports), while the price-setting plants are hardly affected. Neighboring countries
are also affected by a French phase-out. A French phase-out leads to higher conven-
tional power production and stronger investments in conventional power plants in the
rest of Europe. Concerning the third research question, we find that costs of uncertainty
are rather small in the scenarios, reaching a maximum of 6 billion e 2010. The costs of
uncertainty are mitigated by allowing for lifetime-prolonging investments. Moreover,
costs of uncertainty may be mitigated if phase-out policies allow for a transitory period.
Political uncertainty typically reduces investments in nuclear power; yet find that ad-
ditional lifetime-prolonging investments are a rational choice under uncertainty. Such
investments are not as capital-intensive and are therefore to a lesser degree exposed to
the risk of a phase-out harming the economic viability of the investment.
Our analysis bears relevant implications for policy makers who are often confronted with
demands for long-term commitments. In addition to in most cases being unrealistic and
probably even undesirable from an information-theoretic point of view as it would require
the neglecting of future information, our analysis shows that at least in our application
a lack of commitment does not come at a high cost.28
The paper is structured as follows: Section 5.2 provides an overview of the related
literature. Section 5.3 describes the applied approach; Section 5.4 explains the most
important technical and political assumptions. Scenario results for France and the rest
of Europe are discussed in Section 5.5. Section 5.6 concludes.
5.2 Literature Overview
Several recent scientific publications have analysed nuclear policy and nuclear phase-
out scenarios for different countries. For instance, Kannan and Turton (2012) analyze
26e 2010 denotes real Euros based on 2010 values.
27An absolute labelling of such cost figures is difficult as it would require an assessment of the risk-costs
of nuclear power plant operation, for which there is no reliable data available.
28Under asymmetric information, similar reasoning applies. As shown by Ho¨ﬄer and Wambach (2013)
in an application to infrastructure investments, regulators face a trade-off between early commitment
and the aim to elicit information in later stages of the game.
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options for the Swiss power system to replace nuclear power. They find that in the
short-term, newly built gas-fired capacity can meet electricity demand cost-effectively,
in the medium and long-term nuclear power is the most cost effective solution. Park
et al. (2013) show that a Sustainable Society scenario, which focuses on demand man-
agement and renewable electricity, improves energy security and reduces more emissions
at affordable cost in Korea as compared to two scenarios which focus on nuclear ex-
pansion. Hong et al. (2013) use a multi-criteria decision-making analysis to assess the
potential impacts of four different energy policy pathways in Japan. Taking into ac-
count economic, environmental and social criteria, they find that a nuclear-free pathway
for Japan is the worst option to pursue. Fu¨rsch et al. (2012a) analyze costs of a nu-
clear phase-out in Germany. They find that in a scenario similar to the actual German
phase-out plan, these costs amount to 16 billion e for the German power sector.
Several studies analyzing nuclear and energy policy in France have been published:
RTE (2011) identifies the risks of an imbalance between electricity demand and supply
within a timeframe up to 2030. The authors apply a probability-based simulation model
and compare scenarios with different shares of nuclear generation in the electricity mix;
however, none with a full phase-out from nuclear power.
CAS (2012) analyzes four different scenarios for nuclear power plant operation in France
ranging from an immediate exit from nuclear generation to a continued use of the tech-
nology. In summary, the authors calculate the cost of an immediate exit from nuclear
power to amount to about 100 billion e in the timeframe between 2010 and 2030.
CDC (2012) assesses all costs of nuclear power generation in France presenting past,
present and future costs. Concerning future costs of nuclear, the study compares four
scenarios with different assumptions regarding nuclear power generation in France.
UFE (2011) analyzes different possible policy choices based on climate, social, economic
and financial criteria. The authors compare three scenarios with different shares of
nuclear generation in the period up to 2030. In a scenario with 20% nuclear generation,
the authors calculate a required investment expenditure of 434 billion e .
As we show in the following, our results are generally in line with previous results pre-
sented in the literature. A difference in the magnitude of the results can be explained
by the different scenario assumptions, research focus and methodology applied. Our
approach contributes to the existing stream of literature in at least three ways: First,
our scenario definition is novel to the literature since it systematically highlights the
effects of different phase-out periods and lifetime prolongations. Second, we draw atten-
tion to the distribution of costs between the French and the European power system.
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And third, we incorporate a new type of uncertainty into the literature, namely polit-
ical uncertainty regarding nuclear policy, and rigorously analyze its effect on costs and
investment behavior.
5.3 Methodology
Previous research on uncertainty in energy markets has focused primarily on uncertainty
with respect to demand evolution (e.g., Gardner, 1996, Gardner and Rogers, 1999), fuel
and CO2 price development (e.g., Patino-Echeverri et al., 2009, Roques et al., 2006),
portfolio and risk management (e.g., Gro¨we-Kuska et al., 2003, Morales et al., 2009)
and renewables expansion, both regarding short-term (e.g., Nagl et al., 2012, Sun et al.,
2008, Swider and Weber, 2006) and long-term uncertainties (e.g., Fu¨rsch et al., 2012b).
Our approach, in contrast, focuses on long-term uncertainties associated with nuclear
policy in France. In doing so, we employ a stochastic linear programing model of the
European power system. Given a set of input parameters and constraints, the model cal-
culates dispatch and investment decisions in such a way that residual electricity demand
is satisfied and total expected discounted system costs in the European power system
are minimized.29 Uncertainty enters the model in the form of whether or not there is a
nuclear phase-out decision in France at a particular point in time.30
Incorporating uncertainty in a deterministic investment and dispatch model typically
influences model results. Informally speaking, while in the deterministic setting the
social planner has perfect foresight and can optimally adjust decisions according to his
single view of the world, in the multistage stochastic setting the social planner has to
make decisions taking several different states of the world into account. This usually
leads to deviations from the deterministically-optimal decisions and thus to increasing
costs. In our analysis, we quantify these deviations and interpret their implications.
The timeframe of our analysis is up to 2050 in five-year steps. In order to derive consis-
tent investment decisions throughout the outlook period, the optimization is extended to
2070. The dispatch in each modeled year is represented by three representative days per
season consisting of six time-slices taking into account load and renewable generation.
Investments take place on an annual granularity.
29Residual demand refers to the demand met by conventional generation. It is equivalent to total
demand minus generation from renewables (RES-E).
30The model is a stochastic extension of the deterministic linear programing model DIME and its
successor DIMENSION. Bartels (2009) and Richter (2011) provide detailed descriptions of DIME and
DIMENSION including all model equations. The deterministic model has been successfully applied in
electricity market modeling, as for instance in Ja¨gemann et al. (2013) in the modeling of renewable and
carbon policies or in the modeling of flexibility options in Bertsch et al. (2015). The stochastic extension
is straightforward and implemented as discussed in Shapiro et al. (2009).
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Nuclear phase-out decisions in France (denoted “D” in Figure 5.1) can occur in every
five-year time interval between 2015 and 2035 (mimicking the legislative period of the
French government). We assume that no phase-out decision can be made after 2035
in order to have consistent and comparable results for the time period up to 2050.
Moreover, this simplification also helps to reduce computer runtime.31 We thus consider
four states, denoted by State 1 (phase-out decision between 2015 and 2020) to State 4
(phase-out decision between 2030 and 2035), in which a phase-out from nuclear power
in France occurs as well as an additional state without a phase-out, denoted by State 5.
Obviously, we do not allow for investments in nuclear power in France after a phase-out
decision has been made.
2010 2015
D
2020 2025
E
2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
D E
D E
D E
State 5
State 4
State 3
State 2
State 1
2010 2015
D E
2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
D E
D E
D E
State 5
State 4
State 3
State 2
State 1
1
Figure 5.1: Scenario trees for an extended and an immediate exit from nuclear power
in France
The benchmark scenarios (denoted by “exit 2020”, “exit 2025”, “exit 2030”, “exit 2035”
and “no exit” in Table 5.1) are deterministic cases in which we identify the costs and
necessary modifications of the system under perfect foresight, i.e., all investors know
what will happen in the future and when. These scenarios are complemented by three
stochastic cases that vary in the probability of a phase-out decision during the time up
to 2050 (denoted by “high prob”, “low prob” and “medium prob” in Table 5.1).
31The model is implemented in GAMS and solved using CPLEX. Solving the model on an Intel(R)
Xeon(R) (2 processors, each 2.67 GHz) with 96.0 GB RAM takes on average (depending on the scenario
setting) between 12 and 24 hours.
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We perform two sensitivity analyses: The first deals with the form of the phase-out
decision, i.e., whether the phase-out/exit (denoted by “E” in Figure 5.1) takes place
immediately after the decision or over an extended period of 15 years (see Figure 5.1).
The second sensitivity analysis introduces the possibility of a prolongation of lifetimes of
existing nuclear power plants in France. In the sensitivity analysis, lifetimes of existing
French nuclear power plants can be prolonged beyond their license period of 40 years.
In order to fulfill the required safety standards for a lifetime prolongation, significant
investments have to be made. Previous studies have estimated additional costs for a
prolongation of nuclear power plant lifetimes by another 20 years in France to amount
to 55 billion e (Lundgren and Patel, 2012). Based on these figures, we estimate nuclear
retrofit costs in France to amount to 870 e 2010/kW. By way of comparison, the German
government in 2010 assumed retrofit costs for existing nuclear power plants in Germany
of 500 e /kW for a lifetime prolongation of 20 years (Prognos, 2010).
We use the following abbreviations for our model runs: “15y w/o prolongation” indi-
cates the upper scenario tree without the option for prolongation of existing nuclear
power plants in France; “15y prolongation” indicates that we allow for prolongation.
Abbreviations for the lower scenario tree are defined analogously.
Table 5.1: Probabilities of the different states in the model runs
State 1 State 2 State 3 State 4 State 5
high prob 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.80
medium prob 0.125 0.125 0.125 0.125 0.5
low prob 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
exit 2020 1 0 0 0 0
exit 2025 0 1 0 0 0
exit 2030 0 0 1 0 0
exit 2035 0 0 0 1 0
no exit 0 0 0 0 1
5.4 Data and Assumptions
The main parameter assumptions entering the model are demand development, fossil fuel
and CO2 prices, technical and economic parameters of the power plants (in particular,
investment and retrofit costs) as well as the development of renewable power deployment.
The presentation of data in this section is based on the assumptions in Fu¨rsch et al.
(2012a) and Prognos (2010).
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5.4.1 Electricity demand
We assume a slightly increasing electricity demand in France, rising to 543 TWhel in
2030 and decreasing moderately decrease to 522 TWhel in 2050, predominantly driven
by the uptake of energy efficiency measures (see Table 5.2). Concerning the rest of
Europe, we assume moderate growth rates of on average 0.9% p.a. between 2010 and
2050, resulting in a net electricity demand in the modeled regions (excluding France) of
3089 TWhel in 2050.
32
Table 5.2: Net electricity demand in TWhel in France and Europe (excluding France)
2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
France 501 513 543 533 522
Europe (excl. France) 2161 2455 2666 2871 3089
5.4.2 Fuel and CO2 prices
Fuel prices for power plants are based on international market prices plus transportation
costs to the power plants (see Table 5.3). Prices for hard coal and natural gas are
assumed to increase in the long run up to 14.2 e 2010/MWhth and 31.6 e 2010/MWhth,
respectively.
CO2 prices are assumed to be the same in all model runs and states. They are assumed
to increase in the long run up to 75.1 e 2010/t CO2 in 2050 from 23.9 e 2010/t CO2 in
2020.
Table 5.3: Fuel costs in e 2010/MWhth and CO2 prices in e 2010/t CO2
2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
Coal 11.0 10.1 10.9 11.9 14.2
Natural gas 17.0 23.1 25.9 28.8 31.6
Oil 39.0 47.6 58.0 69.0 81.4
CO2 14.0 23.9 41.3 58.7 75.1
5.4.3 Technical and economic parameters for power plants
We assume the introduction of several new or improved conventional technologies as
well as decreasing investment costs over time due to learning effects (see Table 5.4).
32The modeled regions cover France, the United Kingdom, Spain, Portugal, Italy, Germany, Austria,
Switzerland, Belgium, the Netherlands, Poland, the Czech Republic and Denmark-West.
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Table 5.4: Specific investment costs for thermal power plants in e 2010/kW
2020 2030 2040 2050
Nuclear 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,000
Coal 1,300 1,300 1,300 1,300
Coal (innovative) 2,250 1,875 1,700 1,650
CCGT 950 950 950 950
OCGT 400 400 400 400
IGCC-CCS - 2,039 1,986 1,782
CCGT-CCS - 1,173 1,133 1,020
Coal-CCS - 1,848 1,800 1,752
Coal -CCS (innovative) - 2,423 2,263 2,102
5.4.4 Development of RES-E
RES-E development is treated exogenously in our analysis and is not optimized over
time within the model. We assume a strong expansion of RES-E generation in France,
reaching 277 TWh in 2050 up from 152 TWh in 2020 and 85 TWh in 2010 (see Table
5.5). This expansion is driven mainly by photovoltaics and wind power technologies.
RES-E development is assumed to be the same in all model runs and states.
For the other European countries, we assume a continuous increase of RES-E generation
within the coming decades. This development is driven by an increased deployment of
wind farms, mainly in Denmark, the United Kingdom, Poland and the Netherlands.
Electricity generation from photovoltaics increases primarily in Southern Europe, and
geothermal energy is assumed to play an important role for electricity generation only
in Italy because of its potential for high enthalpic resources. In 2050, RES-E generation
in the European countries accounted for in this analysis (excluding France) is assumed
to amount to 1616 TWh compared to approximately 797 TWh in 2020.
Table 5.5: Development of RES-E generation in France in TWh
2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
Hydro 53 56 56 56 56
Wind onshore 14 47 94 104 100
Wind offshore 0 25 35 40 66
Photovoltaics 1 6 19 28 35
Biomass + Waste 17 17 17 17 17
Geothermal 0 1 3 3 3
Total 85 152 224 247 277
5.5 Results and Discussion
In Subsections 5.5.1 and 5.5.2, we present the deterministic costs of a phase-out from
nuclear power in France and the effect on costs across the rest of the European power
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system. Subsection 5.5.1 specifically deals with the costs of prohibiting the prolonga-
tion of lifetimes of existing nuclear power plants in France. Furthermore, in Subsection
5.5.2, we look at the cost differences between a deterministic phase-out scenario (i.e.,
“exit 2020” to “exit 2035”) and a deterministic scenario with nuclear power available in
France until 2050 (i.e., “no exit”). These values reflect the costs of having to substitute
nuclear power plants in France with other conventional fossil-fueled power technologies
in France and Europe under perfect foresight. In Subsection 5.5.3, in order to bet-
ter assess the effects of uncertainty on costs, we analyze the impact of uncertainty on
investment behavior in nuclear power plants in France. Subsection 5.5.4 explores the
effect of uncertainty on system costs. Costs of uncertainty are given in our analysis by
comparing a stochastic scenario state to the corresponding deterministic scenario (e.g.,
cost differences between State 3 in model run “high prob” and the deterministic model
run “exit 2030”). These costs reflect the inefficiency that is arising in the system due to
political uncertainty.
5.5.1 The cost of prohibiting the prolongation of nuclear power plant
lifetimes in France
The costs of prohibiting lifetime prolongations for existing nuclear power plants in France
are significant. In a scenario without phase-out, these costs amount to 19 billion e 2010
and are mainly driven by higher investment costs as well as higher import costs/lower
export revenues (see Figure 5.2).33 The former is due to the lack of comparably low-
cost nuclear lifetime prolongations which, if available, would reduce investment needs
in newly built capacity, particularly newly built base-load capacity (e.g., nuclear), in
the intermediate term in France. Note that not all nuclear capacity reaching the end
of its licensing period is replaced by newly built (nuclear or other fossil fuel) capacity
in France in the scenario without lifetime prolongations. Therefore, power generation
in France is lower than in the scenario allowing for lifetime prolongations, resulting in
lower exports and higher imports.
Additional system costs in the European power system (including France) amount to 20
billion e 2010 and are, as seen in the previous results, of the same magnitude as additional
costs in France. This reveals that costs are hardly passed from the French to the rest
of the European system, i.e., France has to accept the financial burden of prohibiting
lifetime prolongations. European costs are mainly driven by higher investment costs
(primarily due to higher investment costs in France) and, in addition, by higher variable
33Costs refer to the discounted costs for the whole power system and for the French power system,
accumulated over the time horizon up to 2050. A discount rate of 10% has been assumed.
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costs due to an increased utilization of conventional power plants in the rest of Europe
(see middle bar in Figure 5.2).
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Figure 5.2: Accumulated (discounted) system cost differences differentiated by cost
categories in bn e 2010 (2010-2050): Deterministic cost difference – w/o prolongation
vs. prolongation
5.5.2 The deterministic costs of a nuclear phase-out in France
The French power system can adapt to a phase-out from nuclear power at the expense of
higher system costs in France and Europe (see Figures 5.3 to 5.6). The cost differences in
this subsection reflect the costs of having to substitute (cost competitive) nuclear power
plants in France with other conventional fossil-fueled power technologies in France and
Europe under perfect foresight.
Additional (deterministic) costs in France of a phase-out can be significant, amounting
to 76 billion e 2010 in a scenario with an immediate nuclear phase-out in 2020 compared
to a scenario without nuclear phase-out and the possibility of prolonging the lifetime of
existing nuclear plants (see Figure 5.6).
Deterministic cost differences in France are mainly driven by higher variable costs due
to increased utilization of existing and newly built fossil-fueled power plants as well as a
reduction in export revenues/higher import costs. The latter is due to lower exports and
higher imports (in particular, from Germany) as not all phased-out nuclear generation
is replaced by other generation technologies within France. Investment costs are lower
in phase-out scenarios without prolongation opportunities due to the non-availability of
nuclear power plant investments. Nuclear power plants, with comparably high invest-
ment costs, are in part replaced by other fossil-fueled power plants. Investment costs are
typically higher in phase-out scenarios with prolongation opportunities, indicating that
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Figure 5.3: Accumulated (discounted) system cost differences differentiated by cost cat-
egories in bn e 2010 (2010-2050): Deterministic cost difference – 15y w/o prolongation
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Figure 5.4: Accumulated (discounted) system cost differences differentiated by cost
categories in bn e 2010 (2010-2050): Deterministic cost difference – 15y prolongation
nuclear capacity is prolonged even though it has to be replaced by newly built (fossil
fuel) capacities after the phase-out.
Additional (deterministic) costs in the European system (including France) of a French
nuclear phase-out are incurred to a large extent by the French power system, with only a
small fraction being passed onto the rest of the power system (see Figures 5.3 to 5.6).34
Additional costs in the European system are mainly driven by higher variable costs
due to the non-availability of low-cost nuclear power in France. Conventional fossil-
fueled power plants are utilized more often in France and the rest of Europe leading to
higher CO2 emissions in the European power system. Total investment costs in Europe
34In the figures shown in this subsection as well as the following, we refrain from showing the cost
components for Europe excl. France for better readability since the cost components follow a similar
pattern to the one displayed in Figure 5.2. For the stochastic cases, data may be found in Appendix D.
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Figure 5.5: Accumulated (discounted) system cost differences differentiated by cost
categories in bn e 2010 (2010-2050): Deterministic cost difference – 0y w/o prolongation
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Figure 5.6: Accumulated (discounted) system cost differences differentiated by cost
categories in bn e 2010 (2010-2050): Deterministic cost difference – 0y prolongation
follow a similar pattern as the one described above for the French system, i.e., total
investment costs are typically lower in the case of no prolongation opportunities and
higher otherwise.
We find that deterministic cost differences in France and Europe follow two main pat-
terns: First, they are clearly higher under an immediate phase-out (see Figures 5.5 and
5.6) compared to a scenario with a prolonged phase-out (see Figures 5.3 and 5.4). Sec-
ond, the later the phase-out occurs, the stronger the reduction in system cost differences
will be. The first point bears a clear policy implication: Policy makers are well-advised
to opt for extended phase-out periods if a phase-out is to be introduced. Additional
costs are substantially lower in this case.
Chapter 5. The future of nuclear power in France: an analysis of the costs of
phasing-out 93
5.5.3 Investment in nuclear power under uncertainty
We observe significant deviations from deterministically socially-optimal investments
under uncertainty. Intuitively speaking, one would expect over-investment in nuclear
power and under-investment in alternative base-load technologies under uncertainty in
states with an early phase-out. Analogously, intuition suggests that uncertainty leads
to under-investment in nuclear power in states with either no or a late phase-out. How-
ever, deviations from this intuition are possible due to the possibility of prolonging the
lifetimes of existing nuclear power plants in certain model runs. Obviously, the high
number of model runs computed does not allow for a discussion of all arising patterns.
Figures 5.7 to 5.10 therefore illustrate the typical investment patterns that may arise
and that help to clarify the system cost effects described in the next subsection.
Uncertainty may lower investments in new nuclear capacity in 2025 for scenario states
with either no or a late nuclear phase-out (i.e., States 4 or 5) under a setting with no
possible lifetime prolongations. In the example presented in Figure 5.7, this in turn leads
to catch-up effects after 2030 once the uncertainty (in the model) has been resolved. The
level of this effect is correlated to the probability of a phase-out occuring, i.e., investments
in 2025 are lower in the model run “high prob” than in “low prob”, followed by a more
pronounced catch-up effect in “high prob” than in “low prob”.
Figure 5.7: Investment in nuclear power in France in GW: 15y w/o prolongation
Allowing for lifetime prolongations, a greater amount of existing nuclear capacity may be
prolonged under uncertainty in scenario states with either no or a late nuclear phase-out
(see State 5 in Figure 5.8). Less nuclear capacity is typically retrofitted under uncertainty
in scenario states with an early phase-out (see State 3 in Figure 5.8). The investments in
2020 are basically retrofit investments in existing nuclear capacity, with 1.6 GW being
newly-built capacity. Here, the nuclear power plant Flamanville is assumed to be online
in the model. New nuclear power plants are only built in State 5 after 2040. Remarkably,
the increase in retrofit investments in 2020 in State 5 appears to have no effect on new
nuclear power plant investments or retrofit investments thereafter.
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Figure 5.8: Investment in nuclear power in France in GW: 15y prolongation
Investment levels may be much higher under uncertainty than what is considered to be
deterministically socially optimal. In State 4 in Figure 5.9, investment levels at the so-
cial optimum under uncertainty are between investments in the model runs “exit 2035”
and “no exit”.35 Investments in the “low prob” model run thus amount to 11.4 GW
in 2025 and 22.3 GW in 2030 compared to no investment in “exit 2035”. The max-
imum difference in State 5 is achieved in the years 2025 and 2030, at which time we
see no investments in nuclear power plants in France in “high prob” compared to the
deterministically socially-optimal levels of 14.3 GW in 2025 and 22.0 GW in 2030 in
“no exit”.
Figure 5.9: Investment in nuclear power in France in GW: 0y w/o prolongation
Figure 5.10 illustrates investment patterns under uncertainty with prolongation oppor-
tunities. Allowing for the prolongation of existing nuclear capacity, more capacity life-
times are prolonged in State 3 in the “low prob” case due to the high investment levels
in “no exit”. However, with higher probability of phasing-out, even less capacity is
prolonged in State 3 in “high prob” than in “exit 2030”.
35Higher investment levels in 2030 compared to the “no exit” level are again due to catch-up effects.
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Figure 5.10: Investment in nuclear power in France in GW: 0y prolongation
5.5.4 Costs of uncertainty
Costs of uncertainty are given by comparing a stochastic scenario state to the corre-
sponding deterministic scenario. Due to the large number of calculations performed,
we only show selected results in this subsection. Cost figures for all model runs can be
found in Appendix D.
Costs of uncertainty in France and Europe are rather small in most model runs and
states. In fact, costs can amount to 6 billion e 2010 in a setting with a high probability
of a phase-out and no possibility of prolongation for existing nuclear power plants (see
model run “high prob” in Figure 5.11).
Costs of uncertainty in France in the case of no phase-out from nuclear power and a
setting without prolongation opportunities are to a large extent driven by a change in the
trade balance (i.e., lower export revenues and higher import costs) and lower investment
costs (see Figures 5.11 and 5.12). The effect concerning variable costs is not unique:
While variable costs are higher under uncertainty in model run “high prob” in Figure
5.11, they are lower in “low prob” and “medium prob”.
Costs of uncertainty in France follow two main patterns: First, costs are typically lower
in scenarios with an extended phase-out period of 15 years than in scenarios with an
immediate phase-out from nuclear power (compare Figures 5.11 and 5.12). Second, costs
of uncertainty typically increase with increasing probability of a phase-out in states with
either no or a late phase-out (see Figure 5.11). Similarly, costs of uncertainty increase
with decreasing probability of phasing-out in states with an early phase-out (see Figure
5.13).
Costs of uncertainty for the European power system (including France) follow similar
patterns. Costs are typically lower in scenarios with an extended phase-out period.
Additional costs are mainly caused by higher variable costs under uncertainty in the
case of either no or a late phase-out without the possibility of lifetime prolongations (see
Chapter 5. The future of nuclear power in France: an analysis of the costs of
phasing-out 96
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
20
FR EU FR EU FR EU
low_prob medium_prob high_prob
bn
 €
20
10
Investment costs Fixed O&M costs Variable costs Trade balance Net difference
Figure 5.11: Accumulated (discounted) system cost differences differentiated by cost
categories in bn e 2010 (2010-2050): Cost of uncertainty – 0y w/o prolongation – State
5
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Figure 5.12: Accumulated (discounted) system cost differences differentiated by cost
categories in bn e 2010 (2010-2050): Cost of uncertainty – 15y w/o prolongation – State
5
Figures 5.11 and 5.12). When allowing for prolongation, the effect concerning variable
and investment costs is ambiguous. For instance, investment costs may be higher in the
case of an early phase-out (see Figure 5.14) due to over-investment in nuclear power
plants in France, as illustrated in Figure 5.10. However, lower investment costs are also
possible in the case of an early phase-out (see Figure 5.13) due to fewer prolongations
of existing nuclear power plant lifetimes under uncertainty.
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Figure 5.13: Accumulated (discounted) system cost differences differentiated by cost
categories in bn e 2010 (2010-2050): Cost of uncertainty – 15y prolongation – State 2
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Figure 5.14: Accumulated (discounted) system cost differences differentiated by cost
categories in bn e 2010 (2010-2050): Cost of uncertainty – 0y prolongation – State 3
5.6 Conclusion and Policy Implications
This paper provides a model-based analysis of the possible future role of nuclear power
in France. We have investigated different scenarios of nuclear policy in France, both
under perfect foresight and under uncertainty. We have shown that a phase-out from
nuclear power in France leads to higher system costs in the power sector. These costs
are mainly borne by the French system, and the cost effects for the rest of the European
power system are rather limited.
Our finding that extended phase-out periods lead to lower costs is in line with the exam-
ples of Belgium and Switzerland as these countries have opted for extended phase-out
periods. Furthermore, our analysis suggests that the costs of uncertainty are surprisingly
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low when compared to the costs of phasing out. Further, supported by information the-
oretic arguments, this finding presents a strong case, at least in this application, against
a long-term commitment by policy makers to future nuclear policy.
Further research could address the full costs of nuclear power operation. Such an analysis
should include an investigation of the risk-costs of nuclear power plant operation. A
further promising research avenue may be the investigation of the possible additional
burden of a phase-out for different consumer groups in France and Europe. Bearing in
mind that most of the heating in France is electricity based, rising wholesale prices for
electricity as a result of increasing system costs in France are of particular political and
social relevance. We emphasize that our analysis could also be applied to other forms
of political uncertainty such as government intervention in the market through support
schemes for renewables, capacity markets or the introduction/extension of CO2 cap-and-
trade schemes.
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A.1 Econometric Appendix
Wald test of perfect competition
As proposed by Ellis and Halvorsen (2002), we test our results regarding market power
exertion against a null hypothesis of perfectly competitive price-taking behavior. Within
our framework, perfect competition corresponds to β0 = β1 = β2 = β3 = β4 = 0. We
test the rejection of this null hypothesis using a Wald test. The resulting mean of the
test statistic is found to be 36.492 (std. dev. 4.701). With a critical value 15.09, we
reject the hypothesis of perfectly competitive behavior at the 1%-level.
Polynomial representation of β(t)
We estimate the Model 1 system of equations with five different polynomial representa-
tions of the time-varying mark-up. The specifications are as follows:
 Scalar representation: β(t) = β0
 Linear representation: β(t) = β0 + β1T
 Quadratic representation: β(t) = β0 + β1T + β2T
2
 Cubic representation: β(t) = β0 + β1T + β2T
2 + β3T
3
 Biquadratic representation: β(t) = β0 + β1T + β2T
2 + β3T
3 + β4T
4
The estimation for the first four models are given in Table A.1 (scalar representation),
Table A.2 (linear representation), Table A.3 (quadratic representation), Table A.4 (cubic
representation) and Table 2.5 (biquadratic representation).
The results clearly show that the polynomial in β(t) is only statistically significant for
higher order approximations. Apart from that, almost all other estimates are relatively
robust for different specifications. Therefore, we use the biquadratic specification as it
reflects a higher order Taylor-approximation to the actual β(t)-function.
Appendix A. Supplementary Material for Chapter 2 101
Table A.1: Scalar repr.: Estimation results for model without dynamic optimality
condition
Parameter Estimate p-value Std. Error
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
α0 20.719 0.034 7.35E-38
∗∗∗ 4.01E-37 0.103 7.31E-3
αQ 3.03E-8 3.20E-9 7.10E-10
∗∗∗ 4.47E-10 2.98E-9 2.51E-10
αK = 1− αL 0.102 1.32E-5 2.96E-54∗∗∗ 1.37E-54 1.08E-4 1.99E-6
αE 2.144 0.100 2.53E-10
∗∗∗ 7.34E-10 0.186 0.019
αS -0.187 0.136 0.195 0.228 0.114 0.038
γKK -6.43E-4 2.78E-4 0.133
+ 0.141 3.39E-4 3.73E-5
γQQ 3.47E-8 2.72E-9 9.30E-4
∗∗∗ 6.76E-4 8.96E-9 8.34E-10
γEE 1.208 0.266 0.077
∗ 0.096 0.591 0.105
γKQ = −γLQ -8.70E-9 2.74E-9 0.198 0.119 6.06E-9 5.78E-10
γKE = −γLE 2.33E-3 6.35E-5 9.04E-10∗∗∗ 1.23E-9 2.30E-4 9.38E-6
γQE -4.17E-8 4.20E-9 3.50E-7
∗∗∗ 2.33E-7 5.84E-9 5.03E-10
β0 5.276 4.253 0.199 0.233 2.725 0.221
τMFM 26.427 8.941 0.567 0.124 44.715 2.824
τCAP 70.925 40.873 0.633 0.169 139.993 8.118
%LAU 18.112 1.778 0.028
∗∗ 0.012 7.622 0.336
%LKZ -9.679 4.604 0.279 0.200 7.603 0.408
%KAU 32.773 2.439 0.100
+ 0.032 18.950 1.059
%KKZ 3.032 0.680 0.602 0.090 5.715 0.352
τINV 10.810 0.079 3.25E-16
∗∗∗ 5.74E-16 0.508 0.030
%SAU 39.729 1.781 1.24E-3
∗∗∗ 9.36E-4 10.627 0.638
%SKZ -7.900 2.813 0.392 0.183 8.634 0.481
Observations 50×44
Adjusted R2 Eq. (2.18): mean 0.54 std. dev. 0.05, Eq. (2.21): mean 0.62 std. dev. 0.1,
Eq. (2.26): mean 0.27 std. dev. 0.22, Eq. (2.28): mean 0.54 std. Dev. 0.05
∗∗∗ p < 0.01,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗ p < 0.1,+ p < 0.15
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Table A.2: Linear repr.: Estimation results for model without dynamic optimality
condition
Parameter Estimate p-value Std. Error
Mean std. dev. Mean std. dev. Mean std. dev.
α0 20.720 0.033 1.93E-36
∗∗∗ 1.04E-35 0.103 7.22E-3
αQ 2.92E-8 5.37E-9 1.06E-7
∗∗∗ 1.44E-7 3.57E-9 3.84E-10
αK = 1− αL 0.102 1.52E-5 3.97E-52∗∗∗ 1.70E-52 1.09E-4 2.00E-6
αE 2.134 0.090 7.05E-10
∗∗∗ 1.78E-9 0.194 0.016
αS -0.187 0.136 0.190 0.221 0.114 0.038
γKK -6.41E-4 2.73E-4 0.135
+ 0.144 3.40E-4 3.71E-5
γQQ 3.25E-8 6.57E-9 5.59E-3
∗∗∗ 4.72E-3 1.01E-8 1.11E-9
γEE 1.244 0.291 0.073
∗ 0.091 0.596 0.103
γKQ = −γLQ -8.09E-9 3.94E-9 0.273 0.173 6.26E-9 8.94E-10
γKE = −γLE 2.32E-3 6.09E-5 2.53E-9∗∗∗ 2.51E-9 2.38E-4 6.49E-6
γQE -4.01E-8 7.36E-9 6.99E-6
∗∗∗ 7.42E-6 6.56E-9 7.76E-10
β0 3.991 6.864 0.341 0.324 3.419 0.337
β1 -0.073 0.151 0.511 0.222 0.204 0.022
τMFM 26.308 8.868 0.565 0.127 44.434 3.545
τCAP 74.217 43.037 0.624 0.169 141.053 9.315
%LAU 17.868 1.996 0.031
∗∗ 0.013 7.598 0.387
%LKZ -9.040 6.017 0.328 0.239 7.570 0.480
%KAU 31.976 2.402 0.116
+ 0.028 19.422 1.500
%KKZ 4.100 1.983 0.525 0.211 6.110 0.401
τINV 10.769 0.103 1.45E-15
∗∗∗ 2.76E-15 0.515 0.034
%SAU 39.095 2.419 1.44E-3
∗∗∗ 1.21E-3 10.546 0.792
%SKZ -7.759 2.689 0.418 0.178 9.069 0.586
Observations 50×44
Adjusted R2 Eq. (2.18): mean 0.54 std. dev. 0.05, Eq. (2.21): mean 0.62 std. dev. 0.1,
Eq. (2.26): mean 0.27 std. dev. 0.22, Eq. (2.28): mean 0.54 std. dev. 0.05
∗∗∗ p < 0.01,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗ p < 0.1,+ p < 0.15
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Table A.3: Quadratic repr.: Estimation results for model without dynamic optimality
condition
Parameter Estimate p-value Std. Error
Mean std. dev. Mean std. dev. Mean std. dev.
α0 20.729 0.037 7.48E-35
∗∗∗ 4.25E-34 0.105 7.40E-3
αQ 2.27E-8 3.73E-9 1.52E-8
∗∗∗ 3.73E-8 2.42E-9 2.61E-10
αK = 1− αL 0.102 1.89E-5 7.29E-50∗∗∗ 2.60E-50 1.11E-4 1.93E-6
αE 1.894 0.130 9.09E-9
∗∗∗ 2.04E-8 0.197 0.020
αS -0.214 0.149 0.197 0.275 0.116 0.041
γKK -4.94E-4 1.89E-4 0.214 0.163 3.46E-4 3.97E-5
γQQ 2.78E-8 3.92E-9 4.98E-4
∗∗∗ 4.51E-4 6.50E-9 6.49E-10
γEE 1.556 0.316 0.046
∗∗ 0.090 0.616 0.096
γKQ = −γLQ -8.33E-9 1.38E-9 0.043∗∗ 0.036 3.62E-9 4.06E-10
γKE = −γLE 2.10E-3 9.00E-5 1.70E-8∗∗∗ 9.03E-9 2.37E-4 1.13E-5
γQE -2.66E-8 3.34E-9 5.85E-6
∗∗∗ 4.45E-6 4.35E-9 5.27E-10
β0 -7.353 4.180 0.109
+ 0.227 2.718 0.390
β1 0.099 0.149 0.577 0.292 0.158 0.023
β2 0.048 8.32E-3 5.33E-4
∗∗∗ 8.43E-4 0.011 1.32E-3
τMFM 37.310 15.355 0.271 0.157 30.708 2.457
τCAP 71.237 18.597 0.508 0.119 104.568 6.159
%LAU 13.218 1.714 0.042
∗∗ 0.037 5.824 0.373
%LKZ 2.280 4.014 0.530 0.237 5.575 0.348
%KAU 37.954 3.371 0.011
∗∗ 6.59E-3 13.294 1.016
%KKZ 8.187 1.531 0.092
∗ 0.075 4.328 0.307
τINV 10.577 0.172 2.49E-16
∗∗∗ 5.99E-16 0.433 0.028
%SAU 21.975 3.417 0.016
∗∗ 0.047 7.459 0.517
%SKZ -9.784 2.305 0.180 0.117 6.643 0.465
Observations 50×44
Adjusted R2 Eq. (2.18): mean 0.54 std. dev. 0.05, Eq. (2.21): mean 0.62 std. dev. 0.1,
Eq. (2.26): mean 0.27 std. dev. 0.22, Eq. (2.28): mean 0.54 std. dev. 0.05
∗∗∗ p < 0.01,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗ p < 0.1,+ p < 0.15
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Table A.4: Cubic repr.: Estimation results for model without dynamic optimality con-
dition
Parameter Estimate p-value Std. Error
Mean std. dev. Mean std. dev. Mean std. dev.
α0 20.722 0.036 1.58E-33
∗∗∗ 8.58E-33 0.105 7.50E-3
αQ 2.36E-8 4.19E-9 9.80E-8
∗∗∗ 3.76E-7 2.68E-9 3.10E-10
αK = 1− αL 0.102 2.00E-5 8.78E-48∗∗∗ 2.81E-48 1.10E-4 1.84E-6
αE 1.910 0.129 1.30E-8
∗∗∗ 2.78E-8 0.198 0.020
αS -0.215 0.149 0.189 0.271 0.116 0.041
γKK -4.79E-4 1.85E-4 0.228 0.169 3.46E-4 3.97E-5
γQQ 2.79E-8 4.26E-9 1.37E-3
∗∗∗ 1.05E-3 7.24E-9 8.20E-10
γEE 1.549 0.308 0.045
∗∗ 0.082 0.616 0.096
γKQ = −γLQ -8.05E-9 1.52E-9 0.072∗ 0.063 3.96E-9 5.42E-10
γKE = −γLE 2.13E-3 9.26E-5 2.53E-8∗∗∗ 1.36E-8 2.39E-4 1.16E-5
γQE -2.80E-8 3.97E-9 1.14E-5
∗∗∗ 8.09E-6 4.75E-9 7.02E-10
β0 -6.516 4.643 0.126
+ 0.234 2.969 0.439
β1 0.219 0.172 0.392 0.250 0.209 0.033
β2 0.047 8.44E-3 4.30E-3
∗∗∗ 6.84E-3 0.014 1.81E-3
β3 -5.09E-4 2.71E-4 0.581 0.171 8.99E-4 1.09E-4
τMFM 38.888 15.631 0.265 0.133 31.737 2.967
τCAP 71.533 21.270 0.517 0.135 106.829 7.661
%LAU 14.204 1.694 0.048
∗∗ 0.036 6.491 0.376
%LKZ 1.615 4.604 0.564 0.254 5.994 0.507
%KAU 36.335 3.637 0.020
∗∗ 0.011 14.085 1.316
%KKZ 7.150 1.544 0.152 0.109 4.505 0.375
τINV 10.644 0.187 1.63E-15
∗∗∗ 5.33E-15 0.440 0.034
%SAU 22.509 3.909 0.026
∗∗ 0.080 8.187 0.561
%SKZ -9.100 2.692 0.238 0.157 6.994 0.586
Observations 50×44
Adjusted R2 Eq. (2.18): mean 0.54 std. dev. 0.05, Eq. (2.21): mean 0.62 std. dev. 0.1,
Eq. (2.26): mean 0.27 std. dev. 0.22, Eq. (2.28): mean 0.54 std. dev. 0.05
∗∗∗ p < 0.01,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗ p < 0.1,+ p < 0.15
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Additional tables for the estimation results of Model 1
Table A.5: Estimation results for model without dynamic optimality condition: coeffi-
cients
Parameter Estimate
Min 25%-quantile Mean 75%-quantile Max
α0 20.651 20.695 20.715 20.734 20.865
αQ 1.26E-8 1.41E-8 1.57E-8 1.69E-8 2.13E-8
αK = 1− αL 0.102 0.102 0.102 0.102 0.102
αE 1.906 2.062 2.116 2.173 2.314
αS -0.512 -0.252 -0.204 -0.126 0.083
γKK -1.07E-3 -6.04E-4 -4.72E-4 -3.49E-4 -1.26E-4
γQQ 1.00E-8 1.14E-8 1.34E-8 1.48E-8 2.09E-8
γEE 0.700 1.526 1.665 1.890 2.284
γKQ = −γLQ -1.29E-8 -9.95E-9 -9.39E-9 -8.45E-9 -5.81E-9
γKE = −γLE 2.12E-3 2.31E-3 2.35E-3 2.39E-3 2.47E-3
γQE -2.57E-8 -2.04E-8 -1.93E-8 -1.80E-8 -1.62E-8
β0 -21.208 -19.674 -18.297 -17.390 -12.319
β1 -0.171 -0.014 0.038 0.093 0.212
β2 0.090 0.098 0.112 0.116 0.158
β3 -1.34E-3 -1.07E-3 -8.98E-4 -7.60E-4 -2.79E-4
β4 -2.87E-4 -1.92E-4 -1.84E-4 -1.56E-4 -1.37E-4
τMFM -2.020 8.774 14.216 17.448 42.922
τCAP 49.882 84.249 93.717 103.215 127.432
%LAU 12.322 13.657 14.580 15.169 17.976
%LKZ 5.684 9.059 10.609 12.322 13.639
%KAU 19.332 23.716 25.376 26.697 33.292
%KKZ 5.916 8.167 8.555 9.143 9.918
τINV 10.490 10.642 10.713 10.771 10.968
%SAU 15.600 18.387 19.788 21.273 26.506
%SKZ -9.671 -6.181 -4.434 -2.917 0.379
Observations 50×44
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Table A.6: Estimation results for model without dynamic optimality condition: coeffi-
cients
Parameter p-value
Min 25%-quantile Mean 75%-quantile Max
α0 6.29E-34 2.91E-33 3.14E-32 1.08E-32 1.07E-30
αQ 1.98E-6 1.58E-5 3.25E-5 4.46E-5 8.68E-5
αK = 1− αL 4.72E-46 1.02E-45 1.36E-45 1.66E-45 2.41E-45
αE 8.55E-10 2.54E-9 9.23E-9 9.64E-9 9.57E-8
αS 1.36E-4 0.020 0.174 0.234 0.956
γKK 0.026 0.104 0.237 0.300 0.712
γQQ 0.020 0.065 0.104 0.142 0.248
γEE 7.03E-4 4.72E-3 0.031 0.023 0.326
γKQ = −γLQ 1.18E-3 8.75E-3 0.021 0.025 0.137
γKE = −γLE 9.33E-9 1.61E-8 2.89E-8 3.21E-8 1.55E-7
γQE 5.47E-5 2.38E-4 5.68E-4 7.31E-4 1.90E-3
β0 8.94E-6 3.80E-5 7.66E-4 4.32E-4 0.013
β1 0.365 0.626 0.741 0.907 0.994
β2 5.35E-5 4.29E-4 1.11E-3 1.56E-3 5.05E-3
β3 0.146 0.221 0.318 0.365 0.735
β4 4.20E-4 4.05E-3 0.011 0.015 0.041
τMFM 0.150 0.530 0.617 0.727 0.933
τCAP 0.172 0.260 0.324 0.357 0.591
%LAU 7.60E-3 0.020 0.028 0.033 0.062
%LKZ 9.64E-3 0.022 0.076 0.112 0.330
%KAU 9.17E-3 0.032 0.049 0.049 0.144
%KKZ 0.012 0.025 0.041 0.046 0.134
τINV 1.84E-16 3.03E-16 3.66E-16 4.11E-16 6.38E-16
%SAU 3.37E-3 9.07E-3 0.016 0.020 0.040
%SKZ 0.136 0.341 0.513 0.666 0.999
Observations 50×44
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Table A.7: Estimation results for model without dynamic optimality condition: coeffi-
cients
Parameter Std. Error
Min 25%-quantile Mean 75%-quantile Max
α0 0.093 0.101 0.105 0.108 0.138
αQ 2.54E-9 2.66E-9 2.82E-9 3.00E-9 3.30E-9
αK = 1− αL 1.06E-4 1.10E-4 1.11E-4 1.13E-4 1.15E-4
αE 0.184 0.200 0.211 0.218 0.261
αS 0.060 0.085 0.116 0.132 0.259
γKK 2.83E-4 3.11E-4 3.49E-4 3.83E-4 4.44E-4
γQQ 6.72E-9 7.09E-9 7.58E-9 8.07E-9 8.94E-9
γEE 0.468 0.534 0.606 0.687 0.840
γKQ = −γLQ 3.04E-9 3.20E-9 3.47E-9 3.72E-9 4.30E-9
γKE = −γLE 2.43E-4 2.54E-4 2.59E-4 2.64E-4 2.72E-4
γQE 3.90E-9 4.18E-9 4.53E-9 4.89E-9 5.59E-9
β0 3.533 3.687 3.910 4.129 4.536
β1 0.183 0.192 0.209 0.225 0.258
β2 0.024 0.026 0.028 0.030 0.034
β3 7.56E-4 7.93E-4 8.45E-4 8.99E-4 1.02E-3
β4 5.30E-5 5.63E-5 6.13E-5 6.60E-5 7.53E-5
τMFM 23.666 24.987 26.319 27.623 30.055
τCAP 84.385 87.785 91.125 94.147 101.531
%LAU 5.753 5.935 6.012 6.051 6.356
%LKZ 4.739 4.957 5.183 5.387 5.898
%KAU 10.394 11.055 11.694 12.230 13.659
%KKZ 3.481 3.639 3.809 3.948 4.356
τINV 0.410 0.415 0.419 0.422 0.431
%SAU 6.883 7.054 7.268 7.457 8.009
%SKZ 5.828 6.146 6.446 6.724 7.362
Observations 50×44
A.2 Robustness Checks
Estimation without higher order transformations of exogenous variables
as instrumental variables
As discussed in Section 2.4, our system of equations will be nonlinear in endogenous vari-
ables due to transformations of the endogenous variables (e.g., interactions with other
variables and squaring). To address potential endogeneity issues, we follow Wooldridge
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(2002) (Chapter 9.5) and use a set of squared and higher-order transformations of ex-
ogenous variables. To test our choice of variables, we estimate Model 1 and Model 2
with a reduced set of instrumental variables. Instead of using lnQ3, lnQ4, lnS3, lnS4,
lnP 3, lnP 4, T , T 2, as well as the exogenous variables already used in our estimation
equations, we use the exogenous variables already used in our estimation equations, as
well as T , T 2. The estimation results are given in Tables A.8, A.9 and A.10.
Table A.8: Simplified instruments: Estimation results for model without dynamic op-
timality condition
Parameter Estimate p-value Std. Error
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
α0 20.620 0.045 9.78E-31
∗∗∗ 3.10E-30 0.126 0.010
αQ 2.58E-8 1.47E-9 2.47E-3
∗∗∗ 7.55E-4 7.34E-9 1.71E-10
αK = 1− αL 0.102 3.10E-6 1.26E-44∗∗∗ 6.00E-45 1.25E-4 3.14E-6
αE 2.473 0.170 3.05E-7
∗∗∗ 1.04E-6 0.291 0.031
αS -0.134 0.264 0.293 0.312 0.154 0.057
γKK -2.41E-4 2.13E-4 0.588 0.245 4.26E-4 4.27E-5
γQQ 4.82E-8 2.44E-9 6.12E-3
∗∗∗ 2.30E-3 1.55E-8 3.42E-10
γEE 2.667 0.688 0.043
∗∗ 0.041 1.110 0.148
γKQ = −γLQ -3.64E-8 1.40E-9 2.82E-4∗∗∗ 7.38E-5 8.17E-9 2.05E-10
γKE = −γLE 2.83E-3 9.84E-5 2.07E-7∗∗∗ 1.39E-7 3.55E-4 9.94E-6
γQE -1.56E-8 1.12E-9 0.104
+ 0.026 9.05E-9 3.02E-10
β0 -5.547 1.514 0.545 0.107 8.955 0.207
β1 0.927 0.097 0.122
+ 0.028 0.567 0.020
β2 0.131 0.019 0.017
∗∗ 9.94E-3 0.047 1.61E-3
β3 7.44E-3 3.74E-4 1.21E-3
∗∗∗ 3.19E-4 1.95E-3 5.06E-5
β4 1.00E-4 4.12E-5 0.352 0.181 1.02E-4 3.02E-6
τMFM -44.119 13.153 0.570 0.118 75.759 3.626
τCAP 281.212 53.205 0.269 0.083 241.570 10.473
%LAU 19.536 1.396 0.135
+ 0.026 12.442 0.525
%LKZ -31.898 3.518 0.044
∗∗ 0.015 14.613 0.556
%KAU 106.437 8.349 0.038
∗∗ 8.41E-3 47.374 1.901
%KKZ -0.874 2.442 0.874 0.101 11.755 0.491
τINV 10.264 0.205 1.77E-10
∗∗∗ 1.72E-10 0.822 0.039
%SAU 13.419 5.194 0.458 0.113 17.881 0.790
%SKZ 0.025 2.372 0.921 0.072 17.088 0.592
Observations 50×44
Adjusted R2 Eq. (2.18): mean 0.47 std. dev. 0.08, Eq. (2.21): mean 0.43 std. dev. 0.07,
Eq. (2.26): mean 0.57 std. dev. 0.04, Eq. (2.28): mean 0.47 std. Dev. 0.08
∗∗∗ p < 0.01,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗ p < 0.1,+ p < 0.15
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Table A.9: Simplified instruments: Hausman test results for constant interest rates
Interest rate χ2 test statistic p-value
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
0.01 1684.117 5006.961 0.018∗∗ 0.094
0.02 2438.72 10266.476 0.022∗∗ 0.128
0.03 2723.209 10845.397 0.054∗ 0.222
0.04 1553.409 4537.783 0.03∗∗ 0.167
0.05 721.678 2178.448 0.076∗ 0.253
0.06 1544.614 6129.165 0.041∗∗ 0.181
0.07 529.064 1133.182 0.057∗ 0.232
0.08 685.74 1673.32 0.057∗ 0.231
0.09 545.404 869.724 0.057∗ 0.23
0.1 571.335 893.317 0.026∗∗ 0.149
0.11 443.77 694.349 0.022∗∗ 0.12
0.12 429.996 623.075 0.035∗∗ 0.139
0.13 462.302 601.057 0.009∗∗∗ 0.047
0.14 386.714 481.56 0.041∗∗ 0.174
0.15 399.879 537.441 0.037∗∗ 0.161
0.16 444.773 802.049 0.033∗∗ 0.169
0.17 1208.095 4948.531 0.03∗∗ 0.169
0.18 519.925 1117.688 0∗∗∗ 0
0.19 431.879 617.551 0∗∗∗ 0
0.2 569.918 1132.179 0∗∗∗ 0
0.21 503.458 979.483 0∗∗∗ 0
0.22 816.422 2648.744 0∗∗∗ 0
0.23 689.117 1424.815 0∗∗∗ 0
0.24 1376.555 5656.499 0.008∗∗∗ 0.045
0.25 356.417 508.363 0.033∗∗ 0.138
∗∗∗ p < 0.01,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗ p < 0.1,+ p < 0.15
The critical value (CV) for p=0.01 is at 37.566
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Table A.10: Simplified instruments: Hausman test results for proportional variations
of the actual canadian interest rate r
Interest rate χ2 test statistic p-value
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
r · 0.25 2806.53 9795.993 0.017∗∗ 0.101
r · 0.5 4210.452 123.101 0.032∗∗ 0.147
r · 0.75 1783.073 105.781 0.037∗∗ 0.169
r · 1 854.059 100.271 0.049∗∗ 0.186
r · 1.25 1135.411 96.706 0.04∗∗ 0.178
r · 1.5 537.023 98.237 0.029∗∗ 0.167
r · 1.75 524.807 99.078 0.028∗∗ 0.166
r · 2 502.346 104.862 0.027∗∗ 0.156
r · 2.25 479.99 96.347 0.021∗∗ 0.125
r · 2.5 425.095 96.835 0.042∗∗ 0.175
r · 2.75 399.722 98.238 0.013∗∗ 0.053
r · 3 373.576 104.687 0.033∗∗ 0.169
r · 3.25 420.606 108.966 0.038∗∗ 0.173
r · 3.5 868.896 105.875 0.002∗∗∗ 0.01
r · 3.75 507.577 131.428 0∗∗∗ 0
r · 4 443.043 109.229 0∗∗∗ 0
∗∗∗ p < 0.01,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗ p < 0.1,+ p < 0.15
The critical value (CV) for p=0.01 is at 37.566
As can be clearly seen from Tables A.9 and A.10 the results of the Hausman tests
are robust. However, while we find that most coefficient estimates are robust, we find
implausible results for %LKZ . A statistically significant negative estimate would mean
that with increasing labor costs, as a supply shifter, would lead to lower prices. This
however is economically implausible and hence, illustrates biased estimates and the
importance of using higher order instruments.36
Estimation with dummy variables controlling for potential shocks
The observation period used within our estimation, includes two time periods that might
have potential impact on the global uranium market. First, the global financial crisis
of 2008 might have led to a demand reducing shocks. Second, the Fukushima nuclear
disaster and the subsequent shut down of several nuclear power plants could have had
an impact on market price setting. To test whether such effects are observable in the
36We find that out of the 2050 estimates of Model 2 (50 subsamples times 41 different interest rates)
631 face near singular matrices during estimation, exceeding the number of near singular matrices in
our main model by far.
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data, we replace the inverse residual demand function, as given in Equation (2.25), with
the following equation:
P = β lnQ+
∑
k
%k lnVk +
∑
l
τl lnYl +
3∑
i=1
δiDi. (2.25
′)
Equation (2.25′) includes three time dummy variables to capture the above mentioned
potential shocks. The definition of the dummy variables is based on the findings of
spikes in Figure 2.1. D1 equals one for the third quarter of 2008 and zero for any other
time step. D2 equals one for the first quarter of 2012 and zero for any other time step.
D3 equals one for the second quarter of 2012 and zero for any other time step. The
estimation results are given in Tables A.11, A.12 and A.13.
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Table A.11: Shock dummy variables: Estimation results for model without dynamic
optimality condition
Parameter Estimate p-value Std. Error
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
α0 20.710 0.034 6.11E-28
∗∗∗ 2.26E-27 0.107 7.60E-3
αQ 9.96E-9 2.11E-9 0.032
∗∗ 0.104 3.65E-9 1.74E-10
αK = 1− αL 0.102 1.30E-5 4.71E-39∗∗∗ 1.46E-39 1.14E-4 2.22E-6
αE 2.141 0.102 7.02E-8
∗∗∗ 7.51E-8 0.224 0.017
αS -0.188 0.144 0.238 0.256 0.119 0.041
γKK -5.10E-4 2.00E-4 0.212 0.149 3.51E-4 4.28E-5
γQQ 4.72E-9 2.74E-9 0.643 0.137 1.03E-8 6.48E-10
γEE 1.683 0.299 0.031
∗∗ 0.051 0.616 0.089
γKQ = −γLQ -1.01E-8 8.82E-10 0.026∗∗ 9.66E-3 4.07E-9 2.95E-10
γKE = −γLE 2.36E-3 7.63E-5 2.53E-7∗∗∗ 1.41E-7 2.75E-4 7.96E-6
γQE -9.62E-9 1.94E-9 0.178 0.099 6.59E-9 4.73E-10
β0 -25.179 2.065 2.78E-4
∗∗∗ 3.57E-4 5.116 0.262
β1 -0.256 0.146 0.336 0.222 0.224 0.016
β2 0.128 0.024 9.95E-3
∗∗∗ 0.038 0.038 2.79E-3
β3 -7.12E-5 4.44E-4 0.784 0.171 8.99E-4 5.35E-5
β4 -2.26E-4 5.15E-5 0.036
∗∗ 0.108 8.66E-5 6.41E-6
τMFM -32.149 20.166 0.455 0.146 38.613 2.475
τCAP 114.394 42.163 0.448 0.140 140.722 4.889
%LAU 15.328 1.576 0.040
∗∗ 0.013 6.753 0.279
%LKZ 10.536 2.609 0.146
+ 0.120 6.451 0.460
%KAU 24.879 5.490 0.249 0.146 20.145 0.838
%KKZ 13.239 1.112 0.017
∗∗ 6.36E-3 4.944 0.371
τINV 10.490 0.152 1.44E-11
∗∗∗ 9.75E-11 0.486 0.040
%SAU 18.266 2.181 0.054
∗ 0.023 8.580 0.598
%SKZ -0.295 2.846 0.853 0.153 8.592 0.448
δ1 -7.866 4.733 0.454 0.133 10.942 1.023
δ2 7.383 5.645 0.613 0.102 17.296 1.149
δ3 -25.681 7.019 0.222 0.118 19.515 1.615
Observations 50×44
Adjusted R2 Eq. (2.18): mean 0.54 std. dev. 0.05, Eq. (2.21): mean 0.62 std. dev. 0.1,
Eq. (2.26): mean 0.27 std. dev. 0.22, Eq. (2.28): mean 0.54 std. dev. 0.05
∗∗∗ p < 0.01,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗ p < 0.1,+ p < 0.15
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Table A.12: Shock dummy variables: Hausman test results for constant interest rates
Interest rate χ2 test statistic p-value
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
0.01 737.217 1149.548 0.103+ 0.28
0.02 674.936 1181.231 0.067∗ 0.234
0.03 810.951 1295.165 0.104+ 0.302
0.04 765.694 1271.562 0.104+ 0.239
0.05 951.724 2030.274 0.084∗ 0.261
0.06 950.824 1549.972 0.067∗ 0.241
0.07 1105.71 2070.77 0.094∗ 0.282
0.08 813.206 1301.175 0.061∗ 0.211
0.09 868.01 1303.886 0.044∗∗ 0.187
0.1 940.62 1464.42 0.078∗ 0.251
0.11 832.355 1211.427 0.06∗ 0.223
0.12 937.656 1677.771 0.047∗∗ 0.191
0.13 993.898 1716.678 0.064∗ 0.241
0.14 782.812 1308.535 0.049∗∗ 0.191
0.15 804.457 1407.83 0.05∗ 0.189
0.16 5234.076 27117.246 0.083∗ 0.271
0.17 763.876 1175.537 0.064∗ 0.223
0.18 937.014 1621.986 0.05∗ 0.211
0.19 704.424 1186.1 0.05∗ 0.21
0.2 681.163 1157.198 0.077∗ 0.258
0.21 776.816 1303.854 0.064∗ 0.221
0.22 727.61 1183.675 0.074∗ 0.249
0.23 671.346 1104.346 0.046∗∗ 0.188
0.24 638.071 1084.896 0.051∗ 0.186
0.25 755.862 1307.389 0.045∗∗ 0.175
∗∗∗ p < 0.01,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗ p < 0.1,+ p < 0.15
The critical value (CV) for p=0.01 is at 37.566
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Table A.13: Shock dummy variables: Hausman test results for proportional variations
of the actual Canadian interest rate r
Interest rate χ2 test statistic p-value
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
r · 0.25 710.523 1143.932 0.072∗ 0.216
r · 0.5 655.868 56.58 0.065∗ 0.205
r · 0.75 1325.145 50.632 0.102+ 0.25
r · 1 1217.06 64.829 0.047∗∗ 0.19
r · 1.25 924.326 135.989 0.067∗ 0.242
r · 1.5 863.447 102.821 0.064∗ 0.235
r · 1.75 864.167 100.167 0.049∗∗ 0.196
r · 2 1225.145 133.792 0.052∗ 0.192
r · 2.25 844.23 132.805 0.068∗ 0.244
r · 2.5 983.449 111.341 0.067∗ 0.248
r · 2.75 871.569 120.222 0.072∗ 0.243
r · 3 796.647 110.794 0.037∗∗ 0.166
r · 3.25 1068.129 127.346 0.081∗ 0.264
r · 3.5 804.02 127.107 0.103+ 0.266
r · 3.75 777.663 120.227 0.05∗ 0.211
r · 4 703.321 123.534 0.051∗ 0.21
∗∗∗ p < 0.01,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗ p < 0.1,+ p < 0.15
The critical value (CV) for p=0.01 is at 37.566
Again, Tables A.12 and A.13 illustrate the results of the Hausman tests to be robust
even under the alternative specification of the inverse residual demand curve. Further,
we find all coefficient estimates to be robust. Noticeably, no dummy variable coefficient
is statistically significant. Therefore, showing that shock effects on the world market
should not be the factors explaining the negative Lerner index at these points in time.37
A.3 Data Appendix
Summary Statistics
Quantity of uranium extracted, E
Extraction volumes are taken from Cameco (2012b). Missing statements for the fourth
quarter of the years 2008-2012 are calculated using first to third quarter values from
37Out of the 2050 estimates of Model 2 (50 subsamples times 41 different interest rates) 723 models
had near singularity issues during estimation, exceeding the number of near singular matrices in our
main model by far.
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Table A.14: Summary Statistics
Series Mean Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. Observations
B 1.274332 4.070614 0.264269 1.029772 44
lnCR 20.84144 22.94147 19.08893 1.150019 44
lnE 0.022724 1.175044 -1.206911 0.460854 44
lnP 3.333787 4.049799 2.470928 0.520859 44
lnQ -0.054477 0.807969 -1.11201 0.278829 44
lnS -0.042334 1.299977 -5.909206 0.665293 50×44
lnWK 0.00044 0.662086 -0.359989 0.223815 44
lnWL 0.00641 0.294694 -0.570092 0.203949 44
MK 0.102294 0.103997 0.099066 0.001333 44
P 31.75191 57.38593 11.83343 14.49644 44
r¯ 0.033211 0.048234 0.012374 0.009906 44
T 0 21.5 -21.5 12.58251 44
lnVKAU -0.041982 0.134903 -0.29417 0.13467 44
lnVKKZ 0.137492 0.61845 -0.446492 0.315771 44
lnVLAU 0.061223 0.502522 -0.432324 0.258745 44
lnVLKZ -0.085882 0.288374 -0.742886 0.301522 44
lnVSAU -0.044462 0.217286 -0.318706 0.222694 44
lnVSKZ -0.049702 0.18477 -0.298063 0.124974 44
lnYCAP -0.003819 0.012031 -0.031199 0.00964 44
lnYINV 2.98131 3.926857 2.093219 0.502895 44
lnYMFM 0.001745 0.054552 -0.029454 0.027657 44
Cameco (2012b) and annual values from Cameco (2012a).
Quantity of final output, Q
Sales volumes are taken from Cameco (2012b). Missing statements for the fourth quarter
of the years 2008-2012 are calculated using first to third quarter values from Cameco
(2012b) and annual values from Cameco (2012a).
Exploration expenditures, B
Exploration expenditures are given in Cameco (2012b). Quarterly expenditures are di-
rectly stated for the 4th quarter of the following years: 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012.
Using information on annual exploration expenditures (Cameco, 2012a), quarterly values
are calculated. In Cameco (2012b) and Cameco (2012a), monetary values are expressed
in Canadian dollar. Real (2012) values are calculated using the U.S. Consumer price in-
dex (CPI) (U.S. Department of Labor, 2013) (converted to quarterly values by weighting
by the number of days per month) and Canadian to U.S. dollar exchange rates. Ex-
change rates are expressed in Cameco (2012b). Missing data for the 4th quarter 2002
are substituted with data from Bank of Canada (2014a).
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Additional exploration expenditure information for Canada used for estimating the ex-
ploration function, f , is taken from Nuclear Energy Agency (2006). Nominal values are
converted to real (2012) values using Canadian Consumer Price Indices (OECD, 2013).
State of the technology, T
The state of the technology is expressed as a mean-adjusted linear trend.
Market price of final output, P
Data for the first three quarters of each year are taken from Cameco (2012b) using
information on average realized prices. The market price for the final quarter of each
year is calculated from annual data (Cameco, 2012b) weighted by sales volumes. Nominal
values given in Canadian dollar are converted to real (2012) U.S. dollar using Canadian
to U.S. dollar exchange rates (Bank of Canada, 2014a, Cameco, 2012b) and Canadian
Consumer Price Indices (OECD, 2013).
Market price of reproducible input labor, WL
The market price of reproducible input labor in Canada is based on two data sources.
Average weekly wage rates for Saskatchewan for forestry, fishing, mining, quarrying, oil
and gas (North American Industry Classification System) (Statistics Canada, 2013a)
are converted using Canadian to U.S. dollar exchange rates (Bank of Canada, 2014a,
Cameco, 2012b) and U.S. Consumer Price Indices (OECD, 2013). Supplementary ben-
efits are received by calculating the share of supplementary benefits in monthly wages
from Statistics Canada (2012) and scaling the converted average weekly wage rates ac-
cordingly.
Quantity of labor, XL
Annual data for direct employment in uranium mining operations in Canada is taken
from Nuclear Energy Agency (2011). Data for Cameco are obtained by scaling total
numbers using ownership shares for mining operations and assuming an equal distribu-
tion of changes among seasons.
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Market price of reproducible input capital, WK
Following Ellis and Halvorsen (2002), we calculate the price of capital as the product
of the producer price index (PPI, for the mining industry if available), the sum of the
depreciation rate (assumed to be at 10%) and the real rate of interest. We derive market
prices for capital for Canada using the Machinery and Equipment Price Index (MEPI)
for mines, quarries and oil wells (Statistics Canada, 2013b) as well as real interest rates
calculated from data for selected Canadian 10-year bond yields (Bank of Canada, 2014b)
and Canadian consumer price indices (OECD, 2013).
Quantity of capital, XK
Quantity of capital is derived via the perpetual inventory method. Year-end net value
of property for the year 1996 as well as quarterly capital expenditures are taken from
Cameco (2012a) and Cameco (2012b). Depreciation rates are assumed to be 10% and
the producer price index is the Machinery and Equipment Price Index (MEPI) for mines,
quarries and oil wells (Statistics Canada, 2013b). Exchange rates are from ABS (2014a)
and X-RATES (2014).
Proven reserves, S
There are numerous classification schemes for uranium reserves and resources. We utilize
definitions used by Nuclear Energy Agency (2011) and Cameco (2012a) and focus on
proven reserves. Cameco (2012a) covers annual data for uranium reserves and resources.
Quarterly values are imputed as described in Section 2.5.
Recycling of military warheads, YMFM
Annual data for the “Megatons to Megawatts” quantities are given by Centrus (2014).
We assume an equal distribution of quantities among quarters.
Global thermal capacity of nuclear power plants, YCAP
Global thermal capacity of nuclear power plants are calculated from plant characteristics,
and commissioning and decommissioning dates taken from International Atomic Energy
Agency (2013).
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Global inventories, YINV
Inventory data is, generally speaking, not publicly available. Nuclear Energy Agency
(2011) includes graphical information on global uranium production and demand from
1945 (i.e., approximately ten years prior to the commissioning of the first nuclear reactor)
up to 2011. The difference between total production and demand approximates global
uranium inventories. Quarterly values are obtained from annual data from Nuclear
Energy Agency (2011) using cubic splines.
Australian market prices for capital, VKAU
Australian capital prices are obtained using PPI for the (coal) mining industry from ABS
(2014d). Real (2012) rate of interest results from data for Commonwealth Government
10-year bonds (Reserve Bank of Australia, 2014) and inflation rates are calculated using
ABS (2014c).
Kazakh market prices for capital, VKKZ
Capital prices for Kazakhstan are based on the general PPI data from UNECE (2014).
Using the Kazakh corporate bonds index KASE BY (KASE, 2014b) and CPI data from
UNECE (2014), real (2012) interest rates are calculated.
Australian market prices for labor, VLAU
Data for Australian mining operations is taken from ABS (2014b). In order to convert
the data to real (2012) U.S. dollar values, exchange rates from ABS (2014a) are used for
January 2002 to March 2012. April 2012 to December 2012 are covered by X-RATES
(2014). Both time series are weighted for quarterly values and adjusted using ABS
(2014c).
Kazakh market prices for labor, VLKZ
Kazakh mining industry monthly wage data for the years 2008 to 2012 is obtained from
the Agency of Kazakhstan of Statistics (2014a). As sector-specific data is unavailable
for years prior to 2008, we approximate mining wage data using changes in average wage
statistics (Agency of Kazakhstan of Statistics, 2014c). Correlation between both series
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is shown via OLS estimation for overlapping observations (values in brackets represent
t-values):
avg. wage mining industry = −1.128× 104
(−1.951)
+ 1.993
(27.924)
avg. wage.
Assuming strong correlation between GDP and wage growth (Warner et al., 2006, e.g.)
and further decreasing unemployment with growth in GDP, we approximate mining sec-
tor wage data for Kazakhstan using Kazakh labor statistics for changes in unemployment
(Agency of Kazakhstan of Statistics, 2014b). Again, correlation between both series is
shown via OLS estimation for overlapping observations (values in brackets represent
t-values):
avg. wage mining industry = 4.901× 105
(32.64)
−671.36
(−25.91)
unemployed population in thousands.
Real (2012) values are obtained by conversion using KASE (2014a) and UNECE (2014).
Australian proven reserves, VSAU
Australian annual data is taken from Australia (2013). Quarterly values are assumed to
be identical to annual values.
Kazakh proven reserves, VSKZ
Rempel et al. (2013) include annual data on Kazakh uranium reserves. Quarterly values
are assumed to be identical to annual values.
Canadian interest rate, r˜
See Market price of reproducible input capital.
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B.1 The open-loop model
B.1.1 Solving the general open-loop Cournot model
Proof of Theorem 3.1. The problem can be rewritten as a variational inequality (VI).
For this define
xtj = (x
t
1,j , x
t
2,j), G
t
i,j(x
t
j) = δi,j − [atj − b · (xti,j + xt−i,j)] + b · xti,j
xt = (xt1, x
t
2), G
t
i(x
t) = (Gti,1(x
t
1), G
t
i,2(x
t
2))
Gt(xt) = (Gt1(x
t), Gt2(x
t))
x = (x1, ..., xT ), G(x) = (G1(x1), ..., GT (xT ))
y = (y1, y2), k = (k1, k2), F (y, x) = (k,G(x)).
and let Z denote the set of feasible (y, x).
G(x) is strictly monotone, as
[Gt(xt,1)−Gt(xt,2)](xt,1 − xt,2)ᵀ
=
∑
j
b(xt,11,j − xt,21,j , xt,12,j − xt,22,j)
(
2 1
1 2
)
(xt,11,j − xt,21,j , xt,12,j − xt,22,j)ᵀ > 0
for xt,1 6= xt,2. Similarly, F (y, x) is monotone, as
[F (y1, x1)− F (y2, x2)]
(
y1 − y2
x1 − x2
)
= (0, 0, G(y1, x1)−G(y2, x2))

y11 − y21
y12 − y22
x1 − x2

= (G(y1, x1)−G(y2, x2))(x1 − x2) ≥ 0
and > 0 when x1 6= x2.
The open-loop problem can now be stated in terms of a VI as follows:
Find (y∗, x∗) with cap0i + y
∗
i −
∑
j x
t∗
i,j ≥ 0, xt∗i,j ≥ 0 satisfying
F (y∗, x∗)(y − y∗, x− x∗)ᵀ ≥ 0
for all (y, x) with cap0i + yi −
∑
j x
t
i,j ≥ 0, xti,j ≥ 0.
As 0 ≤ xti,j ≤
atj
b and yi ≤ 2 max
atj
b , the VI is defined over a convex and bounded set.
From this together with the continuity of F , existence follows from the general theory
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on VIs. Uniqueness in x is guaranteed by the monotonicity of G(x) and uniqueness in y
follows since yi = maxt
(∑
j x
t
i,j − cap0i
)
.
B.1.2 Solving the one-period open-loop Cournot model with no given
capacities to the players
In the one-period open-loop Cournot model with no given capacities available to the
players, the short-term KKT conditions simplify to
0 ≤ δi,j − [aj − b · (xi,j + x−i,j)] + b · xi,j + λi ⊥ xi,j ≥ 0, ∀i, j
0 ≤ yi −
∑
j
xi,j ⊥ λi ≥ 0, ∀i.
The long-term KKT conditions are given by
0 ≤ ki − λi ⊥ yi ≥ 0, ∀i.
From the long-term KKT condition it follows that in the one-period case all capacity is
fully utilized. Closed-form solutions are obtained by distinguishing the following cases,
leaving aside symmetric cases:
 Both players produce and supply both markets, i.e., xij > 0 for all i, j:
When solving the resulting system of equations, it follows
xi,j =
aj + δ−i,j − 2δi,j + k−i − 2ki
3b
.
 Player 1 supplies both markets, player 2 only market 1, i.e., x1,1 > 0, x1,2 > 0,
x2,1 > 0 and x2,2 = 0:
When solving the resulting system of equations, it follows
x1,2 =
a2 − δ1,2 − k1
2b
and x2,2 = 0,
xi,1 =
a1 + δ−i,1 − 2δi,1 + k−i − 2ki
3b
.
 Player 1 supplies both markets, player 2 none, i.e., x1,1 > 0, x1,2 > 0, x2,1 = 0 and
x2,2 = 0:
When solving the resulting system of equations, it follows
x1,j =
aj − δ1,j − k1
2b
,
x2,j = 0.
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 Player 1 supplies market 1, player 2 supplies market 2, i.e., x1,1 > 0, x1,2 = 0,
x2,1 = 0 and x2,2 > 0:
When solving the resulting system of equations, it follows
x1,1 =
a1 − δ1,1 − k1
2b
and x1,2 = 0,
x2,2 =
a2 − δ2,2 − k2
2b
and x2,1 = 0.
 Player 1 supplies market 1, player 2 none, i.e., x1,1 > 0, x1,2 = 0, x2,1 = 0 and
x2,2 = 0:
When solving the resulting system of equations, it follows
x1,1 =
a1 − δ1,1 − k1
2b
and x1,2 = 0,
x2,j = 0.
 No player supplies, i.e., xi,j = 0 for all i, j.
B.1.3 Solving the multi-period open-loop Cournot model
In the multi-period open-loop Cournot model with no existing capacity available to the
players, time points in which the capacity constraint is binding, termed TB, have to be
distinguished from those in which it is not binding. Any solution to the optimization
problem then satisfies the short-term Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions
0 ≤ δi,j − [atj − b · (xti,j + xt−i,j)] + b · xti,j + λti ⊥ xti,j ≥ 0, ∀i, j, t ∈ TB
0 ≤ δi,j − [atj − b · (xti,j + xt−i,j)] + b · xti,j ⊥ xti,j ≥ 0, ∀i, j, t /∈ TB
0 = yi −
∑
j
xti,j , ∀i, t ∈ TB
0 ≤ yi −
∑
j
xti,j ⊥ λti ≥ 0, ∀i, t /∈ TB
as well as the long-term KKT conditions
0 ≤ ki −
∑
t∈TB
λti ⊥ yi ≥ 0, ∀i.
Again, it is possible to obtain closed-form solutions for the multi-period open-loop
Cournot model using similar case analysis as for the one-period model. See Wogrin
et al. (2013b) for additional technicalities of this procedure.
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B.2 Comparing the open-loop and closed-loop Cournot
model
Proof of Lemma 3.2. The xti,j(y) are unique for all y as for a given investment vector
y the second stage problem is just a series of spatial, single stage Cournot games. The
xti,j(y) are continuous in y from which right and left-differentiability in the components
follows.
Proof of Lemma 3.4. The claim follows by taking derivatives in the following cases:
1. Both players produce and supply both markets, i.e., xti,j > 0 for all i, j
(1a) Both players produce at full capacity, i.e.,
0 < xt1,1 + x
t
1,2 = cap
0
1 + y1 and λ
t
1 ≥ 0 : δt1,1 − at1 + 2b · xt1,1 + b · xt2,1 + λt1 = 0
δt1,2 − at2 + 2b · xt1,2 + b · xt2,2 + λt1 = 0
0 < xt2,1 + x
t
2,2 = cap
0
2 + y2 and λ
t
2 ≥ 0 : δt2,1 − at1 + 2b · xt2,1 + b · xt1,1 + λt2 = 0
δt2,2 − at2 + 2b · xt2,2 + b · xt1,2 + λt2 = 0
(1b) Both players do not produce at full capacity, i.e.,
0 < xt1,1 + x
t
1,2 < cap
0
1 + y1 ⇒ λt1 = 0 : δt1,1 − at1 + 2b · xt1,1 + b · xt2,1 = 0
δt1,2 − at2 + 2b · xt1,2 + b · xt2,2 = 0
0 < xt2,1 + x
t
2,2 < cap
0
2 + y2 ⇒ λt2 = 0 : δt2,1 − at1 + 2b · xt2,1 + b · xt1,1 = 0
δt2,2 − at2 + 2b · xt2,2 + b · xt1,2 = 0
(1c) Player 1 produces at full capacity, player 2 does not, i.e.,
0 < xt1,1 + x
t
1,2 = cap
0
1 + y1 and λ
t
1 ≥ 0 : δt1,1 − at1 + 2b · xt1,1 + b · xt2,1 + λt1 = 0
δt1,2 − at2 + 2b · xt1,2 + b · xt2,2 + λt1 = 0
0 < xt2,1 + x
t
2,2 < cap
0
2 + y2 ⇒ λt2 = 0 : δt2,1 − at1 + 2b · xt2,1 + b · xt1,1 = 0
δt2,2 − at2 + 2b · xt2,2 + b · xt1,2 = 0
Appendix B. Supplementary Material for Chapter 3 126
(1d) Player 1 does not produce at full capacity, player 2 does, i.e.,
0 < xt1,1 + x
t
1,2 < cap
0
1 + y1 ⇒ λt1 = 0 : δt1,1 − at1 + 2b · xt1,1 + b · xt2,1 = 0
δt1,2 − at2 + 2b · xt1,2 + b · xt2,2 = 0
0 < xt2,1 + x
t
2,2 = cap
0
2 + y2 and λ
t
2 ≥ 0 : δt2,1 − at1 + 2b · xt2,1 + b · xt1,1 + λt2 = 0
δt2,2 − at2 + 2b · xt2,2 + b · xt1,2 + λt2 = 0
2. Player 1 supplies both markets, player 2 only market 1, i.e., xt1,1 > 0, x
t
1,2 > 0,
xt2,1 > 0 and x
t
2,2 = 0
(2a) Both players produce at full capacity, i.e.,
0 < xt1,1 + x
t
1,2 = cap
0
1 + y1 and λ
t
1 ≥ 0 : δt1,1 − at1 + 2b · xt1,1 + b · xt2,1 + λt1 = 0
δt1,2 − at2 + 2b · xt1,2 + λt1 = 0
0 < xt2,1 = cap
0
2 + y2 and λ
t
2 ≥ 0 : δt2,1 − at1 + 2b · xt2,1 + b · xt1,1 + λt2 = 0
δt2,2 − at2 + b · xt1,2 + λt2 ≥ 0
(2b) Both players do not produce at full capacity, i.e.,
0 < xt1,1 + x
t
1,2 < cap
0
1 + y1 ⇒ λt1 = 0 : δt1,1 − at1 + 2b · xt1,1 + b · xt2,1 = 0
δt1,2 − at2 + 2b · xt1,2 = 0
0 < xt2,1 < cap
0
2 + y2 ⇒ λt2 = 0 : δt2,1 − at1 + 2b · xt2,1 + b · xt1,1 = 0
δt2,2 − at2 + b · xt1,2 ≥ 0
(2c) Player 1 produces at full capacity, player 2 does not, i.e.,
0 < xt1,1 + x
t
1,2 = cap
0
1 + y1 and λ
t
1 ≥ 0 : δt1,1 − at1 + 2b · xt1,1 + b · xt2,1 + λt1 = 0
δt1,2 − at2 + 2b · xt1,2 + λt1 = 0
0 < xt2,1 < cap
0
2 + y2 ⇒ λt2 = 0 : δt2,1 − at1 + 2b · xt2,1 + b · xt1,1 = 0
δt2,2 − at2 + b · xt1,2 ≥ 0
(2d) Player 1 does not produce at full capacity, player 2 does, i.e.,
0 < xt1,1 + x
t
1,2 < cap
0
1 + y1 ⇒ λt1 = 0 : δt1,1 − at1 + 2b · xt1,1 + b · xt2,1 = 0
δt1,2 − at2 + 2b · xt1,2 = 0
0 < xt2,1 = cap
0
2 + y2 and λ
t
2 ≥ 0 : δt2,1 − at1 + 2b · xt2,1 + b · xt1,1 + λt2 = 0
δt2,2 − at2 + b · xt1,2 + λt2 ≥ 0
Appendix B. Supplementary Material for Chapter 3 127
3. Player 1 supplies both markets, player 2 none, i.e., xt1,1 > 0, x
t
1,2 > 0, x
t
2,1 = 0 and
xt2,2 = 0
(3a) Player 1 produces at full capacity, player 2 does at zero, i.e.,
0 < xt1,1 + x
t
1,2 = cap
0
1 + y1 and λ
t
1 ≥ 0 : δt1,1 − at1 + 2b · xt1,1 + λt1 = 0
δt1,2 − at2 + 2b · xt1,2 + λt1 = 0
0 = cap02 + y2 and λ
t
2 ≥ 0 : δt2,1 − at1 + b · xt1,1 + λt2 ≥ 0
δt2,2 − at2 + b · xt1,2 + λt2 ≥ 0
(3b) Both players do not produce at full capacity, i.e.,
0 < xt1,1 + x
t
1,2 < cap
0
1 + y1 ⇒ λt1 = 0 : δt1,1 − at1 + 2b · xt1,1 = 0
δt1,2 − at2 + 2b · xt1,2 = 0
0 < cap02 + y2 ⇒ λt2 = 0 : δt2,1 − at1 + b · xt1,1 ≥ 0
δt2,2 − at2 + b · xt1,2 ≥ 0
(3c) Player 1 produces at full capacity, player 2 does not, i.e.,
0 < xt1,1 + x
t
1,2 = cap
0
1 + y1 and λ
t
1 ≥ 0 : δt1,1 − at1 + 2b · xt1,1 + λt1 = 0
δt1,2 − at2 + 2b · xt1,2 + λt1 = 0
0 < cap02 + y2 ⇒ λt2 = 0 : δt2,1 − at1 + b · xt1,1 ≥ 0
δt2,2 − at2 + b · xt1,2 ≥ 0
(3d) Player 1 does not produce at full capacity, player 2 does at zero, i.e.,
0 < xt1,1 + x
t
1,2 < cap
0
1 + y1 ⇒ λt1 = 0 : δt1,1 − at1 + 2b · xt1,1 = 0
δt1,2 − at2 + 2b · xt1,2 = 0
0 = cap02 + y2 and λ
t
2 ≥ 0 : δt2,1 − at1 + b · xt1,1 + λt2 ≥ 0
δt2,2 − at2 + b · xt1,2 + λt2 ≥ 0
4. Player 1 supplies market 1, player 2 supplies market 2, i.e., xt1,1 > 0, x
t
1,2 = 0,
xt2,1 = 0 and x
t
2,2 > 0
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(4a) Both players produce at full capacity, i.e.,
0 < xt1,1 = cap
0
1 + y1 and λ
t
1 ≥ 0 : δt1,1 − at1 + 2b · xt1,1 + λt1 = 0
δt1,2 − at2 + b · xt2,2 + λt1 ≥ 0
0 < xt2,2 = cap
0
2 + y2 and λ
t
2 ≥ 0 : δt2,1 − at1 + b · xt1,1 + λt2 ≥ 0
δt2,2 − at2 + 2b · xt2,2 + λt2 = 0
(4b) Both players do not produce at full capacity, i.e.,
0 < xt1,1 < cap
0
1 + y1 ⇒ λt1 = 0 : δt1,1 − at1 + 2b · xt1,1 = 0
δt1,2 − at2 + b · xt2,2 ≥ 0
0 < xt2,2 < cap
0
2 + y2 ⇒ λt2 = 0 : δt2,1 − at1 + b · xt1,1 ≥ 0
δt2,2 − at2 + 2b · xt2,2 = 0
(4c) Player 1 produces at full capacity, player 2 does not, i.e.,
0 < xt1,1 = cap
0
1 + y1 and λ
t
1 ≥ 0 : δt1,1 − at1 + 2b · xt1,1 + λt1 = 0
δt1,2 − at2 + b · xt2,2 + λt1 ≥ 0
0 < xt2,2 < cap
0
2 + y2 ⇒ λt2 = 0 : δt2,1 − at1 + b · xt1,1 ≥ 0
δt2,2 − at2 + 2b · xt2,2 = 0
(4d) Player 1 does not produce at full capacity, player 2 does, i.e.,
0 < xt1,1 < cap
0
1 + y1 ⇒ λt1 = 0 : δt1,1 − at1 + 2b · xt1,1 = 0
δt1,2 − at2 + b · xt2,2 ≥ 0
0 < xt2,2 = cap
0
2 + y2 and λ
t
2 ≥ 0 : δt2,1 − at1 + b · xt1,1 + λt2 ≥ 0
δt2,2 − at2 + 2b · xt2,2 + λt2 = 0
5. Player 1 supplies market 1, player 2 does not supply, i.e., xt1,1 > 0, x
t
1,2 = 0,
xt2,1 = 0 and x
t
2,2 = 0
(5a) Both players produce at full capacity, i.e.,
0 < xt1,1 = cap
0
1 + y1 and λ
t
1 ≥ 0 : δt1,1 − at1 + 2b · xt1,1 + λt1 = 0
δt1,2 − at2 + λt1 ≥ 0
0 = cap02 + y2 and λ
t
2 ≥ 0 : δt2,1 − at1 + b · xt1,1 + λt2 ≥ 0
δt2,2 − at2 + λt2 ≥ 0
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(5b) Both players do not produce at full capacity, i.e.,
0 < xt1,1 < cap
0
1 + y1 ⇒ λt1 = 0 : δt1,1 − at1 + 2b · xt1,1 = 0
δt1,2 − at2 ≥ 0
0 < cap02 + y2 ⇒ λt2 = 0 : δt2,1 − at1 + b · xt1,1 ≥ 0
δt2,2 − at2 ≥ 0
(5c) Player 1 produces at full capacity, player 2 does not, i.e.,
0 < xt1,1 = cap
0
1 + y1 and λ
t
1 ≥ 0 : δt1,1 − at1 + 2b · xt1,1 + λt1 = 0
δt1,2 − at2 + λt1 ≥ 0
0 < cap02 + y2 ⇒ λt2 = 0 : δt2,1 − at1 + b · xt1,1 ≥ 0
δt2,2 − at2 ≥ 0
(5d) Player 1 does not produce at full capacity, player 2 does, i.e.,
0 < xt1,1 < cap
0
1 + y1 ⇒ λt1 = 0 : δt1,1 − at1 + 2b · xt1,1 = 0
δt1,2 − at2 ≥ 0
0 = cap02 + y2 and λ
t
2 ≥ 0 : δt2,1 − at1 + b · xt1,1 + λt2 ≥ 0
δt2,2 − at2 + λt2 ≥ 0
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C.1 Data Appendix
Table C.1: Distance
from to distance [Nautical miles]
United States Europe-Atlantic 3,387
Asia-Pacific 10,978
Australia Europe-Atlantic 11,626
Asia-Pacific 3,731
Canada Europe-Atlantic 8,840
Asia-Pacific 4,227
Fringe Europe-Atlantic 5,018
Asia-Pacific 3,037
Table C.2: Reference Demand and Reference Price
Market Reference Demand [Mt] Reference Price [US$/t]
Europe-Atlantic 96 180
Asia-Pacific 179 180
C.2 An analytical example
We provide an intuition for the results presented in this paper by solving analytically a
simplified model consisting of one market and two players. Player I is the incumbent
in the market and has infinite existing capacity. Player E is the entrant to the market
owning no existing capacity. The entrant can invest at cost k per unit, whereas the
incumbent may not invest. Both players produce at variable production costs c and
there are no transportation costs to the market. There is only one time period and the
inverse residual demand curve for this period is given by P = a− (xI + xE).
We solve both the open-loop and the closed-loop model for this simplified setting and
show that there is an incentive for the players in the closed-loop model to deviate from
their open-loop equilibrium quantities.38
38We restrict our attention to parameter settings in which both players produce. This restriction is
adequate for the objective at hand, namely to provide intuition for the main results in the paper.
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The open-loop model
In the open-loop model, the entrant’s optimization problem is given by
max
xE ,yE
P · xE − c · xE − k · yE
subject to
yE − xE ≥ 0 (λE),
xE ≥ 0,
yE ≥ 0.
From the corresponding KKT conditions, it is easy to see that in an open-loop equilib-
rium the capacity of the entrant is fully utilized, i.e., yE = xE . Therefore the optimiza-
tion problem may be simplified to
max
xE≥0
P · xE − (c+ k) · xE .
Taking the derivative with respect to xE , we obtain the first order condition
a− 2xE − xI − (c+ k) = 0
from which we obtain the entrant’s reaction curve
xE =
a− (c+ k)− xI
2
.
The incumbent faces a different optimization problem, as he may not invest but has
infinite existing capacity. The incumbent’s optimization problem is hence given by
max
xI≥0
P · xI − c · xI
which yields, when taking the derivative with respect to xI , the first order condition
a− 2xI − xE − c = 0.
The first order condition can be solved for xI to obtain the incumbent’s reaction curve
xI =
a− c− xE
2
.
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Solving the system of equations consisting of the two reaction curves for the players’
supply quantities, we obtain
xI =
a− c+ k
3
and
xE =
a− c− 2k
3
,
which is the solution to the open-loop model if the non-negativity conditions for xI and
xE are fulfilled.
The closed-loop model
In order to solve the closed-loop model we use backward induction. For this let yE
denote the first stage investment volume of the entrant. The entrant’s second stage
optimization problem is then given by
max
xE≥0
P · xE − c · xE
subject to
yE − xE ≥ 0 (λE).
The Lagrangian to this optimization problem is given by
L = P · xE − c · xE + λE · (yE − xE)
from which the KKT conditions follow:
xE =
a− (c+ λE)− xI
2
,
0 ≤ λE ⊥ yE − xE ≥ 0.
The incumbent faces the optimization problem
max
xI≥0
P · xI − c · xI
which yields, as in the open-loop model, the reaction curve
xI =
a− c− xE
2
.
By inserting this in the above KKT condition we obtain the expression
xE =
a− c− 2λE
3
.
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The first stage optimization problem of the entrant is then given by
max
yE≥0
P · xE − c · xE − k · yE
subject to
xE =
a− c− 2λE
3
0 ≤ λE ⊥ yE − xE ≥ 0,
xI =
a− c− xE
2
.
Consider the case in which the capacity of the entrant is fully utilized, i.e., xE = yE . In
this case the optimization problem may be simplified to
max
yE≥0
P · yE − (c+ k) · yE
subject to
a− c
3
− yE ≥ 0 (µE),
xI =
a− c− yE
2
.
The Lagrangian to this optimization problem is given by
L =
[
a−
(
yE +
a− c− yE
2
)]
· yE − (c+ k) · yE + µE ·
(
a− c
3
− yE
)
from which the KKT conditions follow:
yE =
a− c− 2k − 2µE
2
,
0 ≤ µE ⊥ a− c
3
− yE ≥ 0.
In case of µE > 0, we obtain
yE = xE = xI =
a− c
3
and λE = 0.
39
This is indeed a solution in case
µE =
a− c− 2k − 2yE
2
=
a− c
6
− k > 0.
39This is also the limiting case for xE < yE .
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In case of µE = 0, we obtain
yE = xE =
a− c− 2k
2
and
xI =
a− c+ 2k
4
.
which is a solution if
λE =
a− c− 3yE
2
≥ 0
and
yE ≤ a− c
3
.
Conclusion
These simple calculations show that the investment in the closed-loop model is higher
than in the open-loop model for the entrant as
a− c− 2k
2
≥ a− c− 2k
3
and
a− c
3
≥ a− c− 2k
3
.
We conclude that there is an incentive for the players in the closed-loop game to deviate
from the open-loop equilibrium. Further investigation of the above considered cases also
shows that the total supply is higher and prices are lower in the closed-loop model than
in the open-loop model.
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D.1 Data Appendix
Table D.1: Accumulated (discounted) system cost differences differentiated by cost
categories in bn e 2010 (2010-2050): Cost of uncertainty – 15y prolongation
State
Prob-
ability
Region
Invest
Costs
Fixed
O&M
Costs
Var.
Costs
Trade Balance
(Import Costs -
Export Revenues)
Net
Difference
S1 low Fr 0.2 -0.1 -1.3 1.1 -0.2
S1 low EU excl. Fr 0.2 -0.1 1.2 -1.1 0.2
S1 low EU incl. Fr 0.4 -0.2 -0.2 0.0 0.1
S1 medium Fr 0.2 -0.1 -1.4 1.2 -0.1
S1 medium EU excl. Fr 0.2 -0.1 1.3 -1.2 0.2
S1 medium EU incl. Fr 0.4 -0.2 -0.1 0.0 0.1
S1 high Fr 0.1 -0.1 -1.1 0.9 -0.1
S1 high EU excl. Fr 0.2 -0.1 0.9 -0.9 0.2
S1 high EU incl. Fr 0.3 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.0
S2 low Fr -1.0 -0.4 0.7 1.2 0.5
S2 low EU excl. Fr 0.1 -0.2 1.4 -1.3 0.0
S2 low EU incl. Fr -1.0 -0.6 2.1 0.0 0.5
S2 medium Fr -0.7 -0.3 0.5 0.8 0.3
S2 medium EU excl. Fr 0.0 -0.1 1.0 -0.8 0.0
S2 medium EU incl. Fr -0.7 -0.4 1.5 0.0 0.3
S2 high Fr -0.4 -0.1 0.4 0.3 0.1
S2 high EU excl. Fr 0.0 -0.1 0.4 -0.3 0.0
S2 high EU incl. Fr -0.4 -0.2 0.8 0.0 0.2
S3 low Fr -1.0 -0.5 0.1 1.6 0.2
S3 low EU excl. Fr 0.1 0.0 1.7 -1.6 0.2
S3 low EU incl. Fr -0.9 -0.5 1.8 0.0 0.4
S3 medium Fr -0.6 -0.3 0.0 1.1 0.1
S3 medium EU excl. Fr -0.1 0.0 1.3 -1.1 0.2
S3 medium EU incl. Fr -0.7 -0.4 1.4 0.0 0.3
S3 high Fr -0.4 -0.2 0.2 0.5 0.1
S3 high EU excl. Fr 0.0 0.0 0.5 -0.4 0.0
S3 high EU incl. Fr -0.4 -0.2 0.8 0.0 0.2
S4 low Fr 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
S4 low EU excl. Fr 0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0
S4 low EU incl. Fr 0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0
S4 medium Fr 0.3 0.2 -0.1 -0.3 0.1
S4 medium EU excl. Fr 0.0 0.0 -0.4 0.3 -0.1
S4 medium EU incl. Fr 0.3 0.2 -0.5 0.0 0.0
S4 high Fr 0.5 0.4 0.1 -0.8 0.2
S4 high EU excl. Fr 0.0 0.0 -1.1 0.8 -0.2
S4 high EU incl. Fr 0.6 0.4 -1.0 0.0 0.0
S5 low Fr 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
S5 low EU excl. Fr 0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0
S5 low EU incl. Fr 0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0
S5 medium Fr 0.3 0.2 -0.1 -0.3 0.1
S5 medium EU excl. Fr -0.1 0.0 -0.4 0.3 -0.1
S5 medium EU incl. Fr 0.2 0.2 -0.5 0.0 0.0
S5 high Fr 0.5 0.4 0.1 -0.8 0.2
S5 high EU excl. Fr 0.0 0.0 -1.1 0.8 -0.2
S5 high EU incl. Fr 0.6 0.4 -1.0 0.0 0.0
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Table D.2: Accumulated (discounted) system cost differences differentiated by cost
categories in bn e 2010 (2010-2050): Cost of uncertainty – 0y prolongation
State
Prob-
ability
Region
Invest
Costs
Fixed
O&M
Costs
Var.
Costs
Trade Balance
(Import Costs -
Export Revenues)
Net
Difference
S1 low Fr 0.4 -0.2 0.2 -0.3 0.1
S1 low EU excl. Fr 0.3 -0.2 0.0 0.2 0.3
S1 low EU incl. Fr 0.6 -0.4 0.1 0.0 0.4
S1 medium Fr 0.2 -0.2 0.4 -0.3 0.1
S1 medium EU excl. Fr 0.2 -0.2 -0.1 0.2 0.2
S1 medium EU incl. Fr 0.4 -0.4 0.3 0.0 0.3
S1 high Fr 0.0 0.0 0.6 -0.7 -0.1
S1 high EU excl. Fr 0.1 -0.2 -0.4 0.7 0.1
S1 high EU incl. Fr 0.1 -0.2 0.2 0.0 0.1
S2 low Fr 1.8 0.4 -1.0 -1.0 0.2
S2 low EU excl. Fr -0.2 -0.1 -0.5 0.9 0.1
S2 low EU incl. Fr 1.6 0.3 -1.5 0.0 0.3
S2 medium Fr 1.5 0.3 -0.8 -0.9 0.2
S2 medium EU excl. Fr -0.2 -0.1 -0.5 0.8 0.0
S2 medium EU incl. Fr 1.2 0.3 -1.3 0.0 0.2
S2 high Fr 1.4 0.4 -0.5 -1.1 0.3
S2 high EU excl. Fr -0.2 -0.1 -0.8 1.1 0.0
S2 high EU incl. Fr 1.2 0.3 -1.3 0.0 0.2
S3 low Fr 1.8 0.6 0.7 -2.5 0.6
S3 low EU excl. Fr -1.2 -0.3 -1.1 2.5 -0.1
S3 low EU incl. Fr 0.6 0.3 -0.3 0.0 0.5
S3 medium Fr 1.5 0.4 0.8 -2.1 0.6
S3 medium EU excl. Fr -0.9 -0.3 -1.1 2.1 -0.2
S3 medium EU incl. Fr 0.5 0.2 -0.2 0.0 0.4
S3 high Fr 1.3 0.4 1.1 -2.1 0.7
S3 high EU excl. Fr -0.7 -0.2 -1.5 2.1 -0.2
S3 high EU incl. Fr 0.6 0.3 -0.4 0.0 0.4
S4 low Fr 0.6 0.2 0.5 -1.0 0.3
S4 low EU excl. Fr -0.4 -0.1 -0.5 1.0 -0.1
S4 low EU incl. Fr 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.3
S4 medium Fr 0.4 0.0 0.8 -0.8 0.4
S4 medium EU excl. Fr -0.3 -0.1 -0.6 0.8 -0.1
S4 medium EU incl. Fr 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.3
S4 high Fr 0.4 0.1 1.2 -1.1 0.6
S4 high EU excl. Fr 0.0 0.0 -1.4 1.1 -0.3
S4 high EU incl. Fr 0.3 0.1 -0.2 0.0 0.3
S5 low Fr -0.3 -0.2 0.4 0.1 0.1
S5 low EU excl. Fr 0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0
S5 low EU incl. Fr -0.2 -0.1 0.4 0.0 0.1
S5 medium Fr -0.5 -0.3 0.7 0.4 0.3
S5 medium EU excl. Fr 0.3 0.1 -0.2 -0.4 -0.1
S5 medium EU incl. Fr -0.2 -0.2 0.5 0.0 0.2
S5 high Fr -0.5 -0.3 1.1 0.2 0.5
S5 high EU excl. Fr 0.6 0.2 -1.0 -0.1 -0.2
S5 high EU incl. Fr 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2
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Table D.3: Accumulated (discounted) system cost differences differentiated by cost
categories in bn e 2010 (2010-2050): Cost of uncertainty – 15y w/o prolongation
State
Prob-
ability
Region
Invest
Costs
Fixed
O&M
Costs
Var.
Costs
Trade Balance
(Import Costs -
Export Revenues)
Net
Difference
S1 low Fr 0.1 0.0 0.2 -0.2 0.0
S1 low EU excl. Fr 0.1 -0.1 -0.3 0.2 0.0
S1 low EU incl. Fr 0.2 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.0
S1 medium Fr 0.0 0.0 0.1 -0.1 0.0
S1 medium EU excl. Fr 0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.1 0.0
S1 medium EU incl. Fr 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
S1 high Fr 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
S1 high EU excl. Fr 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
S1 high EU incl. Fr 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
S2 low Fr 0.1 0.0 0.2 -0.3 0.0
S2 low EU excl. Fr 0.0 -0.1 -0.2 0.3 0.1
S2 low EU incl. Fr 0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
S2 medium Fr 0.0 0.0 0.1 -0.1 0.0
S2 medium EU excl. Fr 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0
S2 medium EU incl. Fr 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
S2 high Fr 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0
S2 high EU excl. Fr 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0
S2 high EU incl. Fr 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0
S3 low Fr 2.6 0.3 -0.8 -2.5 -0.4
S3 low EU excl. Fr -0.2 0.1 -2.2 2.5 0.2
S3 low EU incl. Fr 2.4 0.3 -2.9 0.0 -0.2
S3 medium Fr 2.2 0.3 -0.6 -2.2 -0.4
S3 medium EU excl. Fr -0.1 0.1 -2.0 2.2 0.2
S3 medium EU incl. Fr 2.1 0.3 -2.6 0.0 -0.2
S3 high Fr 1.6 0.2 -0.5 -1.6 -0.3
S3 high EU excl. Fr 0.0 0.1 -1.5 1.6 0.2
S3 high EU incl. Fr 1.6 0.3 -2.0 0.0 -0.2
S4 low Fr 1.4 0.2 0.0 -1.6 0.0
S4 low EU excl. Fr -0.8 -0.2 -0.7 1.6 -0.1
S4 low EU incl. Fr 0.5 0.0 -0.6 0.0 -0.1
S4 medium Fr 0.9 0.2 -0.1 -0.9 0.1
S4 medium EU excl. Fr -0.6 -0.1 -0.3 0.9 -0.1
S4 medium EU incl. Fr 0.3 0.0 -0.4 0.0 -0.1
S4 high Fr 0.1 0.0 -0.2 0.2 0.1
S4 high EU excl. Fr -0.3 -0.1 0.4 -0.1 -0.1
S4 high EU incl. Fr -0.1 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0
S5 low Fr -0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.3 0.0
S5 low EU excl. Fr 0.1 0.0 0.2 -0.3 0.0
S5 low EU incl. Fr -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0
S5 medium Fr -0.5 -0.1 -0.2 0.8 0.1
S5 medium EU excl. Fr 0.2 0.1 0.5 -0.8 0.0
S5 medium EU incl. Fr -0.3 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0
S5 high Fr -1.2 -0.2 -0.3 1.8 0.1
S5 high EU excl. Fr 0.6 0.2 1.0 -1.8 0.0
S5 high EU incl. Fr -0.6 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.1
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Table D.4: Accumulated (discounted) system cost differences differentiated by cost
categories in bn e 2010 (2010-2050): Cost of uncertainty – 0y w/o prolongation
State
Prob-
ability
Region
Invest
Costs
Fixed
O&M
Costs
Var.
Costs
Trade Balance
(Import Costs -
Export Revenues)
Net
Difference
S1 low Fr 0.0 0.0 0.6 -0.7 -0.1
S1 low EU excl. Fr 0.1 -0.2 -0.4 0.6 0.1
S1 low EU incl. Fr 0.1 -0.2 0.2 0.0 0.1
S1 medium Fr 0.0 0.0 0.5 -0.5 0.0
S1 medium EU excl. Fr 0.0 -0.2 -0.3 0.5 0.1
S1 medium EU incl. Fr 0.0 -0.2 0.2 0.0 0.1
S1 high Fr 0.0 0.0 0.3 -0.4 0.0
S1 high EU excl. Fr 0.0 -0.2 -0.1 0.4 0.1
S1 high EU incl. Fr 0.0 -0.1 0.2 0.0 0.0
S2 low Fr 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0
S2 low EU excl. Fr 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0
S2 low EU incl. Fr 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
S2 medium Fr 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
S2 medium EU excl. Fr 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0
S2 medium EU incl. Fr 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0
S2 high Fr 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.1 0.0
S2 high EU excl. Fr 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0
S2 high EU incl. Fr 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
S3 low Fr 9.0 1.0 -0.9 -5.4 3.7
S3 low EU excl. Fr -0.1 0.3 -5.3 5.5 0.3
S3 low EU incl. Fr 8.9 1.3 -6.2 0.0 4.0
S3 medium Fr 5.8 0.8 -1.0 -3.3 2.2
S3 medium EU excl. Fr -0.2 0.2 -3.3 3.3 0.0
S3 medium EU incl. Fr 5.6 0.9 -4.4 0.0 2.2
S3 high Fr 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0
S3 high EU excl. Fr 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0
S3 high EU incl. Fr 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0
S4 low Fr 15.5 1.2 -4.1 -7.6 5.0
S4 low EU excl. Fr -1.0 0.1 -6.5 7.7 0.3
S4 low EU incl. Fr 14.5 1.3 -10.6 0.0 5.2
S4 medium Fr 11.8 0.7 -4.6 -3.7 4.3
S4 medium EU excl. Fr -0.4 0.1 -3.4 3.7 0.1
S4 medium EU incl. Fr 11.4 0.9 -8.0 0.0 4.4
S4 high Fr -0.8 -0.3 -0.7 1.9 0.1
S4 high EU excl. Fr 0.4 0.2 1.3 -1.9 0.0
S4 high EU incl. Fr -0.3 -0.1 0.6 0.0 0.1
S5 low Fr -1.4 -0.2 -0.4 2.2 0.2
S5 low EU excl. Fr 0.6 0.2 1.4 -2.1 0.0
S5 low EU incl. Fr -0.8 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.2
S5 medium Fr -3.6 -0.7 -0.7 6.1 1.1
S5 medium EU excl. Fr 1.2 0.3 4.5 -6.1 -0.2
S5 medium EU incl. Fr -2.5 -0.4 3.7 0.0 0.9
S5 high Fr -9.3 -1.3 6.8 10.1 6.4
S5 high EU excl. Fr 1.5 0.2 7.9 -10.1 -0.5
S5 high EU incl. Fr -7.7 -1.1 14.7 0.0 5.8
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